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6 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1991–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Dillongreen2 sentences2011The presence of the additional Santiago factors distinguishes this case from Commonwealth v. Dillon, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 297 (2011) (affidavit “did not set forth adequate particularized evidence to establish a substantial and timely nexus between the defendant’s drug-selling activity and the . . . residence sufficient to establish probable cause to search the . . . residence”). 2011The presence of the additional Santiago factors distinguishes this case from Commonwealth v. Dillon, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 297 (2011) (affidavit “did not set forth adequate particularized evidence to establish a substantial and timely nexus between the defendant’s drug-selling activity and the . . . residence sufficient to establish probable cause to search the . . . residence”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kozecgreen2 sentences2009See generally Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 518-519 (1987). 2009See generally Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 518-519 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Muldoon v. Superior Court Department of the Trial Courtgreen1 sentence2006See, e.g., Muldoon v. Superior Court Dep’t of the Trial Court, 439 Mass. 1010 (2003); Matthews v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Cedar Junction, 438 Mass. 1012 (2003); Sabree v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1003 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.green1 sentence2002See, e.g., Davis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 862, 865 (1st Cir. 1983) (limitations period begins to run on date of notice of discriminatory dismissal); Davis v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 251 F.3d 227, 231 (1st Cir. 2001) (MCAD complaint should have been filed within six months of date of termination to be timely). | 1 | 1 |
Feleicia Malcolm DAVIS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY, Defendant, Appelleegreen1 sentence2002See, e.g., Davis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 862, 865 (1st Cir. 1983) (limitations period begins to run on date of notice of discriminatory dismissal); Davis v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 251 F.3d 227, 231 (1st Cir. 2001) (MCAD complaint should have been filed within six months of date of termination to be timely). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Amendolagreen1 sentence1991“When a defendant is charged with a crime in which possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search is an essential element of guilt, the defendant shall be deemed to have standing to contest the legality of the search and the seizure of that evidence.” Commonwealth v. Amendola, 406 Mass. 592, 601 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
green
1 sentence2009The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” Id. at 315 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Babigian v. Committee on Professional Standards
green
2 sentences2009The Santiago factors are analyzed as follows: “[1] whether defense counsel seasonably objected to the arguments at trial [I consider that there was objection in this case]; [2] whether the judge’s instructions mitigated the error [I consider that there was no adequate jury instruction here 4 ]; [3] whether the errors in the arguments went to the heart of the issues at trial or concerned collateral matters [I consider the misstatements in this closing to be directed to core issues]; [4] whether the jury would be able to sort out the excessive claims made by the prosecutor [I consider that the c 2009The Santiago factors are analyzed as follows: “[1] whether defense counsel seasonably objected to the arguments at trial [I consider that there was objection in this case]; [2] whether the judge’s instructions mitigated the error [I consider that there was no adequate jury instruction here 4 ]; [3] whether the errors in the arguments went to the heart of the issues at trial or concerned collateral matters [I consider the misstatements in this closing to be directed to core issues]; [4] whether the jury would be able to sort out the excessive claims made by the prosecutor [I consider that the c | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Sabree v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2006See, e.g., Muldoon v. Superior Court Dep’t of the Trial Court, 439 Mass. 1010 (2003); Matthews v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Cedar Junction, 438 Mass. 1012 (2003); Sabree v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1003 (2000). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Matthews v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Cedar Junction
neutral
1 sentence2006See, e.g., Muldoon v. Superior Court Dep’t of the Trial Court, 439 Mass. 1010 (2003); Matthews v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Cedar Junction, 438 Mass. 1012 (2003); Sabree v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1003 (2000). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.