benchmark for judging any claim in Tennessee

2021“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); see Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 277 (6th Cir. 2000).

2017“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct - 24 - so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); see Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 277 (6th Cir. 2000).

2021“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); see Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 277 (6th Cir. 2000).

2017“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct - 24 - so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); see Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 277 (6th Cir. 2000).

2013Courts need not approach the Strickland test in a specific order or even “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697 ; see also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim”).

2012When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, “the petitioner bears the burden of proving both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).

2012Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 ; State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999).

2001“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also State v. Bums, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn.1999).

2012See also, e.g., Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 276 (Tenn. 2011).

2011Given the seriousness of a death sentence, “[c]ourts are particularly cautious in preserving a defendant’s right to counsel at a capital sentencing hearing.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 532 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992).