psychological factors in California

2013Like the proposed expert evidence regarding the psychological factors that might affect the accuracy of *953 eyewitness identifications at issue in People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 ], or the proposed expert evidence (that the defendant’s psychological test results did not suggest sexual deviancy) at issue in People v. Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d 1136 , the evidence here was not a new scientific technique or procedure but merely expert opinion evidence.

2013Like the proposed expert evidence regarding the psychological factors that might affect the accuracy of *953 eyewitness identifications at issue in People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 ], or the proposed expert evidence (that the defendant’s psychological test results did not suggest sexual deviancy) at issue in People v. Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d 1136 , the evidence here was not a new scientific technique or procedure but merely expert opinion evidence.

2015(See, e.g., People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 995 [“Expert testimony on the psychological factors affecting eyewitness identification is often unnecessary”]; People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 377 [whether to admit or exclude expert testimony on psychological factors impacting eyewitness identification “remains primarily a matter within the trial court’s discretion”], overruled on other grounds in People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 914 .) And, here, significantly, we do not know why defense counsel failed to seek appointment of such an expert, given that she was nev

2014Moreover, the court was correct that expert testimony is generally unnecessary on issues of common knowledge, including “the psychological factors affecting eyewitness identification.” (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 995 .) Such evidence ordinarily is needed only when ‘“an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the prosecution’s case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability.”’ (People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1111 .) In such 7 cases, expert testimony may be necessary to explain “specific psychological

2018When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the prosecution's case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability, and the defendant offers qualified expert testimony on specific psychological factors shown by the record that could have affected the accuracy of the identification but are not likely to be fully known to or understood by the jury, it will ordinarily be error to exclude that testimony ." ( McDonald , supra , 37 Cal.3d at p. 377 , 208 Cal.Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 , italics added.) Under McDonald , we review a trial co

2018When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the prosecution's case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability, and the defendant offers qualified expert testimony on specific psychological factors shown by the record that could have affected the accuracy of the identification but are not likely to be fully known to or understood by the jury, it will ordinarily be error to exclude that testimony ." ( McDonald , supra , 37 Cal.3d at p. 377 , 208 Cal.Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 , italics added.) Under McDonald , we review a trial co

2021(People v. Datt (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 942, 952 .) To the contrary, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[e]xpert testimony on the psychological factors affecting eyewitness identification is often unnecessary.” (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 995 ; see People v. McDonald, at p. 377 [“[w]e expect that such evidence will not often be needed”].) 26 As the trial court explained in denying the motion for new trial, this was not a typical eyewitness identification case.

2014(See People v. Datt (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 942, 952 .) As stated by our Supreme Court, “[e]xpert testimony on the psychological factors affecting eyewitness identification is often unnecessary.” (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 995 .) The record suggests that this was a case in which an expert witness regarding eyewitness testimony did not fit with the defense theory and defense counsel therefore reasonably did not call an expert.

2020The Trial Court Was Within Its Discretion to Conclude That Although N.G.’s Delay May Have Been Due to Psychological Factors Arising From Sexual Assault, She Did Not Establish Psychological Disability for Relief Based on Mistake or Excusable Neglect N.G.’s final argument is that, taking into account the psychological factors that may cause a victim of sexual assault to delay in reporting an assault, the trial court should have concluded that she was under “the functional equivalent of a temporary psychological disability.” (Italics added.) According to N.G., “what [she] proved were facts unique

2020Specifically, T.M. argues that “the unique and daunting circumstances sexual assault victims like T.M. face, may create the functional equivalent of a psychological disability that effectively prevents them from reporting the assault, or to delay reporting it.” (Italics added.) As we have explained, case law establishes that psychological disability or severe emotional trauma justifies relief under section 946.6, subdivision (c)(3) only if it “substantially interfere[s] with [the petitioner’s] ability to function in daily life, take care of [her] personal and business affairs, or seek out lega

2020The Trial Court Was Within Its Discretion to Conclude That Although N.G.’s Delay May Have Been Due to Psychological Factors Arising From Sexual Assault, She Did Not Establish Psychological Disability for Relief Based on Mistake or Excusable Neglect N.G.’s final argument is that, taking into account the psychological factors that may cause a victim of sexual assault to delay in reporting an assault, the trial court should have concluded that she was under “the functional equivalent of a temporary psychological disability.” (Italics added.) According to N.G., “what [she] proved were facts unique

2020Specifically, T.M. argues that “the unique and daunting circumstances sexual assault victims like T.M. face, may create the functional equivalent of a psychological disability that effectively prevents them from reporting the assault, or to delay reporting it.” (Italics added.) As we have explained, case law establishes that psychological disability or severe emotional trauma justifies relief under section 946.6, subdivision (c)(3) only if it “substantially interfere[s] with [the petitioner’s] ability to function in daily life, take care of [her] personal and business affairs, or seek out lega

2018Code, § 801, subd. (a) ; People v. Chavez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 663 , 680, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 20 .) In particular, expert testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence is admissible to "inform[ ] the jury of certain factors that may affect such an identification in a typical case ...." ( McDonald , supra , 37 Cal.3d at pp. 370, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 .) The psychological factors and other circumstances that may affect an eyewitness identification are numerous and are listed in CALCRIM No. 315, which was given in this case.

2018Code, § 801, subd. (a) ; People v. Chavez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 663 , 680, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 20 .) In particular, expert testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence is admissible to "inform[ ] the jury of certain factors that may affect such an identification in a typical case ...." ( McDonald , supra , 37 Cal.3d at pp. 370, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 .) The psychological factors and other circumstances that may affect an eyewitness identification are numerous and are listed in CALCRIM No. 315, which was given in this case.

2025(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.47(c)(1), (2) [to maintain confidentiality, a party may file a motion to file a document under seal]; People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 617, fn. 38 , overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046 , 1069 & fn. 13, and superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1107, fn. 4 .) We clarify or expand upon the facts discussed by the parties where necessary “to adequately consider the issues presented.” (In re M.T. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 322 , 328–329.) Dr. Mogannam’s Aug

2022Indeed, the psychologist determined petitioner has “some issues related to 5 As explained post, the Governor ignores an important caveat at the end of this quote. 26 insight” due to his inability “to describe why he became involved in three murders over several days without seeking outside assistance” and because “[h]e struggled to explain why he would stay with his co-defendant for several days after the first murder.” But, the psychologist stated these issues related to insight are “of low relevance due to [petitioner’s] consistent ability to maintain prosocial behavior and avoid the influen

2021Most recently, in Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 411 , we rejected a claim challenging CALJIC No. 2.92’s certainty language based on “scientific studies [finding] that . . . there is, at best, a weak correlation between witness certainty and accuracy.” (Sánchez, at p. 461.) We explained that the studies defendant had cited were “nothing new” (id. at p. 462), noting that our decision in McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d 351 , decided 32 years earlier, had “cited some of [those studies] . . . [in support of its] holding that the trial court has discretion to admit expert testimony regarding the reliability

2021Most recently, in Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 411 , we rejected a claim challenging CALJIC No. 2.92’s certainty language based on “scientific studies [finding] that . . . there is, at best, a weak correlation between witness certainty and accuracy.” (Sánchez, at p. 461.) We explained that the studies defendant had cited were “nothing new” (id. at p. 462), noting that our decision in McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d 351 , decided 32 years earlier, had “cited some of [those studies] . . . [in support of its] holding that the trial court has discretion to admit expert testimony regarding the reliability

2020(Bettencourt, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 275 .) Applying that deferential standard, appellate courts have affirmed trial court orders denying relief even when the petitioner showed that the delay in attempting to file a claim arose because of circumstances that involved significant emotional trauma.

2020Our high court recently discussed Page and followed its reasoning in People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 14 .

2018If there is substantial evidence showing that the eyewitness testimony is reliable, the trial court may conclude that the probative value of the expert testimony would not outweigh any prejudicial effect caused by potential confusion of the issues and/or the amount of time that would be consumed by such testimony." ( People v. Goodwillie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 695 , 729-730, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 601 .) Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Shomer's expert testimony.

2018If there is substantial evidence showing that the eyewitness testimony is reliable, the trial court may conclude that the probative value of the expert testimony would not outweigh any prejudicial effect caused by potential confusion of the issues and/or the amount of time that would be consumed by such testimony." ( People v. Goodwillie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 695 , 729-730, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 601 .) Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Shomer's expert testimony.

2016In Wright, supra, at page 1141, the court held that ‘a proper instruction on eyewitness identification factors should focus the jury’s attention on facts relevant to its determination of the existence of reasonable doubt regarding identification, by listing, in a neutral manner, the relevant factors supported by the evidence. [¶] The instruction should not take a position as to the impact of each of the psychological factors listed.’ (Italics omitted.) In Gaglione, we noted that the Wright opinion ‘expressly approved CALJIC No. 2.92, commenting that CALJIC No. 2.92, with appropriate modificati

2016In Wright, supra, at page 1141, the court held that ‘a proper instruction on eyewitness identification factors should focus the jury’s attention on facts relevant to its determination of the existence of reasonable doubt regarding identification, by listing, in a neutral manner, the relevant factors supported by the evidence. [¶] The instruction should not take a position as to the impact of each of the psychological factors listed.’ (Italics omitted.) In Gaglione, we noted that the Wright opinion ‘expressly approved CALJIC No. 2.92, commenting that CALJIC No. 2.92, with appropriate modificati

2016In Wright, supra, at page 1141, the court held that ‘a proper instruction on eyewitness identification factors should focus the jury’s attention on facts relevant to its determination of the existence of reasonable doubt regarding identification, by listing, in a neutral manner, the relevant factors supported by the evidence. [¶] The instruction should not take a position as to the impact of each of the psychological factors listed.’ (Italics omitted.) In Gaglione, we noted that the Wright opinion ‘expressly approved CALJIC No. 2.92, commenting that CALJIC No. 2.92, with appropriate modificati

2014Code, § 801, subd. (a); McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 373 ; People v. Valdez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 494, 506 .) 4 In fact, at the hearing on the new trial motion, trial counsel testified she did not file a motion to challenge Thabiti’s pretrial identification of defendant because Thabiti Terry had “on his own and without police involvement” identified defendant. 13 “Expert testimony on the psychological factors affecting eyewitness identification is often unnecessary.

2014The jury did not need edification on the obvious fact that an unprovoked gang attack is a stressful event or that the passage of time frequently affects one’s memory.” (Id. at p. 555.) Under the circumstances of this case, it is not reasonably probable a different result would have occurred had the expert witness been allowed to testify. 7 (See People v. Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 510 ; McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 377 ; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) 7 We note that the type of expert testimony regarded favorably in McDonald has not been without its critics.