Act waives immunity in Texas

2022See Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 375 (“Accordingly, we hold that for section 101.106(f), suit ‘could have been brought’ under the Act against the government regardless of whether the Act waives immunity from suit.”); see also Donohue v. Dominguez, 486 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2016, pet. denied) (“Because the Tort Claims Act is the only, albeit limited, avenue for common law recovery against the government, all tort theories alleged against a governmental unit, whether it is sued alone or together with its employees, are assumed to be under the [TTCA] for purposes of section 101.106.”), qu

2015Code Ann. § 101.106(f); Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 385 (“[W]e hold that for section 101.106(f), suit ‘could have been brought’ under the Act against the government regardless of whether the Act waives immunity from *399 suit.”); see also Cannon, 453 S.W.3d at 416 (two elements of section 101.106(e)).

2025Id. at 108-110 (“The Act waives immunity for contract claims that meet certain conditions: the existence of a specific type of contract, a demand for certain kinds of damages, a state forum, etc.”) (emphasis added).

2025Id. at 108-110 (“The Act waives immunity for contract claims that meet certain conditions: the existence of a specific type of contract, a demand for certain kinds of damages, a state forum, etc.”) (emphasis added).

2002Code Ann. § 101.021 (2) (making government entity liable for injuries caused by tangible property to the same extent as a private property owner); see also Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 587 (stating that although section 101.021(2) speaks to liability only, the Act waives immunity both from suit and liability).

2002Code Ann. § 101.021(2) (making government entity liable for injuries caused by tangible property to the same extent as a private property owner); see also Miller , 51 S.W.3d at 587 (stating that although section 101.021(2) speaks to liability only, the Act waives immunity both from suit and liability).

2022See Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 375 (“Accordingly, we hold that for section 101.106(f), suit ‘could have been brought’ under the Act against the government regardless of whether the Act waives immunity from suit.”); see also Donohue v. Dominguez, 486 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2016, pet. denied) (“Because the Tort Claims Act is the only, albeit limited, avenue for common law recovery against the government, all tort theories alleged against a governmental unit, whether it is sued alone or together with its employees, are assumed to be under the [TTCA] for purposes of section 101.106.”), qu

2011See Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 659-60 (noting that, when applicable, 101.106(b) bars claims outside of the Tort Claims Act, “not just suits for which the [Act] waives immunity or those that allege common law claims.”); see also Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 371 n. 9 (describing the character of the election-of-remedies provision as “conferring immunity”).

2019In LeLeaux v. Hamshire–Fannett Independent School District, we held that an injury that occurred on a parked school bus did not arise out of the use of the bus.18 “[T]he bus [was] only the setting for the injury”.19 Several months later, in Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Petty, five members of the Court concluded that the Act waives immunity for a claim based on the state’s having continually misdiagnosed a mental patient over the course of several decades.20 But the lead opinion for the Court attracted only 12 Lowe, 540 S.W.2d at 301 (Greenhill, C.J., concurring).

2019In LeLeaux v. Hamshire–Fannett Independent School District, we held that an injury that occurred on a parked school bus did not arise out of the use of the bus.18 “[T]he bus [was] only the setting for the injury”.19 Several months later, in Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Petty, five members of the Court concluded that the Act waives immunity for a claim based on the state’s having continually misdiagnosed a mental patient over the course of several decades.20 But the lead opinion for the Court attracted only 12 Lowe, 540 S.W.2d at 301 (Greenhill, C.J., concurring).

2019In LeLeaux v. Hamshire–Fannett Independent School District, we held that an injury that occurred on a parked school bus did not arise out of the use of the bus.18 “[T]he bus [was] only the setting for the injury”.19 Several months later, in Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Petty, five members of the Court concluded that the Act waives immunity for a claim based on the state’s having continually misdiagnosed a mental patient over the course of several decades.20 But the lead opinion for the Court attracted only 12 Lowe, 540 S.W.2d at 301 (Greenhill, C.J., concurring).

2019In LeLeaux v. Hamshire–Fannett Independent School District, we held that an injury that occurred on a parked school bus did not arise out of the use of the bus.18 “[T]he bus [was] only the setting for the injury”.19 Several months later, in Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Petty, five members of the Court concluded that the Act waives immunity for a claim based on the state’s having continually misdiagnosed a mental patient over the course of several decades.20 But the lead opinion for the Court attracted only 12 Lowe, 540 S.W.2d at 301 (Greenhill, C.J., concurring).

2002See Lawson, 524 S.W.2d at 356 .

2002See Lawson, 524 S.W.2d at 356 .

2023Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 , 224–25 5 (Tex. 2004). 6 Id. 7Tex.

2018The Act waives immunity in three areas: “‘use of publicly owned automobiles, premises defects, and injuries arising out of conditions or use of property.’” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Cty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex. 2002), and citing TEX.

2024See id. § 101.025 (“Sovereign immunity to suit is waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by this chapter.”); see also Molina v. Alvarado, 463 S.W.3d 867, 870 (Tex. 2015).

2022See Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 375 (“Accordingly, we hold that for section 101.106(f), suit ‘could have been brought’ under the Act against the government regardless of whether the Act waives immunity from suit.”); see also Donohue v. Dominguez, 486 S.W.3d 50, 55 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2016, pet. denied) (“Because the Tort Claims Act is the only, albeit limited, avenue for common law recovery against the government, all tort theories alleged against a governmental unit, whether it is sued alone or together with its employees, are assumed to be under the [TTCA] for purposes of section 101.106.”), qu

2020State v. Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1993).

2019In LeLeaux v. Hamshire–Fannett Independent School District, we held that an injury that occurred on a parked school bus did not arise out of the use of the bus.18 “[T]he bus [was] only the setting for the injury”.19 Several months later, in Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Petty, five members of the Court concluded that the Act waives immunity for a claim based on the state’s having continually misdiagnosed a mental patient over the course of several decades.20 But the lead opinion for the Court attracted only 12 Lowe, 540 S.W.2d at 301 (Greenhill, C.J., concurring).

2019In LeLeaux v. Hamshire–Fannett Independent School District, we held that an injury that occurred on a parked school bus did not arise out of the use of the bus.18 “[T]he bus [was] only the setting for the injury”.19 Several months later, in Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Petty, five members of the Court concluded that the Act waives immunity for a claim based on the state’s having continually misdiagnosed a mental patient over the course of several decades.20 But the lead opinion for the Court attracted only 12 Lowe, 540 S.W.2d at 301 (Greenhill, C.J., concurring).

2019Bd. of Trs., 557 S.W.3d 93 , 97–99 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, no pet.) (remanding to the trial court for entry of partial summary judgment declaring that trustee appointments were void because of Open Meetings Act violations); City of Laredo v. Escamilla, 219 S.W.3d 14, 23 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. denied) (affirming the trial court’s judgment declaring the city’s vote to purchase a parcel of real property “invalid and void” due to Open Meetings Act violations). 16 presented with, and did not address, the specific question of whether the Act waives immunity from suit for

2019In LeLeaux v. Hamshire–Fannett Independent School District, we held that an injury that occurred on a parked school bus did not arise out of the use of the bus.18 “[T]he bus [was] only the setting for the injury”.19 Several months later, in Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Petty, five members of the Court concluded that the Act waives immunity for a claim based on the state’s having continually misdiagnosed a mental patient over the course of several decades.20 But the lead opinion for the Court attracted only 12 Lowe, 540 S.W.2d at 301 (Greenhill, C.J., concurring).

2018The Act waives immunity in three areas: “‘use of publicly owned automobiles, premises defects, and injuries arising out of conditions or use of property.’” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Cty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex. 2002), and citing TEX.

2016Tex. Dep’t of Aging & Disability Servs. v. Cannon, 453 S.W.3d 411, 415 (Tex. 2015); Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 379– 80.

2015City of El Paso v. Abbott, 444 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Tex.App.-Austin 2014, pet. filed).

2013Code Ann. § 101.001 (5) (West Supp. 2013); Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2004). 3 Alrick and Lund raised their right to dismissal under section 101.106(f) shortly after the supreme court held that section 101.106(f)’s phrase “could have been brought” applies to claims raised under the Act “regardless of whether the Act waives immunity from suit.” Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 385 .

2009See Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. Flynn , 228 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. 2007).

2008In three general areas, the Act waives immunity from liability: "use of publicly owned automobiles, premises defects, and injuries arising out of conditions or use of property." Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Able , 35 S.W.3d 608, 611 (Tex. 2000) (quoting Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ. , 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976)); Tex. Civ.