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7 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2002 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Morones v. Stategreen2 sentences1990"The purpose of the statutory requirement for a court inquiry as to basic facts is to protect the defendant who pleads guilty voluntarily and understanding the charge brought but not realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the statutory definition of the charge." Morones v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 544, 552 , 213 N.W.2d 31, 36 (1973). 1990"The purpose of the statutory requirement for a court inquiry as to basic facts is to protect the defendant who pleads guilty voluntarily and understanding the charge brought but not realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the statutory definition of the charge." Morones v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 544, 552 , 213 N.W.2d 31, 36 (1973). | 2 | 3 |
Brandt v. Labor & Industry Review Commissiongreen2 sentences2002If the purpose of the statutory rule is fulfilled, then we consider the defect to be technical and not fundamental.") (internal citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Schaefer v. Riegelman, 2002 WI 18 , 250 Wis. 2d 494 , 639 N.W. 2d 715 ; see Brandt, 166 Wis. 2d at 634 , 480 N.W.2d at 499 (failure to join adverse party as a defendant is a "fundamental defect" even though adverse party knew of proceeding because "knowledge that a suit is pending is not the equivalent of service") (quoted source omitted). 2002If the purpose of the statutory rule is fulfilled, then we consider the defect to be technical and not fundamental.") (internal citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Schaefer v. Riegelman, 2002 WI 18 , 250 Wis. 2d 494 , 639 N.W. 2d 715 ; see Brandt, 166 Wis. 2d at 634 , 480 N.W.2d at 499 (failure to join adverse party as a defendant is a "fundamental defect" even though adverse party knew of proceeding because "knowledge that a suit is pending is not the equivalent of service") (quoted source omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Schaefer v. Riegelmangreen2 sentences2002If the purpose of the statutory rule is fulfilled, then we consider the defect to be technical and not fundamental.") (internal citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Schaefer v. Riegelman, 2002 WI 18 , 250 Wis. 2d 494 , 639 N.W. 2d 715 ; see Brandt, 166 Wis. 2d at 634 , 480 N.W.2d at 499 (failure to join adverse party as a defendant is a "fundamental defect" even though adverse party knew of proceeding because "knowledge that a suit is pending is not the equivalent of service") (quoted source omitted). 2002If the purpose of the statutory rule is fulfilled, then we consider the defect to be technical and not fundamental.") (internal citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Schaefer v. Riegelman, 2002 WI 18 , 250 Wis. 2d 494 , 639 N.W. 2d 715 ; see Brandt, 166 Wis. 2d at 634 , 480 N.W.2d at 499 (failure to join adverse party as a defendant is a "fundamental defect" even though adverse party knew of proceeding because "knowledge that a suit is pending is not the equivalent of service") (quoted source omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stoehrgreen2 sentences1993As the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in explaining the purpose of the statutory privilege: The statutory privilege defense was intended to protect a public officer who, but for the defense provided in sec. 939.45, would be guilty of a crime if he or she were acting as a private citizen, and whose unlawful conduct has "sufficient value to society so that it ought not subject the actor to criminal liability." The statutory privilege defense is designed to provide a justification for conduct which "must be in accord with the actor's function as a public servant, and must be necessary and proport 1993As the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in explaining the purpose of the statutory privilege: The statutory privilege defense was intended to protect a public officer who, but for the defense provided in sec. 939.45, would be guilty of a crime if he or she were acting as a private citizen, and whose unlawful conduct has "sufficient value to society so that it ought not subject the actor to criminal liability." The statutory privilege defense is designed to provide a justification for conduct which "must be in accord with the actor's function as a public servant, and must be necessary and proport | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Burnett v. Hill
green
2 sentences2000And, in Burnett v. Hill, 207 Wis. 2d 110, 125 , 557 N.W.2d 800 (1997), the court similarly concluded that a plaintiffs service of an unauthenticated copy of a publication summons, along with authenticated copies of the original summons and complaint, fulfilled the purpose of the statutory requirement for authentication, and was therefore not a fundamental error. 2000And, in Burnett v. Hill, 207 Wis. 2d 110, 125 , 557 N.W.2d 800 (1997), the court similarly concluded that a plaintiffs service of an unauthenticated copy of a publication summons, along with authenticated copies of the original summons and complaint, fulfilled the purpose of the statutory requirement for authentication, and was therefore not a fundamental error. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Moes v. State
green
2 sentences1986In Moes v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 756, 765 , 284 N.W.2d 66 (1979), the court stated, “[I]f the defendant introduces evidence to establish a statutory defense to criminal liability, the defendant must be found not guilty unless the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant notwithstanding the proffered *85 defense.” See also 2 Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 149(a), pp. 216-17 (1984). 9 The 1953 Wisconsin Legislative Council Judiciary Committee Report, p. 39, states the purpose of the statutory privilege as follows: “Subsection (3) recognizes that a public official 1986In Moes v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 756, 765 , 284 N.W.2d 66 (1979), the court stated, “[I]f the defendant introduces evidence to establish a statutory defense to criminal liability, the defendant must be found not guilty unless the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant notwithstanding the proffered *85 defense.” See also 2 Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 149(a), pp. 216-17 (1984). 9 The 1953 Wisconsin Legislative Council Judiciary Committee Report, p. 39, states the purpose of the statutory privilege as follows: “Subsection (3) recognizes that a public official | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.