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6 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1956–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Central Trust Co. v. Danngreen1 sentence2022Co., 85 NY2d at 772, quoting Reichert, 172 NY at 88 ). | 1 | 1 |
Sikora v. Keillorgreen1 sentence2004It reasoned that the purpose of the statutory immunity was “to encourage and facilitate” service by volunteer firefighters, and found that this purpose would not be accomplished if the immunity from liability was not extended to the owner of the vehicle which was used by the firefighter in the performance of those duties (see Sikora v Keillor, supra at 7). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Reichert v. . Stilwell
green
1 sentence2022Co., 85 NY2d at 772, quoting Reichert, 172 NY at 88 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Nelson v. Garcia
green
1 sentence2004However, the Court in Nelson v Garcia ( 152 AD2d 22 [1989], supra) did not limit its analysis to the policy-based rationale of Sikora. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Simmons v. Department of Fire
green
1 sentence1985The purpose of the statutory requirement is to avoid “the intermittent and irritating * * * delays caused by prior-statement turnovers” (Bellacosa, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 240.45, p 408) and, absent bad faith or prejudice, not present here, the appropriate remedy for noncompliance is an adjournment, not preclusion (People v Keppler, 92 AD2d 1032, 1033 ; People v Napierala, 90 AD2d 689 ). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Keppler
green
1 sentence1985The purpose of the statutory requirement is to avoid “the intermittent and irritating * * * delays caused by prior-statement turnovers” (Bellacosa, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 240.45, p 408) and, absent bad faith or prejudice, not present here, the appropriate remedy for noncompliance is an adjournment, not preclusion (People v Keppler, 92 AD2d 1032, 1033 ; People v Napierala, 90 AD2d 689 ). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co.
green
1 sentence1980A beneficial interest in a trust is a vested property right (Whittemore v Equitable Trust Co. of N. Y., 250 NY 298 ) which cannot be revoked except in accordance with law or upon the holder’s consent. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Younger v. . Duffie
green
1 sentence1962The purpose of the statutory requirement that the testator and the attesting witnesses sign “ at the end of the will ” is to prevent fraudulent additions to a will after the execution (Younger v. Duffie, 94 N. Y. 535 ; Matter of Gibson, 128 App. Div. 769, appeal dismissed 195 N. Y. 466 ). | 1 | 1962–1962 |
In Re the Probate of the Will of Field
green
1 sentence1962Where there is obviously no chance that a fraud has been perpetrated it has been the tendency of the courts to have a less rigid approach (Matter of Field, 204 N. Y. 448 ). | 1 | 1962–1962 |
In Re the Probate of Will of Gibson
neutral
1 sentence1962The purpose of the statutory requirement that the testator and the attesting witnesses sign “ at the end of the will ” is to prevent fraudulent additions to a will after the execution (Younger v. Duffie, 94 N. Y. 535 ; Matter of Gibson, 128 App. Div. 769, appeal dismissed 195 N. Y. 466 ). | 1 | 1962–1962 |
In re Proving the Last Will & Testament of Gibson
green
1 sentence1962The purpose of the statutory requirement that the testator and the attesting witnesses sign “ at the end of the will ” is to prevent fraudulent additions to a will after the execution (Younger v. Duffie, 94 N. Y. 535 ; Matter of Gibson, 128 App. Div. 769, appeal dismissed 195 N. Y. 466 ). | 1 | 1962–1962 |
In re the Probate of the Will of Winters
neutral
1 sentence1956In short, the statute is complied with when subscription of the paper is not followed by matter either essential to its validity or of such importance to the testator’s intention regarding the administration of his estate as to form an integral part of his will (Matter of Winters, 277 App. Div. 24 , affd. 302 N. Y. 666 ). | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.