orthodox rule in Pennsylvania

1977Under the orthodox rule, voluntariness is determined solely by the judge; the jury considers voluntariness only as it affects the weight or credibility of the statement. [12] None of the other requested points for charge are germane to these appeals. [13] All of the cases wherein we ruled that a defendant's requested instruction was sufficient to alert the court to an error in its charge, Commonwealth v. Palmer, supra; Commonwealth v. Williams, 463 Pa. 370 , 344 A.2d 877 (1975); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 460 Pa. 665 , 334 A.2d 285 (1975); Commonwealth v. Sisak, supra, fit within this analysis.

1977Under the orthodox rule, voluntariness is determined solely by the judge; the jury considers voluntariness only as it affects the weight or credibility of the statement. [12] None of the other requested points for charge are germane to these appeals. [13] All of the cases wherein we ruled that a defendant's requested instruction was sufficient to alert the court to an error in its charge, Commonwealth v. Palmer, supra; Commonwealth v. Williams, 463 Pa. 370 , 344 A.2d 877 (1975); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 460 Pa. 665 , 334 A.2d 285 (1975); Commonwealth v. Sisak, supra, fit within this analysis.

1977Under the orthodox rule, voluntariness is determined solely by the judge; the jury considers voluntariness only as it affects the weight or credibility of the statement. [12] None of the other requested points for charge are germane to these appeals. [13] All of the cases wherein we ruled that a defendant's requested instruction was sufficient to alert the court to an error in its charge, Commonwealth v. Palmer, supra; Commonwealth v. Williams, 463 Pa. 370 , 344 A.2d 877 (1975); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 460 Pa. 665 , 334 A.2d 285 (1975); Commonwealth v. Sisak, supra, fit within this analysis.

1977Under the orthodox rule, voluntariness is determined solely by the judge; the jury considers voluntariness only as it affects the weight or credibility of the statement. [12] None of the other requested points for charge are germane to these appeals. [13] All of the cases wherein we ruled that a defendant's requested instruction was sufficient to alert the court to an error in its charge, Commonwealth v. Palmer, supra; Commonwealth v. Williams, 463 Pa. 370 , 344 A.2d 877 (1975); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 460 Pa. 665 , 334 A.2d 285 (1975); Commonwealth v. Sisak, supra, fit within this analysis.

1968Under the orthodox rule, the judge himself solely and finally determines the voluntariness of the confession, Jackson, supra, at page 378, and the jury considers voluntariness only as it affects the weight or credibility of the com fession.

1950Our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Blanchard, 345 Pa. 289 , made an exception to the orthodox rule in connection with a confession and treated it as substantive evidence against appellant.

1938Interest is, as a general rule, demandable from the date money is due: Minard v. Beans, 64 Pa. 411 .

1937(Va.) 705: “For reasons founded in wisdom and to prevent frauds and perjuries, the rules of the common law exclude such oral testimony of the alleged agreement; and as it cannot be proved by legal evidence, the agreement itself in legal contemplation, cannot be regarded as existing in fact.” In Wigmore’s 1934 “Supplement” to Wigmore on Evidence, there appears this statement under section 2431: “But this original form of the rule in Pennsylvania [referring to the rule laid down in Phillips v. Meily, 106 Pa. 536, 543 ] has now been abandoned for a form more nearly harmonizing with the orthodox r

1937(Va.) 705: “For reasons founded in wisdom and to prevent frauds and perjuries, the rules of the common law exclude such oral testimony of the alleged agreement; and as it cannot be proved by legal evidence, the agreement itself in legal contemplation, cannot be regarded as existing in fact.” In Wigmore’s 1934 “Supplement” to Wigmore on Evidence, there appears this statement under section 2431: “But this original form of the rule in Pennsylvania [referring to the rule laid down in Phillips v. Meily, 106 Pa. 536, 543 ] has now been abandoned for a form more nearly harmonizing with the orthodox r

1937(Va.) 705: “For reasons founded in wisdom and to prevent frauds and perjuries, the rules of the common law exclude such oral testimony of the alleged agreement; and as it cannot be proved by legal evidence, the agreement itself in legal contemplation, cannot be regarded as existing in fact.” In Wigmore’s 1934 “Supplement” to Wigmore on Evidence, there appears this statement under section 2431: “But this original form of the rule in Pennsylvania [referring to the rule laid down in Phillips v. Meily, 106 Pa. 536, 543 ] has now been abandoned for a form more nearly harmonizing with the orthodox r

1937(Va.) 705: “For reasons founded in wisdom and to prevent frauds and perjuries, the rules of the common law exclude such oral testimony of the alleged agreement; and as it cannot be proved by legal evidence, the agreement itself in legal contemplation, cannot be regarded as existing in fact.” In Wigmore’s 1934 “Supplement” to Wigmore on Evidence, there appears this statement under section 2431: “But this original form of the rule in Pennsylvania [referring to the rule laid down in Phillips v. Meily, 106 Pa. 536, 543 ] has now been abandoned for a form more nearly harmonizing with the orthodox r

1937(Va.) 705: “For reasons founded in wisdom and to prevent frauds and perjuries, the rules of the common law exclude such oral testimony of the alleged agreement; and as it cannot be proved by legal evidence, the agreement itself in legal contemplation, cannot be regarded as existing in fact.” In Wigmore’s 1934 “Supplement” to Wigmore on Evidence, there appears this statement under section 2431: “But this original form of the rule in Pennsylvania [referring to the rule laid down in Phillips v. Meily, 106 Pa. 536, 543 ] has now been abandoned for a form more nearly harmonizing with the orthodox r

1937(Va.) 705: “For reasons founded in wisdom and to prevent frauds and perjuries, the rules of the common law exclude such oral testimony of the alleged agreement; and as it cannot be proved by legal evidence, the agreement itself in legal contemplation, cannot be regarded as existing in fact.” In Wigmore’s 1934 “Supplement” to Wigmore on Evidence, there appears this statement under section 2431: “But this original form of the rule in Pennsylvania [referring to the rule laid down in Phillips v. Meily, 106 Pa. 536, 543 ] has now been abandoned for a form more nearly harmonizing with the orthodox r

1937(Va.) 705: “For reasons founded in wisdom and to prevent frauds and perjuries, the rules of the common law exclude such oral testimony of the alleged agreement; and as it cannot be proved by legal evidence, the agreement itself in legal contemplation, cannot be regarded as existing in fact.” In Wigmore’s 1934 “Supplement” to Wigmore on Evidence, there appears this statement under section 2431: “But this original form of the rule in Pennsylvania [referring to the rule laid down in Phillips v. Meily, 106 Pa. 536, 543 ] has now been abandoned for a form more nearly harmonizing with the orthodox r