literal requirement (New York) · Go Syfert
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literal requirement in New York

7 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1879–2000 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
Balram v. Etheridgegreen
nycivct · 1982 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
1 sentence

1989Co. v Kranz, 96 Misc 2d 396 ; see also, Balram v Etheridge, 113 Misc 2d 251 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1982]; Matter of Filippazzo v Garden Face Brickface Co., 120 AD2d 663 [2d Dept 1986].) The public policy rationale behind CPLR 4544 was to protect residential tenants and consumers who are at risk when entering into contracts drawn up by others and presented to them on a take-or-leave basis.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

CaseCitedYears
Bergan v. Home for Incurables green
nyappdiv · 1986
1 sentence

2000The consistent rule has been that an affidavit of merit is required (Kougianos v City of New York, 234 AD2d 14 ; Bergan v Home for Incurables, 124 AD2d 517 ).

12000–2000
Kougianos v. City of New York neutral
nyappdiv · 1996
1 sentence

2000The consistent rule has been that an affidavit of merit is required (Kougianos v City of New York, 234 AD2d 14 ; Bergan v Home for Incurables, 124 AD2d 517 ).

12000–2000
Filippazzo v. Garden State Brickface Co. green
nyappdiv · 1986
1 sentence

1989Co. v Kranz, 96 Misc 2d 396 ; see also, Balram v Etheridge, 113 Misc 2d 251 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1982]; Matter of Filippazzo v Garden Face Brickface Co., 120 AD2d 663 [2d Dept 1986].) The public policy rationale behind CPLR 4544 was to protect residential tenants and consumers who are at risk when entering into contracts drawn up by others and presented to them on a take-or-leave basis.

11989–1989
Sorbonne Apartments Co. v. Kranz neutral
nycivct · 1978
1 sentence

1989Co. v Kranz, 96 Misc 2d 396 ; see also, Balram v Etheridge, 113 Misc 2d 251 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1982]; Matter of Filippazzo v Garden Face Brickface Co., 120 AD2d 663 [2d Dept 1986].) The public policy rationale behind CPLR 4544 was to protect residential tenants and consumers who are at risk when entering into contracts drawn up by others and presented to them on a take-or-leave basis.

11989–1989
Koslowski v. Palmieri green
nyappterm · 1979
1 sentence

1989(See, for example, Koslowski v Palmieri, 98 Misc 2d 885 [App Term, 2d Dept 1979] [despite the literal requirement of CPLR 4544 (prior to the 1979 amendment to this provision) that precluded consideration of a lease provision only where the clause was both small and illegible, the Legislature’s obvious intent was that the type be both clear and the proper size]; accord, Sorbonne Apts.

11989–1989
Webster Associates v. Town of Webster green
ny · 1983
1 sentence

1984Thus, the failure to comply with the literal requirement of the SEQRA regulations does not require a reversal of the Commissioner’s determination (see Webster Assoc. v Town of Webster, 59 NY2d 220 ).

11984–1984
Carter, Macy Co. v. Matthews neutral
nyappdiv · 1927
1 sentence

1955The court will not permit mere verbiage to defeat the apparent purpose intended by the testator (Carter, Macy Co. v. Matthews, 220 App. Div. 679, 683 , affd. 247 N. Y. 532 ; Collister v. Fassitt, 163 N. Y. 281, 286 ; Atwater & Co. v. Panama R.

11955–1955
Collister v. . Fassitt green
ny · 1900
1 sentence

1955The court will not permit mere verbiage to defeat the apparent purpose intended by the testator (Carter, Macy Co. v. Matthews, 220 App. Div. 679, 683 , affd. 247 N. Y. 532 ; Collister v. Fassitt, 163 N. Y. 281, 286 ; Atwater & Co. v. Panama R.

11955–1955
Carter, MacY Company, Inc. v. Matthews neutral
ny · 1928
1 sentence

1955The court will not permit mere verbiage to defeat the apparent purpose intended by the testator (Carter, Macy Co. v. Matthews, 220 App. Div. 679, 683 , affd. 247 N. Y. 532 ; Collister v. Fassitt, 163 N. Y. 281, 286 ; Atwater & Co. v. Panama R.

11955–1955
Amelsburg v. Lunning green
iowa · 1944
1 sentence

1948In other words, there was substantial evidence adduced, which, if believed by the jury, constituted legal excuse for the technical noncompliance with the literal requirement of the statute, and the verdict returned by the jury, being itself thus supported, in turn supports the judgment based upon it of which plaintiff now complains.” In Amelsburg v. Lunning ( 234 Iowa 852 ) the plaintiff was injured as the result of a collision between two motor vehicles, one being operated by the plaintiff and the other by the defendant.

11948–1948
Landreth v. Wyckoff neutral
nyappdiv · 1901
1 sentence

1930In Landreth v. Wyckoff (supra) the literal rule laid down in the Passinger case was followed.

11930–1930
United States v. Linn neutral
scotus · 1841
1 sentence

1879The supreme political power, acting through its officers, is competent to take as security for official good conduct an obligation in writing not squaring with the literal requirement of the authorizing statute : (The United States v. Linn, 15 Peters, 290 ; The Same v. Hodson, 10 Wall., 395 .) The executive officer of a county has been held to be so ; (Morse v. Hodsden, 5 Mass., 318 ); and a judicial officer of a county ; (Thomas v. White, 12 id., 369 ); and the directors of a bank (Bank of Brighton v. Smith, 5 Allen, 415 ).

11879–1879
United States v. Hodson green
scotus · 1870
1 sentence

1879The supreme political power, acting through its officers, is competent to take as security for official good conduct an obligation in writing not squaring with the literal requirement of the authorizing statute : (The United States v. Linn, 15 Peters, 290 ; The Same v. Hodson, 10 Wall., 395 .) The executive officer of a county has been held to be so ; (Morse v. Hodsden, 5 Mass., 318 ); and a judicial officer of a county ; (Thomas v. White, 12 id., 369 ); and the directors of a bank (Bank of Brighton v. Smith, 5 Allen, 415 ).

11879–1879

Where else courts name it

CA 11 (1930–2021) NY 7 (1879–2000) MI 7 (1973–1994) DE 6 (1973–1981) FL 5 (1961–2007) LA 4 (1958–2009) WV 4 (1982–1999) RI 3 (2001–2012) WA 3 (1985–2013) IL 3 (1983–2022) HI 3 (1969–2005) AL 2 (1983–1992) ME 2 (1921–1938) MA 2 (2011–2013) WI 2 (1976–1983)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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