confidentiality clause in Texas

2023Goodman correctly recognizes that “parties asserting defenses to arbitration clauses have the burden to prove the defenses—including unconscionability.” See Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, & Williams, LLP v. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494, 500 (Tex. 2015) (citing In re Poly-Am., 262 S.W.3d at 348 ).

2020Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017). 4 AKOE disputes that it disclosed any aspect of the Purchase Agreement to Baker. 6 discrepancies with the Lear identified after closing, and (3) the confidentiality clause by disclosing the Purchase Agreement’s terms to Baker.

2020Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017). 4 AKOE disputes that it disclosed any aspect of the Purchase Agreement to Baker. 6 discrepancies with the Lear identified after closing, and (3) the confidentiality clause by disclosing the Purchase Agreement’s terms to Baker.

2015See Cox, 343 S.W.3d at 118 (holding that “[o]n remand, the trial court must closely examine each of the disputed documents” to determine if it meets the standard for an applicable exception to disclosure); Industrial Foundation, 540 S.W.2d 685 -86 (reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the requestor, and remanding for a fact-specific assessment of the applicability of the confidentiality exception); see also Hubert v. Harte-Hanks Texas Newspapers, Inc., 652 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex. App. - Austin 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e) (noting that judgment was rendered after a bench trial, and

2015See Cox, 343 S.W.3d at 118 (holding that “[o]n remand, the trial court must closely examine each of the disputed documents” to determine if it meets the standard for an applicable exception to disclosure); Industrial Foundation, 540 S.W.2d 685 -86 (reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the requestor, and remanding for a fact-specific assessment of the applicability of the confidentiality exception); see also Hubert v. Harte-Hanks Texas Newspapers, Inc., 652 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex. App. - Austin 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e) (noting that judgment was rendered after a bench trial, and

2015See Industrial Foundation, 540 S.W.2d at 685-86 (reversing a grant of summary judgment to the requestor, and remanding to the trial court for a fact-specific analysis of the claims of confidentiality, as applied to each record at issue); Rhone-Poulenc, 997 S.W.2d at 221 (defendant not entitled to summary judgment because it did not affirmatively negate any element of the plaintiff’s case). 12 To conduct the proper analysis in similar cases, other courts have relied on an assessment of particular facts.

2015See Industrial Foundation, 540 S.W.2d at 685-86 (reversing a grant of summary judgment to the requestor, and remanding to the trial court for a fact-specific analysis of the claims of confidentiality, as applied to each record at issue); Rhone-Poulenc, 997 S.W.2d at 221 (defendant not entitled to summary judgment because it did not affirmatively negate any element of the plaintiff’s case). 12 To conduct the proper analysis in similar cases, other courts have relied on an assessment of particular facts.

2014See Roark, 633 S.W.2d at 809 ; Westcliffe, Inc., 105 S.W.3d at 292 .

2014See id.

2006See Stewart Title , 941 S.W.2d at 73–74; see also C.M.

1999See McMullen v. Carson, 568 F.Supp. 937, 943 (M.D.Fla.1983), aff'd, 754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir.1985).

1999See McMullen v. Carson, 568 F.Supp. 937, 943 (M.D.Fla.1983), aff'd, 754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir.1985).

1999See Hicks v. Western Funding, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (presuming facts against appellant in appeal from directed verdict with no statement of facts); Norwood v. Bayshore Bus Lines, Inc., 196 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1946, writ dism’d) (presuming facts against appellant in appeal from JNOV with no statement of facts).

1999See Hicks v. Western Funding, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (presuming facts against appellant in appeal from directed verdict with no statement of facts); Norwood v. Bayshore Bus Lines, Inc., 196 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1946, writ dism’d) (presuming facts against appellant in appeal from JNOV with no statement of facts).

1998See generally Bodin, 807 S.W.2d at 317 ; Ro- *287 viaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 , 77 S.Ct. 623 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957).

1992Cheatham v. Rogers, 824 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1992) (orig. proceeding) (the exception to privilege applied to a mental health professional).