driver violation in Pennsylvania

2025When a non-investigable vehicle offense has occurred, an officer must “articulate specific facts possessed by him at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the [Vehicle] Code.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010).

2023In such an instance, "it is encumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Code." Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 992 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1290-91 (Pa. Super. 2010)) (emphasis added).

2022In such an instance, “it is incumbent upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Motor Vehicle Code.” Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785 A.2d 983, 989 (Pa. 2001) (superseded by statute) (citation omitted); see also Chase, 960 A.2d at 116 (reaffirming Gleason’s probable cause standard for non-investigative detentions of suspected Vehicle Code violations.

2021In such an instance, “it is [incumbent] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the [Motor Vehicle] Code.” [Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785 A.2d 983, 989 (Pa. 2001) (superseded by statute) (citation omitted); see also] Chase, 960 A.2d at 116 (reaffirming Gleason’s probable cause standard for non- investigative detentions of suspected Vehicle Code violations).

1997In so doing, the court explained that the difference between the standard police must employ when stopping a vehicle for a violation of the Vehicle Code as announced in Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53 , 58- 59, 331 A.2d 414, 416-17 (1975), citing Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 115 , 307 A2d 875, 879 (1973), i.e., “probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation”, and the standard set forth by the legislature in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(a), i.e., “ar-ticulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation”, is purely semantic and a “distinction without a differenc

1997In so doing, the court explained that the difference between the standard police must employ when stopping a vehicle for a violation of the Vehicle Code as announced in Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53 , 58- 59, 331 A.2d 414, 416-17 (1975), citing Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 115 , 307 A2d 875, 879 (1973), i.e., “probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation”, and the standard set forth by the legislature in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(a), i.e., “ar-ticulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation”, is purely semantic and a “distinction without a differenc

2018In finding the stop of Appellant to be justified nevertheless, the [Superior Court] lowered the standard necessary for a proper vehicle stop as articulated by this Court in [Commonwealth v.] Whitmyer, 668 A.2d 1113 (Pa. 1995)]: If the alleged basis of a vehicular stop is to permit a determination whether there has been compliance with the Motor Vehicle Code of this Commonwealth, it is encumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of

2005At a minimum, with respect to this latter offense, the degree of erratic driving observed by Officer Strohl reasonably raised an inference that this provision of the Vehicle Code was being violated, sufficient to justify a stop and an investigation by the officer to determine the cause of the erratic driving. 8 Commonwealth v. Barkley, 234 Pa. Super. 503 , 341 A.2d 192 (1975) (finding that officer’s observations of defendant weaving four or five times over approximately two miles provided officer with probable cause to believe the driver was in violation of this section of the Vehicle Code); c

2005With these constitutional protections in mind regarding a traffic stop, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has provided the following guidance: “If the alleged basis of a vehicular stop is to permit a determination whether there has been compliance with the Motor Vehicle Code of this Commonwealth, it is in cumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Code.” Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 550 , 668 A.2d 11

2005With these constitutional protections in mind regarding a traffic stop, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has provided the following guidance: “If the alleged basis of a vehicular stop is to permit a determination whether there has been compliance with the Motor Vehicle Code of this Commonwealth, it is in cumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Code.” Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 550 , 668 A.2d 11

2022In such an instance, “it is incumbent upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Motor Vehicle Code.” Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785 A.2d 983, 989 (Pa. 2001) (superseded by statute) (citation omitted); see also Chase, 960 A.2d at 116 (reaffirming Gleason’s probable cause standard for non-investigative detentions of suspected Vehicle Code violations.

2021In such an instance, “it is [incumbent] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the [Motor Vehicle] Code.” [Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785 A.2d 983, 989 (Pa. 2001) (superseded by statute) (citation omitted); see also] Chase, 960 A.2d at 116 (reaffirming Gleason’s probable cause standard for non- investigative detentions of suspected Vehicle Code violations).

2023“Accordingly, when considering whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the nature of the violation has to be considered.” Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa. Super. 2015).

2023In such an instance, "it is encumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Code." Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 992 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1290-91 (Pa. Super. 2010)) (emphasis added).

2017“The officer must be able to articulate specific facts possessed by him at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Vehicle Code.” Commonwealth v. Lindblom, 854 A.2d 604, 607 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Mickley, 846 A.2d 686, 689 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 860 A.2d 489 (Pa. 2004)), appeal denied, 868 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 2005). “[W]hile an actual violation of the [Vehicle Code] need not ultimately be established to validate a vehicle stop, a police officer must have a

2015In determining whether a police officer has conducted a valid traffic stop, the following standard applies: If the alleged basis of a vehicular stop is to permit a determination whether there has been compliance with the Motor Vehicle Code of this Commonwealth, it is encumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Code. -4- J-A22039-15 Commonwealth v. Spieler, 887 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation om

2016“And, as noted by the trial court, an officer need not stop a vehicle only where he or she intends to issue a citation, but can effectuate a stop solely for purposes of issuing the driver a warning.” Commonwealth v. Benton, 655 A.2d 1030, 1033 (Pa.Super. 1995) (citing Commonwealth v. Fisher, 440 A.2d 570, 572 (Pa.Super. 1982)). -4- J-A08025-16 grade crossing, when approaching and going around curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway and when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway condi

1996Commonwealth v. Fisher, 294 Pa. Super. 486 , 440 A.2d 570 (1982). 2 After stopping the vehicle, the officer ordered defendant out of the vehicle, at which time he commenced a pat-down of defendant.

1992Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107 , 307 A.2d 875, 879 (1973), citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 , 93 S.Ct. 2535 , 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973).

1992Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107 , 307 A.2d 875, 879 (1973), citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 , 93 S.Ct. 2535 , 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973).

2014Investigation by police officers -7- J-A17001-14 * * * (b) Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title. investigatory purpose relevant to the Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 611 Pa. officer

2014Investigation by police officers -7- J-A17001-14 * * * (b) Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title. investigatory purpose relevant to the Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 611 Pa. officer

2005Commonwealth v. Slonaker, 795 A.2d 397, 400 (Pa.Super.2002) ( quoting Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 550 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995)).

2005Commonwealth v. Slonaker, 795 A.2d 397, 400 (Pa.Super.2002) (quoting Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 550 , 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995)).

1992Commonwealth v. Swanger, supra, 453 Pa. at 115 , 307 A.2d at 879 ; see also Commonwealth v. Boyer, 455 Pa. 283, 286 , 314 A.2d 317, 318 (1974) (footnote omitted). 460 Pa. at 58-59 , 331 A.2d at 416-17 .

1992Commonwealth v. Swanger, supra, 453 Pa. at 115 , 307 A.2d at 879 ; see also Commonwealth v. Boyer, 455 Pa. 283, 286 , 314 A.2d 317, 318 (1974) (footnote omitted). 460 Pa. at 58-59 , 331 A.2d at 416-17 .

2026Commonwealth v. Prizzia, 260 A.3d 263 , 268-70 (Pa. Super. 2021).

2025Section 4524(e) has no such requirement and, as this Court has previously stated, the standard of whether a driver is in violation of the window tint statute is subjective in nature based solely on whether “from the point of view of the officer, he or she is unable to see inside of a vehicle - 10 - J-S33020-25 through the windshield, side wing, or side window.” See Prizzia, 260 A.3d at 269 n.2 (quoting Cartagena, 63 A.3d at 305 n.26).

2025In contrast, “[w]hen no further investigation is necessary to determine if a driver committed a traffic violation or crime, the officer must possess probable cause -5- J-S46027-24 to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the [c]ode.” Id. (cleaned up).

2025In contrast, “[w]hen no further investigation is necessary to determine if a driver committed a traffic violation or crime, the officer must possess probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Code.” Id. (cleaned up).

2025Since Officer Ambs credibly testified that he could not see into Appellant’s vehicle due to the window tinting, he had probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle for a violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(e).6 See Prizzia, 260 A.3d at 270; Harris, 176 A.3d at 1019 .

2024Commonwealth v. Prizzia, 260 A.3d 263 , 268-70 (Pa. Super. 2021); Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1013, 1019-20 (Pa. Super. 2017).

2019See Enick, supra; Martin, supra. Thus, Officer Marinez had probable cause to conduct the traffic stop for careless driving, and the suppression court erred in granting Rogers’s motion to suppress.

2017Id. at 847 .

2017“The officer must be able to articulate specific facts possessed by him at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Vehicle Code.” Commonwealth v. Lindblom, 854 A.2d 604, 607 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Mickley, 846 A.2d 686, 689 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 860 A.2d 489 (Pa. 2004)), appeal denied, 868 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 2005). “[W]hile an actual violation of the [Vehicle Code] need not ultimately be established to validate a vehicle stop, a police officer must have a

2004Commonwealth v. Slonaker, 795 A.2d 397, 400 (Pa.Super.2002), quoting Whitmyer, supra, at 550 , 668 A.2d at 1116 . ¶ 5 The Commonwealth relies primarily on Gleason, supra, Slonaker, supra, and Commonwealth v. Mickley, 846 A.2d 686 (Pa.Super.2004) in support of its position that Trooper Dziedzic had probable cause to stop the appellee.

1997Whitmyer, 668 A2d at 1116 ; see also, Commonwealth v. McElroy, 428 Pa.Super. 69, 75 , 630 A.2d 35, 39 (1993) (En Banc) (Murray standard and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308 standard are interchangeable, but “articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect” is the “preferred ” standard so as to avoid any confusion which may be caused by using the term “probable cause” to describe police encounters with citizens which do not rise to the level of an arrest or a search), allocatur denied, 543 Pa. 729 , 673 A2d 335 (1996).

1997Whitmyer, 668 A2d at 1116 ; see also, Commonwealth v. McElroy, 428 Pa.Super. 69, 75 , 630 A.2d 35, 39 (1993) (En Banc) (Murray standard and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308 standard are interchangeable, but “articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect” is the “preferred ” standard so as to avoid any confusion which may be caused by using the term “probable cause” to describe police encounters with citizens which do not rise to the level of an arrest or a search), allocatur denied, 543 Pa. 729 , 673 A2d 335 (1996).

1993In Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 415 Pa. Super. 393 , 609 A.2d 809 (1992), the Superior Court stated: “In order to legally stop a single vehicle for a summary violation of the Vehicle Code a police officer ‘must have probable cause based on specific facts which indicate to him ... [that the] vehicle or the driver is in violation of the code.’ ” Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107 , 307 A.2d 875 (1973).

1993In Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 415 Pa. Super. 393 , 609 A.2d 809 (1992), the Superior Court stated: “In order to legally stop a single vehicle for a summary violation of the Vehicle Code a police officer ‘must have probable cause based on specific facts which indicate to him ... [that the] vehicle or the driver is in violation of the code.’ ” Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107 , 307 A.2d 875 (1973).

2025See R.R. at 67a; Hasson v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 866 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (“We agree with PennDOT that the trial court implicitly found [the officer] credible by crediting his account of the events.”). 4 Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 965 A.2d 341, 345 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009); Quigley v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 965 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (“We hold [the DL-26B Form] warning sufficiently apprises the driver hearing and/or reading it that, if he/she refuses to submit to the chemical test, his/her operating privileges

2025See R.R. at 67a; Hasson v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 866 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (“We agree with PennDOT that the trial court implicitly found [the officer] credible by crediting his account of the events.”). 4 Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 965 A.2d 341, 345 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009); Quigley v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 965 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (“We hold [the DL-26B Form] warning sufficiently apprises the driver hearing and/or reading it that, if he/she refuses to submit to the chemical test, his/her operating privileges

2025Finally, “[p]robable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that a defendant has or is committing an offense.” Commonwealth v. Fudge, 213 A.3d 321, 327 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted). -7- J-A19040-25 With respect to the offense of driving on roadways laned for traffic, the Vehicle Code states that “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made

2025Furthermore, “police officers are not required to spend effort either cajoling the [licensee] or spend time waiting to see if the [licensee] will ultimately change his mind.” Broadbelt, 903 A.2d at 641 n.7 (quoting Appeal of Miller, 470 A.2d 213, 214 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984)).

2025See R.R. at 67a; Hasson v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 866 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (“We agree with PennDOT that the trial court implicitly found [the officer] credible by crediting his account of the events.”). 4 Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 965 A.2d 341, 345 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009); Quigley v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 965 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (“We hold [the DL-26B Form] warning sufficiently apprises the driver hearing and/or reading it that, if he/she refuses to submit to the chemical test, his/her operating privileges

2025Furthermore, “police officers are not required to spend effort either cajoling the [licensee] or spend time waiting to see if the [licensee] will ultimately change his mind.” Broadbelt, 903 A.2d at 641 n.7 (quoting Appeal of Miller, 470 A.2d 213, 214 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984)).

2025See R.R. at 67a; Hasson v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 866 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (“We agree with PennDOT that the trial court implicitly found [the officer] credible by crediting his account of the events.”). 4 Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 965 A.2d 341, 345 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009); Quigley v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 965 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (“We hold [the DL-26B Form] warning sufficiently apprises the driver hearing and/or reading it that, if he/she refuses to submit to the chemical test, his/her operating privileges