confidentiality clause in Kentucky

2010See Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t v. Lexington Herald-Leader, 941 S.W.2d 469, 472-73 (Ky.1997) (Finding that even “a confidentiality clause reached by the agreement of parties to litigation cannot in and of itself create an inherent right to privacy superior to and exempt from the statutory mandate for disclosure contained in the Open Records Act.”).

2010A confidentiality clause in such an agreement is not entitled to protection ... 941 S.W.2d at 472-73 ; see also id. at 472 (“[T]he specific statutory provisions ... reflect a policy determination favoring disclosure of public records over the general policy of encouraging settlement.

2012Insight directs us to Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th Cir.2004) (while the confidentiality requirement is probably more favorable to the cellular provider than to its customer, the plaintiffs have not persuaded us that the requirement is so offensive as to be invalid.); Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Services, VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 280 (3rd Cir.2004) (each side has the same rights and restraints under those provisions and there is nothing inherent in confidentiality itself that favors or burdens one party vis-a-vis the other in the dispute resolution pr

2012Insight directs us to Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th Cir. 2004) (while the confidentiality requirement is probably more favorable to the cellular provider than to its customer, the plaintiffs have not persuaded us that the requirement is so offensive as to be invalid.); Parilla v. L4P Worldwide Services, VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269 , 280 (3rd Cir. 2004) (each side has the same rights and restraints under those provisions and there is nothing inherent in confidentiality itself that favors or burdens one 32 party vis-a-vis the other in the dispute resolut

2012Insight directs us to Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th Cir.2004) (while the confidentiality requirement is probably more favorable to the cellular provider than to its customer, the plaintiffs have not persuaded us that the requirement is so offensive as to be invalid.); Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Services, VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 280 (3rd Cir.2004) (each side has the same rights and restraints under those provisions and there is nothing inherent in confidentiality itself that favors or burdens one party vis-a-vis the other in the dispute resolution pr

2012Insight directs us to Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th Cir. 2004) (while the confidentiality requirement is probably more favorable to the cellular provider than to its customer, the plaintiffs have not persuaded us that the requirement is so offensive as to be invalid.); Parilla v. L4P Worldwide Services, VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269 , 280 (3rd Cir. 2004) (each side has the same rights and restraints under those provisions and there is nothing inherent in confidentiality itself that favors or burdens one 32 party vis-a-vis the other in the dispute resolut

1997The right to privacy has been defined as the “right to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters with which the public is not necessarily concerned.” Wheeler v. P. Sorensen Manufacturing Company, Inc., Ky.App., 415 S.W.2d 582, 585 (1967).

1989As we stated in Commonwealth v. O'Harrah, Ky., 262 S.W.2d 385, 389 (1953), "[c]onstitutional provisions, whether operating by way of grant or limitation, are to be enforced according to their letter and spirit"; and in Fannin v. Williams, Ky., 655 S.W.2d 480, 484 (1983), "we cannot uphold the statute [simply] because we could find some public benefit in its purpose." The trial court correctly stated that the language of McGuffey v. Hall must mean either that the confidentiality privilege expressed in Section 2 of KRS 311.377 is limited to suits against peer review entities as referred to and p

1989As we stated in Commonwealth v. O’Harrah, Ky., 262 S.W.2d 385, 389 (1953), “[constitutional provisions, whether operating by way of grant or limitation, are to be enforced according to their letter and spirit”; and in Fannin v. Williams, Ky., 655 S.W.2d 480, 484 (1983), “we cannot uphold the statute [simply] because we could find some public benefit in its purpose.” The trial court correctly stated that the language of McGuffey v. Hall must mean either that the confidentiality privilege expressed in Section 2 of KRS 311.377 is limited to suits against peer review entities as referred to and pr

1989As we stated in Commonwealth v. O'Harrah, Ky., 262 S.W.2d 385, 389 (1953), "[c]onstitutional provisions, whether operating by way of grant or limitation, are to be enforced according to their letter and spirit"; and in Fannin v. Williams, Ky., 655 S.W.2d 480, 484 (1983), "we cannot uphold the statute [simply] because we could find some public benefit in its purpose." The trial court correctly stated that the language of McGuffey v. Hall must mean either that the confidentiality privilege expressed in Section 2 of KRS 311.377 is limited to suits against peer review entities as referred to and p

1989As we stated in Commonwealth v. O’Harrah, Ky., 262 S.W.2d 385, 389 (1953), “[constitutional provisions, whether operating by way of grant or limitation, are to be enforced according to their letter and spirit”; and in Fannin v. Williams, Ky., 655 S.W.2d 480, 484 (1983), “we cannot uphold the statute [simply] because we could find some public benefit in its purpose.” The trial court correctly stated that the language of McGuffey v. Hall must mean either that the confidentiality privilege expressed in Section 2 of KRS 311.377 is limited to suits against peer review entities as referred to and pr