purpose of the statutory requirement in California

2025Proc., § 906.) “The purpose of the statutory exception is to allow a respondent to assert a legal theory which may result in affirmance of the judgment.” (California State Employees’ Assn. v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 382, fn. 7 .) Without having cross-appealed, a party can properly raise an argument in its capacity as a respondent that shows the trial court reached the right result, even if on the wrong theory.

2015Code of Civil Procedure section 906 provides a limited exception to the rule that a respondent may not urge error; it allows a respondent to “request the reviewing court to . . . review [the judgment] for the purpose of determining whether or not the appellant was prejudiced by the error or errors upon which he relies for reversal or modification of the judgment from which the appeal is taken.” “The purpose of the statutory exception is to allow a respondent to assert a legal theory which may result in affirmance of the judgment.” (California State Employees’ Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1986

2019Henselmeier is Blakely's mother, McHugh's successor-in interest, and a contingent beneficiary under the policy. 3 respondent who has not appealed from the judgment may not urge error on appeal. [Citation.] A limited exception to this rule is provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 906, which states in pertinent part: 'The respondent . . . may, without appealing from [the] judgment, request the reviewing court to and it may review any of the foregoing [described orders or rulings] for the purpose of determining whether or not the appellant was prejudiced by the error or errors upon which he

2014(Estate of Powell (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439 .) A limited exception to this rule is provided by section 906, which states in pertinent part: “The respondent . . . may, without appealing from [the] judgment, request the reviewing court to and it may review any of the foregoing [described orders or rulings] for the purpose of determining whether or not the appellant was prejudiced by the error or errors upon which he relies for reversal or modification of the judgment from which the appeal is taken.” “‘The purpose of the statutory exception is to allow a respondent to assert a legal theory

2021Driver (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 48, 57 [without filing a separate cross-appeal, a respondent may properly raise an argument that shows the trial court reached the right result, “even if on the wrong theory”].) The limited statutory exception does not apply here because, if we were to agree with defendants’ argument, the result would not be affirmance of the judgment on a different legal theory.

2010Driver (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 48, 57 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 535 ]; Central Manufacturing District, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (1960) 176 Cal.App.2d 850, 857 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 733 ].) The County casts its challenges to the trial court’s tax increment rulings in this mold, arguing that they are additional theories supporting affirmance of the judgment.

2020(In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1204, 1207 (Manzy W.); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.780(e)(5), 5.795(a).) “This declaration must be made at or before disposition.” (In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119 , 1125 (G.C.).) 12 The purpose of the statutory requirement is “twofold:” “it helps determine the length of any present or future confinement for a wobbler offense” and “ it ‘ensur[es] that the juvenile court is aware of, and actually exercises, its discretion under . . . [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 702.’ ” (G.C., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1125.) “It is not sufficient that

2020(In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1204, 1207 (Manzy W.); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.780(e)(5), 5.795(a).) “This declaration must be made at or before disposition.” (In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119 , 1125 (G.C.).) Moreover, the requirement applies even when a minor admits the offense because the “minor’s admission of a wobbler offense charged as a felony is not an ‘adjudication’ of the misdemeanor or felony status of that offense.” (In re Nancy C. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 508, 512 .) The purpose of the statutory requirement is “twofold:” “it helps determine the length of any pre

2010Driver (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 48, 57 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 535 ]; Central Manufacturing District, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (1960) 176 Cal.App.2d 850, 857 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 733 ].) The County casts its challenges to the trial court’s tax increment rulings in this mold, arguing that they are additional theories supporting affirmance of the judgment.

2010Driver (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 48, 57 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 535 ]; Central Manufacturing District, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (1960) 176 Cal.App.2d 850, 857 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 733 ].) The County casts its challenges to the trial court’s tax increment rulings in this mold, arguing that they are additional theories supporting affirmance of the judgment.

2009Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 514 P.2d 1224 ].) Interpretation of the statutory language should be consistent and harmonized with the purpose of the statutory framework for workers’ compensation as a whole.

2009Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 514 P.2d 1224 ].) Interpretation of the statutory language should be consistent and harmonized with the purpose of the statutory framework for workers’ compensation as a whole.

2002(Clark v. Jordan, supra, 7 Cal.2d 248 [finding no substantial compliance where short title does not reveal initiative measure would affect taxes]; Mervyn’s v. Reyes (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 93, 104 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 148 ] [omitting 17 pages of general plan section did not constitute substantial compliance]; Hebard v. Bybee, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th 1331 [no substantial compliance where title of ordinance in referendum petition was inaccurate]; Ibarra v. City of Carson (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 90, 99 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 485 ] [“[w]here the purpose of the statutory requirement is to give information to the pu

1989(E.g., Creighton v. Reviczky (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 1225, 1233 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 834 ] [referendum petition did not contain full text of ordinance sought to be repealed]; Chase v. Brooks (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 657, 664 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 65 ] [same]; Myers v. Patterson, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at pp. 138-139 [petition did not contain a copy of the notice of intent to circulate, although the notice had otherwise been published].) In the present case, as we have discussed, the requirement to give notice of intent prior to commencing circulation serves important purposes educating the public about the pet

2018Governing Principles Evidence Code section 703.5 states: "No person presiding at any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, and no arbitrator or mediator, shall be competent to testify, in any subsequent civil proceeding, as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling, occurring at or in conjunction with the prior proceeding, except as to a statement or conduct that could (a) give rise to civil or criminal *1035 contempt, (b) constitute a crime, (c) be the subject of investigation by the *95 State Bar or Commission on Judicial Performance, or (d) give rise to disqualification proceedings un

2018Governing Principles Evidence Code section 703.5 states: "No person presiding at any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, and no arbitrator or mediator, shall be competent to testify, in any subsequent civil proceeding, as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling, occurring at or in conjunction with the prior proceeding, except as to a statement or conduct that could (a) give rise to civil or criminal *1035 contempt, (b) constitute a crime, (c) be the subject of investigation by the *95 State Bar or Commission on Judicial Performance, or (d) give rise to disqualification proceedings un

2014(Estate of Powell (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439 .) A limited exception to this rule is provided by section 906, which states in pertinent part: “The respondent . . . may, without appealing from [the] judgment, request the reviewing court to and it may review any of the foregoing [described orders or rulings] for the purpose of determining whether or not the appellant was prejudiced by the error or errors upon which he relies for reversal or modification of the judgment from which the appeal is taken.” “‘The purpose of the statutory exception is to allow a respondent to assert a legal theory

2014(Estate of Powell (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439 .) A limited exception to this rule is provided by section 906, which states in pertinent part: “The respondent . . . may, without appealing from [the] judgment, request the reviewing court to and it may review any of the foregoing [described orders or rulings] for the purpose of determining whether or not the appellant was prejudiced by the error or errors upon which he relies for reversal or modification of the judgment from which the appeal is taken.” “‘The purpose of the statutory exception is to allow a respondent to assert a legal theory

2008Accordingly, [plaintiff] has no exclusivity with respect to the area.” If plaintiff claimed the FIS area was under the exclusive control of the federal government, a logical implication is that plaintiff was also claiming that it had no independent right and ability to exercise significant authority and control over the management of the area. (§ 107, subd. (a)(1); Cal. Code Regs., tit 18, § 20, subds. (a), (c)(5).) As noted in Focus Cable of Oakland, Inc. v. County of Alameda (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 519 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 95 ], California courts “liberally construe claims for refund of taxes. ...

2008Accordingly, [plaintiff] has no exclusivity with respect to the area.” If plaintiff claimed the FIS area was under the exclusive control of the federal government, a logical implication is that plaintiff was also claiming that it had no independent right and ability to exercise significant authority and control over the management of the area. (§ 107, subd. (a)(1); Cal. Code Regs., tit 18, § 20, subds. (a), (c)(5).) As noted in Focus Cable of Oakland, Inc. v. County of Alameda (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 519 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 95 ], California courts “liberally construe claims for refund of taxes. ...

2021Corp. v. International Hotel Tenants’ Assn. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 604, 611 [“the Legislature did intend to distinguish between notice requirements on subtenants as opposed to tenants, the intent clearly being to provide an opportunity for a subtenant to cure his tenant’s default except where, as here, the default is 7 incurable because the term has expired”], Fifth & Broadway Partnership v. Kimny, Inc., supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at p. 202 [“The purpose of the statutory requirement of notice is to give the tenant, or the subtenant in actual possession, the opportunity to pay the rent and thereby ret

2021Corp. v. International Hotel Tenants’ Assn. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 604, 611 [“the Legislature did intend to distinguish between notice requirements on subtenants as opposed to tenants, the intent clearly being to provide an opportunity for a subtenant to cure his tenant’s default except where, as here, the default is 7 incurable because the term has expired”], Fifth & Broadway Partnership v. Kimny, Inc., supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at p. 202 [“The purpose of the statutory requirement of notice is to give the tenant, or the subtenant in actual possession, the opportunity to pay the rent and thereby ret

2021Corp. v. International Hotel Tenants’ Assn. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 604, 611 [“the Legislature did intend to distinguish between notice requirements on subtenants as opposed to tenants, the intent clearly being to provide an opportunity for a subtenant to cure his tenant’s default except where, as here, the default is 7 incurable because the term has expired”], Fifth & Broadway Partnership v. Kimny, Inc., supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at p. 202 [“The purpose of the statutory requirement of notice is to give the tenant, or the subtenant in actual possession, the opportunity to pay the rent and thereby ret

2020(In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1204, 1207 (Manzy W.); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.780(e)(5), 5.795(a).) “This declaration must be made at or before disposition.” (In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119 , 1125 (G.C.).) Moreover, the requirement applies even when a minor admits the offense because the “minor’s admission of a wobbler offense charged as a felony is not an ‘adjudication’ of the misdemeanor or felony status of that offense.” (In re Nancy C. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 508, 512 .) The purpose of the statutory requirement is “twofold:” “it helps determine the length of any pre

2015(Department of Parks & Recreation v. State Personnel Bd. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 813, 823 (Department of Parks & Rec.); Cal. Const., art.

2015(State Personnel Bd. v. Department of Personnel Admin. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 512, 522 (State Personnel Bd.); Boren v. State Personnel Board (1951) 37 Cal.2d 634, 638 .) 5 Code of Civil Procedure section 906 creates an exception allowing a respondent to request that the reviewing court review the trial court’s order or rulings “for the purpose of determining whether or not the appellant was prejudiced by the error or errors upon which he relies for reversal or modification of the judgment from which the appeal is taken.” (See California State Employees’ Assn. v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 178 Cal.

2013Defendant asserts that the purpose of the statutory requirement of a standardized protocol is “[t]o help prevent arbitrary governmental action in the commitment of SVPs.” He argues somewhat obliquely that the 2009 protocol cannot achieve this objective because “[i]f each evaluator is free to employ whatever evaluation method he or she chooses, there is no assurance that the method chosen will be proper or reliable.” Quoting People v. Superior Court (Gary) (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 207, 216 (Gary), he writes, “ ‘[A]bsent any standards, the director’s decision will be completely discretionary and co

2012(Cochran, at p. 402.) None of the express provisions of section 311.4(c) nor any aspect of the purpose of the statutory framework of which that subdivision is a part— namely, “ ‘ “combat[ting] the exploitive use of children in the production of pornography” ’ ” (Cochran, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 402)—evinces a legislative intent to require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as an essential element of a violation of section 311.4(c) charge, that the accused committed an act of directing an alleged child victim to pose or model.

2012In other words, no foul, no harm.” (Erikson v. Weiner (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1663, 1671 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 362 ].) Here, if father was not a Kelsey S. father, his parental rights may be terminated under the far less stringent best interests of the child standard.

2012In other words, no foul, no harm.” (Erikson v. Weiner (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1663, 1671 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 362 ].) Here, if father was not a Kelsey S. father, his parental rights may be terminated under the far less stringent best interests of the child standard.