confidentiality clause in California

2026As explained by another appellate court, “neither of those opinions addressed [the] argument that a confidentiality clause like the one at issue in this case would impair [a plaintiff’s] ability to 31 engage in informal discovery in pursuit of her litigation claims.” (Ramos, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 1066 .) For that reason, defendants’ citation to a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion does not advance their argument, as the Ninth Circuit relied on these two cases and addressed a narrower confidentiality provision that did not limit the plaintiffs’ ability to share information.

2024The arbitration agreement provides that “any and all disputes, claims, or causes of action, in law or equity, arising from or relating to [e]mployee’s employment or the termination of [e]mployee’s employment, including but not limited to statutory, contractual and other claims . . . shall be resolved to the fullest extent permitted by law, by final, binding, and confidential arbitration.” (Italics added.) The trial court found the confidentiality clause was “overly broad” and thus unconscionable because the employee “is essentially barred from conducting informal discovery,” which increases di

2026We are not persuaded by defendants’ reliance on Sanchez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 398 , and Woodside Homes of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 723 , to support their argument that the confidentiality clause in this case is not substantively unconscionable.

2024Confidentiality Requirement The arbitration clause states that the parties may submit disputes for resolution “by final binding confidential arbitration” and that the arbitration must be conducted “under the Employment Dispute Resolution Rules of the AAA (Rules) on a confidential basis.” Relying on Ramos v. Superior Court (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1042 , the trial court found that the confidentiality requirement was “substantively unconscionable because it would impair Plaintiff’s ability to engage in informal discovery in pursuit of her litigation claims.” On appeal, defendants contest this findi

2023(See also, e.g., Valentino v. Elliott Sav-On Gas, Inc. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 692 , 694–699 (Valentino) [reversing § 998 costs to prevailing gas station in personal injury lawsuit; offer released gas station, its attorney, and its insurance carrier on “potential unfiled claims,” which made it “impractical if not impossible to accurately and fairly evaluate the offer”]; Barella v. Exchange Bank (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 793, 803 [invalid § 998 offer; “valuing a confidentiality clause attached to a settlement offer in a defamation action is too subjective and, therefore, cannot be done”].) The Jareck

2021(See., e.g., Barella, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 803 [“We conclude that the task of valuing a confidentiality clause attached to a settlement offer in a defamation action is too subjective and, therefore, cannot be done.”].) Where an offer requires a party to forego other causes of action not included in the complaint, the condition introduces an “imponderable” which makes it impractical, if not impossible, to accurately and fairly ascertain whether the jury verdict or the offer is more favorable.

2018But neither of those opinions addressed Ramos's argument that a confidentiality clause like the one at issue in this case would impair her ability to engage in informal discovery in pursuit of her litigation claims. 11 In Zuver v. Airtouch Communications, Inc. (2004) 153 Wn.2d 293 , 299, 103 P.3d 753 , 757 , the Washington Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of an arbitration clause in an employment contract with a confidentiality clause providing, "All arbitration proceedings, including settlements and awards, under the Agreement will be confidential." The Zuver court observed the appe

2018But neither of those opinions addressed Ramos’s argument that a confidentiality clause like the one at issue in this case would impair her ability to engage in informal discovery in pursuit of her litigation claims.11 In Zuver v. Airtouch Communications, Inc. (2004) 153 Wn.2d 293, 299 [ 103 P.3d 753, 757 ], the Washington Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of an arbitration clause in an employment contract with a confidentiality clause providing, “All arbitration 11 Although Sanchez noted in passing that the trial court found the confidentiality provision at issue was unconscionable be

2015(See Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at p. 74 [employee did not argue that limitations on discovery, as applied to delegation provision, rendered that provision unconscionable]; Tiri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 248 [employee did not “assert and demonstrate that the confidentiality clause as applied to the delegation clause renders that clause unconscionable by impeding her ability to arbitrate whether the arbitration agreement as a whole is unconscionable”].) We conclude it has merit.

2014(Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at p. 73.) For example, she argues that the agreement’s confidentiality clause is substantively unconscionable because it could give Lucky Chances an advantage on her underlying claims for wrongful discharge by preventing her from contacting other employees and accessing information that is available to Lucky Chances.

2014(Davis v. O’Melveny & Myers (9th Cir. 2007) 485 F.3d 1066, 1078 (Davis).) 11 But she does not assert and demonstrate that the confidentiality clause as applied to the delegation clause renders that clause unconscionable by impeding her ability to arbitrate whether the arbitration agreement as a whole is unconscionable.

2013She cites Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers (2007) 485 F.3d 1066, 1078 (Davis), in which the court determined that a confidentiality clause favored the defendant to a degree that rendered it unconscionable.

2021(See Goglin, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 467, 471 [plaintiff’s rejection of section 998 settlement offer did no bar recovery of post-offer fees because offer contained many “unfavorable” and “extraneous” provisions]; McKenzie v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 695 at pp. 699-700, 706, 708 [trial court’s denial of post-offer fees was error where plaintiff acted reasonably in rejecting section 998 offer that contained illegal provisions, a confidentiality clause, and a “breathtakingly broad release.”].) Appellants also rely on Hanna v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 493 (Hann

2018Rejecting the prelitigation settlement because of these unfavorable extraneous terms was not unreasonable." ( Ibid . ) In reaching this conclusion, we relied in part on McKenzie , supra , 238 Cal.App.4th 695 , 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 . ( Goglin , supra , 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 471 , 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 646 .) In McKenzie , after the plaintiff settled his lemon law claims with the defendant, the trial court awarded him $28,350 in attorney fees out of his requested $48,000. ( McKenzie , 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 697 , 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 .) The defendant had made earlier settlement offers, the first in April 2

2018The provisions requiring Ramos to pay half the costs of arbitration, pay her own attorney fees, restricting the ability of the panel of arbitrators to "override" or "substitute its judgment" for that of the partnership, and the confidentiality clause, are unconscionable and significantly inhibit Ramos's ability to pursue her unwaivable statutory claims. 14 Because we are unable to cure the unconscionability simply by striking these clauses, and would instead have to reform the parties' agreement in order to enforce it, we must find the agreement void as a matter of law. ( Armendariz, supra, 24

2018The provisions requiring Ramos to pay half the costs of arbitration, pay her own attorney fees, restricting the ability of the panel of arbitrators to "override" or "substitute its judgment" for that of the partnership, and the confidentiality clause, are unconscionable and significantly inhibit Ramos's ability to pursue her unwaivable statutory claims. 14 Because we are unable to cure the unconscionability simply by striking these clauses, and would instead have to reform the parties' agreement in order to enforce it, we must find the agreement void as a matter of law. ( Armendariz, supra, 24

2018The Court of Appeal in Stevens concluded that the IMR process, including the confidentiality requirement of section 4610.6, subdivision (f), does not violate the federal due process clause. ( Stevens, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1096-1101; see also Ramirez, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 227- 12 Zuniga also argues that if the Board cannot order the disclosure of reviewers’ identities, the decisions are unreviewable, and therefore due process is violated.

2018The Court of Appeal in Stevens concluded that the IMR process, including the confidentiality requirement of section 4610.6, subdivision (f), does not violate the federal due process clause. ( Stevens , supra , 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1096-1101, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 469 ; see also Ramirez, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 227-229, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 723 .) We agree with the reasoning in Stevens , which we summarize here.

2016In that letter, Wolff did not make any claims on behalf of DPI that had been resolved in the settlement agreement. 15 This case is thus distinguishable from Cariveau, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at page 128 , relied on by DPI, in which the trial court had refused, on public policy grounds, to enforce a settlement agreement’s confidentiality clause that expressly “prohibited the customer in a securities transaction from discussing the selling agent’s misconduct with regulatory authorities.” In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the appellate court identified numerous statutory provisions and securit

2016In that letter, Wolff did not make any claims on behalf of DPI that had been resolved in the settlement agreement. 15 This case is thus distinguishable from Cariveau, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at page 128 , relied on by DPI, in which the trial court had refused, on public policy grounds, to enforce a settlement agreement’s confidentiality clause that expressly “prohibited the customer in a securities transaction from discussing the selling agent’s misconduct with regulatory authorities.” In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the appellate court identified numerous statutory provisions and securit

1994In light of the trauma and fear of Jayne and Jerry that the children continue to experience, allowing the dissemination of these records can only be viewed as likely to compound their suffering. “[T]here exists in this state a strong public policy protective of the confidentiality of juvenile court records and proceedings.” (Foster v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 218, 228 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 701 ].) The juvenile court has the authority to determine the extent to which its files are released and “has the inherent right to control the time, place and manner of inspection.” (Lorenza P. v. Sup

1994In light of the trauma and fear of Jayne and Jerry that the children continue to experience, allowing the dissemination of these records can only be viewed as likely to compound their suffering. “[T]here exists in this state a strong public policy protective of the confidentiality of juvenile court records and proceedings.” (Foster v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 218, 228 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 701 ].) The juvenile court has the authority to determine the extent to which its files are released and “has the inherent right to control the time, place and manner of inspection.” (Lorenza P. v. Sup

1994While Jayne has access to the juvenile court’s records, to allow her to disseminate them to anyone she pleases would stand the confidentiality principle on its head, and disserve rather than support the principle of confidentiality. 6 (Cf. Bank of San Pedro v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 797, 804 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 838 P.2d 218 ].) Moreover, Jayne and Jerry’s circulation of these records seems nothing short of callous and cruel.

1994While Jayne has access to the juvenile court’s records, to allow her to disseminate them to anyone she pleases would stand the confidentiality principle on its head, and disserve rather than support the principle of confidentiality. 6 (Cf. Bank of San Pedro v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 797, 804 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 838 P.2d 218 ].) Moreover, Jayne and Jerry’s circulation of these records seems nothing short of callous and cruel.

1994In light of the trauma and fear of Jayne and Jerry that the children continue to experience, allowing the dissemination of these records can only be viewed as likely to compound their suffering. “[T]here exists in this state a strong public policy protective of the confidentiality of juvenile court records and proceedings.” (Foster v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 218, 228 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 701 ].) The juvenile court has the authority to determine the extent to which its files are released and “has the inherent right to control the time, place and manner of inspection.” (Lorenza P. v. Sup

1994In light of the trauma and fear of Jayne and Jerry that the children continue to experience, allowing the dissemination of these records can only be viewed as likely to compound their suffering. “[T]here exists in this state a strong public policy protective of the confidentiality of juvenile court records and proceedings.” (Foster v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 218, 228 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 701 ].) The juvenile court has the authority to determine the extent to which its files are released and “has the inherent right to control the time, place and manner of inspection.” (Lorenza P. v. Sup

1994In light of the trauma and fear of Jayne and Jerry that the children continue to experience, allowing the dissemination of these records can only be viewed as likely to compound their suffering. “[T]here exists in this state a strong public policy protective of the confidentiality of juvenile court records and proceedings.” (Foster v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 218, 228 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 701 ].) The juvenile court has the authority to determine the extent to which its files are released and “has the inherent right to control the time, place and manner of inspection.” (Lorenza P. v. Sup

1994In light of the trauma and fear of Jayne and Jerry that the children continue to experience, allowing the dissemination of these records can only be viewed as likely to compound their suffering. “[T]here exists in this state a strong public policy protective of the confidentiality of juvenile court records and proceedings.” (Foster v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 218, 228 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 701 ].) The juvenile court has the authority to determine the extent to which its files are released and “has the inherent right to control the time, place and manner of inspection.” (Lorenza P. v. Sup

1994In light of the trauma and fear of Jayne and Jerry that the children continue to experience, allowing the dissemination of these records can only be viewed as likely to compound their suffering. “[T]here exists in this state a strong public policy protective of the confidentiality of juvenile court records and proceedings.” (Foster v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 218, 228 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 701 ].) The juvenile court has the authority to determine the extent to which its files are released and “has the inherent right to control the time, place and manner of inspection.” (Lorenza P. v. Sup

1994In light of the trauma and fear of Jayne and Jerry that the children continue to experience, allowing the dissemination of these records can only be viewed as likely to compound their suffering. “[T]here exists in this state a strong public policy protective of the confidentiality of juvenile court records and proceedings.” (Foster v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 218, 228 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 701 ].) The juvenile court has the authority to determine the extent to which its files are released and “has the inherent right to control the time, place and manner of inspection.” (Lorenza P. v. Sup

2026(See Menges, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 26 [“The inclusion of nonmonetary terms and conditions does not render a section 998 offer invalid; but those terms or conditions must be sufficiently certain and capable of valuation to allow the court to determine whether the judgment is more favorable than the offer.”].) For example, an offer conditioned on a promise of indemnity against third party claims, or a release of claims outside the scope of the litigation, is invalid under section 998 because it is “ ‘difficult to accurately value the monetary term of the offer . . . .’ [Citations.]” (Toste

2024Co. v. Rising (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 302, 308 [general custom or usage must be considered in determining the intent of the parties unless the contract manifests a contrary intention].) But there is no evidence the confidentiality clause has ever, let alone customarily, been accorded legal force in the county, even assuming common usage.

2022The minute book shall be available only to members of the legislative body or, if a violation of this chapter is alleged to have occurred at a closed session, to a court of general jurisdiction wherein the local agency lies.” (§ 54957.2, subd. (a); see also Register Division of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 893, 907 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 92 .)[46] 43 Kleitman v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 324 , 326–327; see Stats. 2002, ch. 1119, § 1 (enacting section 54963), Stats. 1981, ch. 968, § 31 (enacting current version of section 54957.2). 44 Kleitman v. Superi

2022The minute book shall be available only to members of the legislative body or, if a violation of this chapter is alleged to have occurred at a closed session, to a court of general jurisdiction wherein the local agency lies.” (§ 54957.2, subd. (a); see also Register Division of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 893, 907 , 205 Cal.Rptr. 92 .)[46] 43 Kleitman v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 324 , 326–327; see Stats. 2002, ch. 1119, § 1 (enacting section 54963), Stats. 1981, ch. 968, § 31 (enacting current version of section 54957.2). 44 Kleitman v. Superi

2022(See Delos v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 642 , 550 fn. 6 [“ ‘general verdict implies a finding in favor of the prevailing party of every fact essential to the support of his action or defense’ ”]; Tavaglione v. Billings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1150, 1157 (Tavaglione) [under general verdict rule, “general verdict will be sustained if any one count is supported by substantial evidence and is unaffected by error”].)10 Acacia’s arguments on this point lack merit.