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47 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Florida v. Royergreen2 sentences2025“One specifically established exception to the warrant requirement is ‘a search that is conducted with consent.’” State v. Hawkins, 2016-Ohio-1404, ¶ 98 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Portman, 2014-Ohio-4343, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). “‘“[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.”’” State v. Nwachukwa, 2015-Ohio-3282, ¶ 28 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Aguirre, 2012- Ohio-2014, ¶ 12 (3 2025“One specifically established exception to the warrant requirement is ‘a search that is conducted with consent.’” State v. Hawkins, 2016-Ohio-1404, ¶ 98 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Portman, 2014-Ohio-4343, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). “‘“[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.”’” State v. Nwachukwa, 2015-Ohio-3282, ¶ 28 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Aguirre, 2012- Ohio-2014, ¶ 12 (3 | 7 | 29 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen2 sentences2020Clark No. 2013-CA-68, 2014-Ohio-4343, ¶ 11 , citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973). “‘“[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.”’” State v. Nwachukwa, 3d Dist. 2020Clark No. 2013-CA-68, 2014-Ohio-4343, ¶ 11 , citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973). “‘“[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.”’” State v. Nwachukwa, 3d Dist. | 2 | 10 |
State v. Poseygreen2 sentences2025State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 (1988). “[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). 2024Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement that requires the state to “show by ‘clear and positive’ evidence that the consent was ‘freely and voluntarily’ given.” State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 , 534 N.E.2d 61 (1988). “ ‘[T]he State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 243 , 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 | 2 | 3 |
State v. Robinettegreen2 sentences2024Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement that requires the state to “show by ‘clear and positive’ evidence that the consent was ‘freely and voluntarily’ given.” State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 , 534 N.E.2d 61 (1988). “ ‘[T]he State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 243 , 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 2024Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement that requires the state to “show by ‘clear and positive’ evidence that the consent was ‘freely and voluntarily’ given.” State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 , 534 N.E.2d 61 (1988). “ ‘[T]he State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 243 , 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 | 1 | 21 |
State v. Nwachukwagreen2 sentences2025“One specifically established exception to the warrant requirement is ‘a search that is conducted with consent.’” State v. Hawkins, 2016-Ohio-1404, ¶ 98 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Portman, 2014-Ohio-4343, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). “‘“[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.”’” State v. Nwachukwa, 2015-Ohio-3282, ¶ 28 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Aguirre, 2012- Ohio-2014, ¶ 12 (3 2023Clark No. 2013-CA-68, 2014-Ohio-4343, ¶ 11 . “‘“[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.”’” State v. Nwachukwa, 3d Dist. -7- Case No. 10-22-01 Marion No. 9-15-03, 2015-Ohio-3282, ¶ 28 , quoting State v. Aguirre, 3d Dist. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Portmangreen2 sentences2025“One specifically established exception to the warrant requirement is ‘a search that is conducted with consent.’” State v. Hawkins, 2016-Ohio-1404, ¶ 98 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Portman, 2014-Ohio-4343, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). “‘“[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.”’” State v. Nwachukwa, 2015-Ohio-3282, ¶ 28 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Aguirre, 2012- Ohio-2014, ¶ 12 (3 2023Clark No. 2013-CA-68, 2014-Ohio-4343, ¶ 11 . “‘“[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.”’” State v. Nwachukwa, 3d Dist. -7- Case No. 10-22-01 Marion No. 9-15-03, 2015-Ohio-3282, ¶ 28 , quoting State v. Aguirre, 3d Dist. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Fostergreen2 sentences2002The Second District Court of Appeals has analyzed consent to search as follows: "It is settled law that where the validity of a search rests on consent, the state has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority." Foster, supra , at 41, 621 N.E.2d 843 , citing Florida v. Royer (1983), 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 , Schneckloth, supra . 2000"It is settled law that where the validity of a search rests on consent, the state has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority." Foster , supra at 41, citing Florida v. Royer (1983), 460 U.S. 491 , Schneckloth , supra . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Hawkinsgreen1 sentence2025“One specifically established exception to the warrant requirement is ‘a search that is conducted with consent.’” State v. Hawkins, 2016-Ohio-1404, ¶ 98 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Portman, 2014-Ohio-4343, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). “‘“[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.”’” State v. Nwachukwa, 2015-Ohio-3282, ¶ 28 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Aguirre, 2012- Ohio-2014, ¶ 12 (3 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Clarkgreen1 sentence2025“When an individual is lawfully detained by police and consents to a search, the state must demonstrate by clear 8 Case No. 2024-L-061 and convincing evidence that consent was freely and voluntarily given.” State v. Clark, 2024-Ohio-1869, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (“the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Halegreen2 sentences2023State v. Hale, 2023-Ohio-980 , 212 N.E.3d 32, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.). [W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority. 2023State v. Hale, 2023-Ohio-980 , 212 N.E.3d 32, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.). [W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Terrellgreen2 sentences2019Assignment of Error #2 – Consent to Search Vehicle {¶ 22} Although a search warrant ordinarily is required before a police officer may search an individual’s property, “[c]onsent is an exception to the warrant requirement.” Ojezua, 2016-Ohio-2659 , 50 N.E.3d 14 , at ¶ 15. “[T]he State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.” Id., quoting State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 243 , 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Florida v. Royer, 46 2019Assignment of Error #2 – Consent to Search Vehicle {¶ 22} Although a search warrant ordinarily is required before a police officer may search an individual’s property, “[c]onsent is an exception to the warrant requirement.” Ojezua, 2016-Ohio-2659 , 50 N.E.3d 14 , at ¶ 15. “[T]he State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.” Id., quoting State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 243 , 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Florida v. Royer, 46 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975green2 sentences2017See State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985). “[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.” State v. Scarberry, 10th Dist. 2017See State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985). “[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.” State v. Scarberry, 10th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Scarberrygreen2 sentences2017Franklin No. 15AP-775, 2016-Ohio-7065, ¶ 18 , quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). 2017See State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975 , 19 Ohio St.3d 49 , 51, 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985). "[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority." State v. Scarberry , 2016-Ohio-7065 , 72 N.E.3d 173 , ¶ 18, quoting Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491 , 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. Jimenogreen1 sentence2016See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Jimeno at 250-51 (stating that "we have long approved consensual searches because it is no doubt reasonable for the police No. 15AP-775 8 to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so"). "[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sneedgreen1 sentence2015No. 09AP-898, 2010-Ohio-3208 , ¶ 19, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). {¶ 7} "It is well settled that consent to a warrantless search will not be held invalid nor the resulting search unreasonable when one with authority over the premises voluntarily permits the search." State v. Sneed, 63 Ohio St.3d 3, 7 (1992), citing Schneckloth. "[T]he State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was No. 14AP-830 3 obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority." Florid | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Aguirre
green
2 sentences2023Seneca Nos. 13-11-19 and 13-11-20, 2012-Ohio-2014, ¶ 12 , quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983). {¶12} Whether consent was freely and voluntarily given, or whether it was the product of duress, coercion, or deception, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. 2015Seneca Nos. 13-11-19 and 13-11-20, 2012-Ohio-2014, ¶ 12 , quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983). | 2 | 2015–2023 |
State v. Hawkins
neutral
2 sentences2017Montgomery No. 25712, 2013-Ohio-5458 [ 2013 WL 6576529 ], ¶ 14, quoting State v. Robinette , 80 Ohio St.3d 234 , 243, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491 , 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). 2016Montgomery No. 25712, 2013-Ohio-5458, ¶ 14 , quoting State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 243 , 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). {¶ 18} “A ‘clear and positive’ standard is not significantly different from the ‘clear and convincing’ standard of evidence, which is the amount of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations to be proved. | 2 | 2016–2017 |
Bumper v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences2007"That burden is `not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.'" Id. citing Royer at 497. {¶ 37} In this case, as in Lyons , the state has failed to carry its burden of proving clearly and convincingly that Mr. Frye freely and voluntarily consented to the search of his home. 2007"That burden is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority." Id. citing Royer at 497 . {¶ 45} In this case, as in Lyons , the state has failed to carry their burden of proving clearly and convincingly that the appellant freely and voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
United States v. Mateen Yusuf Shabazz, A/K/A Edward L. Eberhart, A/K/A Edward Wallace, and Keith Lamar Parker
green
2 sentences2002Recently, we have employed the six-factor test used in United States v. Shabazz (C.A. 5, 1993), 993 F.2d 431 , to assess the voluntary nature of consent. 2000Recently, we have employed the six-factor test used in United States v. Shabazz (C.A.5, 1993), 993 F.2d 431 , to assess the voluntary nature of consent. | 2 | 2000–2002 |
State v. Ojezua
green
1 sentence2019Assignment of Error #2 – Consent to Search Vehicle {¶ 22} Although a search warrant ordinarily is required before a police officer may search an individual’s property, “[c]onsent is an exception to the warrant requirement.” Ojezua, 2016-Ohio-2659 , 50 N.E.3d 14 , at ¶ 15. “[T]he State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.” Id., quoting State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 243 , 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Florida v. Royer, 46 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. George
green
1 sentence2019Montgomery No. 25945, 2014-Ohio-4853, ¶ 28 . “[A] search may be lawful even if the person giving consent does not recite the talismanic phrase ‘You have my permission to search.’ * * *” Id. at ¶ 83, quoting State v. Lane, 2d Dist. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Drayton
green
2 sentences2015Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d at 243 , 685 N.E.2d at 770 . {¶29} The United States Supreme Court further noted, “[w]hile most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.” I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); Drayton, supra, 536 U.S. at 205 , 122 S.Ct. at 2113 . 2015Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d at 243 , 685 N.E.2d at 770 . {¶29} The United States Supreme Court further noted, “[w]hile most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.” I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); Drayton, supra, 536 U.S. at 205 , 122 S.Ct. at 2113 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgado
green
2 sentences2015Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d at 243 , 685 N.E.2d at 770 . {¶29} The United States Supreme Court further noted, “[w]hile most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.” I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); Drayton, supra, 536 U.S. at 205 , 122 S.Ct. at 2113 . 2015Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d at 243 , 685 N.E.2d at 770 . {¶29} The United States Supreme Court further noted, “[w]hile most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.” I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 , 104 S.Ct. 1758 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); Drayton, supra, 536 U.S. at 205 , 122 S.Ct. at 2113 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Barnes
green
2 sentences2012“Once an individual has been unlawfully detained by law enforcement, for his or her consent to be considered an independent act of free will, the totality of the circumstances must clearly demonstrate that a reasonable person would believe that he or she had the freedom to refuse to answer further questions and could in fact leave.” Robinette II at 245-246, citing Bustamonte; Royer; State v. Barnes, 25 Ohio St.3d 203, 208-209 , 495 N.E.2d 922 (1986). {¶19} The facts in Robinette mirror those before this court. 2012“Once an individual has been unlawfully detained by law enforcement, for his or her consent to be considered an independent act of free will, the totality of the circumstances must clearly demonstrate that a reasonable person would believe that he or she had the freedom to refuse to answer further questions and could in fact leave.” Robinette II at 245-246, citing Bustamonte; Royer; State v. Barnes, 25 Ohio St.3d 203, 208-209 , 495 N.E.2d 922 (1986). {¶19} The facts in Robinette mirror those before this court. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Jackson
green
1 sentence2005State v. Jackson (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 137 , 142 , citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248 — 49. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.