benchmark for judging any claim in Texas

2023“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Butler, 716 S.W.2d at 54 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 ).

1995The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), held that in order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must (1) show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, in that counsel made such serious errors that he was not functioning effectively as counsel and (2) show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense to such a degree that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. “ ‘The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so un

2025“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 .

2023“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Butler, 716 S.W.2d at 54 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 ).

2014“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” Holland v. State, 761 S.W.2d 307, 320 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988).

2014“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” Holland v. State, 761 S.W.2d 307, 320 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988).

2000Welborn, 785 S.W.2d at 393 (citations omitted).

2000Welborn , 785 S.W.2d at 393 (citations omitted).

2015“This right does not mean errorless or perfect counsel whose 17 competency of representation is to be judged by hindsight.” Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 483 (Tex. Crim.

2015Ineffective assistance of counsel The constitutional right to counsel in a criminal prosecution exists to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.157 In this context, “a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding.”158 “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s 157 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 158 Id. at 685 , 104 S.Ct. at 2063 . 32 conduct so undermined the proper f

2009Here, the record before us undisputedly establishes “the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness,” that is, that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ; Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d at 466–67 (granting habeas relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds because defense counsel failed to investigate or obtain experts for economic reasons, not as trial strategy); Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d at 132–33 (holding that when defendant’s guilt or i

2009Here, the record before us undisputedly establishes “the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness,” that is, that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 ; Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d at 466-67 (granting habeas relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds because defense counsel failed to investigate or obtain experts for economic reasons, not as trial strategy); Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d at 132-33 (holding that when defendant’s guilt or in

2009Here, the record before us undisputedly establishes “the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness,” that is, that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ; Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d at 466–67 (granting habeas relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds because defense counsel failed to investigate or obtain experts for economic reasons, not as trial strategy); Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d at 132–33 (holding that when defendant’s guilt or i

2009Here, the record before us undisputedly establishes “the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness,” that is, that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 ; Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d at 466-67 (granting habeas relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds because defense counsel failed to investigate or obtain experts for economic reasons, not as trial strategy); Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d at 132-33 (holding that when defendant’s guilt or in

1993The difficulty of evaluating an attorney's performance from the perspective of counsel at the time decisions are made is emphasized in Miniel v. State , 831 S.W.2d 310, 323 (Tex. Crim.

1993The difficulty of evaluating an attorney's performance from the perspective of counsel at the time decisions are made is emphasized in Minial v. State , 831 S.W.2d 310, 323 (Tex. Crim.

2018The defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. -2- 04-17-00611-CR Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim.

2014In evaluating the first prong of Strickland, we strongly presume that counsel is 5 competent, that his actions “fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999), and that his decisions “might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. at 2065 .

2005Here, counsel's reasons for waiving voir dire appear in the record. [3] However, even when applying the standard harm analysis, the error here could not be found harmless because, by effectively allowing the State to conduct voir dire for appellant, Strickland's central holding was violated; i.e., "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added); see also,

2005Here, counsel's reasons for waiving voir dire appear in the record. [3] However, even when applying the standard harm analysis, the error here could not be found harmless because, by effectively allowing the State to conduct voir dire for appellant, Strickland's central holding was violated; i.e., "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added); see also,

2005Here, counsel’s reasons for waiving voir dire appear in the record. .However, even when applying the standard harm analysis, the error here could not be found harmless because, by effectively allowing the State to conduct voir dire for appellant, Strickland’s central holding was violated; i.e., "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added); see also, Uni

2005Here, counsel’s reasons for waiving voir dire appear in the record. .However, even when applying the standard harm analysis, the error here could not be found harmless because, by effectively allowing the State to conduct voir dire for appellant, Strickland’s central holding was violated; i.e., "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added); see also, Uni

2009Here, the record before us undisputedly establishes “the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness,” that is, that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ; Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d at 466–67 (granting habeas relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds because defense counsel failed to investigate or obtain experts for economic reasons, not as trial strategy); Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d at 132–33 (holding that when defendant’s guilt or i

2009Here, the record before us undisputedly establishes “the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness,” that is, that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 ; Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d at 466-67 (granting habeas relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds because defense counsel failed to investigate or obtain experts for economic reasons, not as trial strategy); Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d at 132-33 (holding that when defendant’s guilt or in

2009Here, the record before us undisputedly establishes “the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness,” that is, that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ; Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d at 466–67 (granting habeas relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds because defense counsel failed to investigate or obtain experts for economic reasons, not as trial strategy); Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d at 132–33 (holding that when defendant’s guilt or i

2009Here, the record before us undisputedly establishes “the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness,” that is, that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 ; Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d at 466-67 (granting habeas relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds because defense counsel failed to investigate or obtain experts for economic reasons, not as trial strategy); Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d at 132-33 (holding that when defendant’s guilt or in

2009Here, the record before us undisputedly establishes “the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness,” that is, that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ; Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d at 466–67 (granting habeas relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds because defense counsel failed to investigate or obtain experts for economic reasons, not as trial strategy); Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d at 132–33 (holding that when defendant’s guilt or i

2009Here, the record before us undisputedly establishes “the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness,” that is, that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 ; Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d at 466-67 (granting habeas relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds because defense counsel failed to investigate or obtain experts for economic reasons, not as trial strategy); Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d at 132-33 (holding that when defendant’s guilt or in

2009Here, the record before us undisputedly establishes “the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness,” that is, that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ; Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d at 466–67 (granting habeas relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds because defense counsel failed to investigate or obtain experts for economic reasons, not as trial strategy); Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d at 132–33 (holding that when defendant’s guilt or i

2009Here, the record before us undisputedly establishes “the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness,” that is, that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 ; Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d at 466-67 (granting habeas relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds because defense counsel failed to investigate or obtain experts for economic reasons, not as trial strategy); Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d at 132-33 (holding that when defendant’s guilt or in

2021Strickland also states, “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.

2015App. 2006). 161 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 ; Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim.

2013Under the second prong requiring a showing of harm, a “reasonable probability” of prejudice is “one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim.

2005Here, counsel's reasons for waiving voir dire appear in the record. [3] However, even when applying the standard harm analysis, the error here could not be found harmless because, by effectively allowing the State to conduct voir dire for appellant, Strickland's central holding was violated; i.e., "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added); see also,

2005Here, counsel's reasons for waiving voir dire appear in the record. [3] However, even when applying the standard harm analysis, the error here could not be found harmless because, by effectively allowing the State to conduct voir dire for appellant, Strickland's central holding was violated; i.e., "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added); see also,

1998See Ex parte Cruz , 739 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Tex. Crim.

1997“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. at 2063-64 ; see also Ex parte Davis, 866 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (following Strickland in recognizing the importance of the reliability of the trial proceedings).

1995See Holland v. State, 761 S.W.2d 307, 320 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1091 , 109 S.Ct. 1560 , 103 L.Ed.2d 863 (1989).

1995"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. at 826 (citations omitted).

1990The Strickland standard has been adopted in Texas for resolving allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel under both the federal and state constitutions. *827 Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).