orthodox test in California

1986The orthodox test under the United States or California constitutions for unconstitutional vagueness is whether the statute “ ‘either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application^] violating] the first essential of due process of law.’” (People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614,619 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ] [citing Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 [ 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 , 46 S.Ct. 126 ]].) However, “a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs w

1986The orthodox test under the United States or California constitutions for unconstitutional vagueness is whether the statute “ ‘either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application^] violating] the first essential of due process of law.’” (People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614,619 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ] [citing Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 [ 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 , 46 S.Ct. 126 ]].) However, “a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs w

2024The decision in People v. Guest (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 809 , 811–812 (Guest), reasoned as follows in rejecting the claim as to section 12022.7: “The orthodox test under the United States or California constitutions for unconstitutional vagueness is whether the statute ‘ “either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application . . . .” ’ [Citation.] However, ‘a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs words of long usage or with a common law meaning, “notwithstanding an element of

1986The orthodox test under the United States or California constitutions for unconstitutional vagueness is whether the statute “ ‘either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application^] violating] the first essential of due process of law.’” (People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614,619 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ] [citing Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 [ 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 , 46 S.Ct. 126 ]].) However, “a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs w

2007(See Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra, 393 U.S. at pp. 449-450 Thus the court was called upon `to determine *874 matters' at the very core of a religion — the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion.)" (Palm Springs, supra, 89 Cal.App.3d at pp. 921-922, 152 Cal.Rptr. 854 , italics added.) Now, that is a most novel reading of Watson , given that Watson had tried to get civil courts away from implied trust theory and toward a principle that would recognize "no heresy." (See Watson, supra, 80 U.S. at p. 728 ["The law knows no he

2000(Cf. Thompson v. City of Lake Elsinore, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 49, 58 [“The critical point... is that... the building official had already exercised its discretion ....

1992(Jack v. Wood (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 639, 646-647 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 856 ].) It is not sufficient if the defendant shows only that the action “may be, but is not necessarily, barred." (Moseley v. Abrams (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 355, 360 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 40 ] [error to sustain demurrer and dismiss action where complaint alleged discovery on or about a certain date].) *1065 Statute of Limitations The parties agree that the matter is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in section 338, subdivisions (b) and (d). 3 “The orthodox rule in tort actions is that the applicable limitation period will

1992(Jack v. Wood (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 639, 646-647 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 856 ].) It is not sufficient if the defendant shows only that the action “may be, but is not necessarily, barred." (Moseley v. Abrams (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 355, 360 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 40 ] [error to sustain demurrer and dismiss action where complaint alleged discovery on or about a certain date].) *1065 Statute of Limitations The parties agree that the matter is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in section 338, subdivisions (b) and (d). 3 “The orthodox rule in tort actions is that the applicable limitation period will

1992Public entity liability for such dangerous conditions is in the first instance defined and limited by statute (Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice, supra, § 3.3, pp. 180-181, as supplemented; cf. Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 809 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 842 , 685 P.2d 1193 ]; McCauley v. City of San Diego (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 981, 991 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 732 ]); the pertinent liability provision is Government Code section 835; section 835 provides for liability in specified circumstances “[e]xcept as provided by statute . . . .” (Italics added.)

1992Public entity liability for such dangerous conditions is in the first instance defined and limited by statute (Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice, supra, § 3.3, pp. 180-181, as supplemented; cf. Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 809 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 842 , 685 P.2d 1193 ]; McCauley v. City of San Diego (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 981, 991 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 732 ]); the pertinent liability provision is Government Code section 835; section 835 provides for liability in specified circumstances “[e]xcept as provided by statute . . . .” (Italics added.)

1992(Leaf v. City of San Mateo (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 398, 406 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 711 ].) Consequently, the applicable rule in such cases provides for delayed accrual of the cause of action until: “ ‘plaintiff either (1) actually discovered his injury and its negligent cause or (2) could have discovered injury and cause through the exercise of reasonable diligence ....’” (Id., at p. 407, italics omitted.) Conclusive Admissions in Complaint At the heart of Seeno’s summary judgment motion is its contention that the complaint contains a conclusive concession that significant structural damage was discove

1992(Leaf v. City of San Mateo (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 398, 406 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 711 ].) Consequently, the applicable rule in such cases provides for delayed accrual of the cause of action until: “ ‘plaintiff either (1) actually discovered his injury and its negligent cause or (2) could have discovered injury and cause through the exercise of reasonable diligence ....’” (Id., at p. 407, italics omitted.) Conclusive Admissions in Complaint At the heart of Seeno’s summary judgment motion is its contention that the complaint contains a conclusive concession that significant structural damage was discove

1992Public entity liability for such dangerous conditions is in the first instance defined and limited by statute (Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice, supra, § 3.3, pp. 180-181, as supplemented; cf. Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 809 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 842 , 685 P.2d 1193 ]; McCauley v. City of San Diego (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 981, 991 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 732 ]); the pertinent liability provision is Government Code section 835; section 835 provides for liability in specified circumstances “[e]xcept as provided by statute . . . .” (Italics added.)

1992Public entity liability for such dangerous conditions is in the first instance defined and limited by statute (Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice, supra, § 3.3, pp. 180-181, as supplemented; cf. Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 809 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 842 , 685 P.2d 1193 ]; McCauley v. City of San Diego (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 981, 991 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 732 ]); the pertinent liability provision is Government Code section 835; section 835 provides for liability in specified circumstances “[e]xcept as provided by statute . . . .” (Italics added.)

1992(Cf. Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1980) § 3.76, pp. 300-301; cf. also 9 Grossman & Van Alstyne, Cal. Practice: Pleading—Civil Actions (2d ed. 1981) § 1557, p. 164.) Nor, in these circumstances, shall we insist upon the orthodox rule that amotion for summary judgment be limited to issues raised by the pleadings (cf. Vanderbilt Growth Fund, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d 628, 635 ): Patently, both parties understood that these immunity issues were implicit in the fact situation, and the issues were fully argued on their merits on essentially un

1992(Cf. Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1980) § 3.76, pp. 300-301; cf. also 9 Grossman & Van Alstyne, Cal. Practice: Pleading—Civil Actions (2d ed. 1981) § 1557, p. 164.) Nor, in these circumstances, shall we insist upon the orthodox rule that amotion for summary judgment be limited to issues raised by the pleadings (cf. Vanderbilt Growth Fund, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d 628, 635 ): Patently, both parties understood that these immunity issues were implicit in the fact situation, and the issues were fully argued on their merits on essentially un

1992(Jack v. Wood (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 639, 646-647 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 856 ].) It is not sufficient if the defendant shows only that the action “may be, but is not necessarily, barred." (Moseley v. Abrams (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 355, 360 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 40 ] [error to sustain demurrer and dismiss action where complaint alleged discovery on or about a certain date].) *1065 Statute of Limitations The parties agree that the matter is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in section 338, subdivisions (b) and (d). 3 “The orthodox rule in tort actions is that the applicable limitation period will

1992(Jack v. Wood (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 639, 646-647 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 856 ].) It is not sufficient if the defendant shows only that the action “may be, but is not necessarily, barred." (Moseley v. Abrams (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 355, 360 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 40 ] [error to sustain demurrer and dismiss action where complaint alleged discovery on or about a certain date].) *1065 Statute of Limitations The parties agree that the matter is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in section 338, subdivisions (b) and (d). 3 “The orthodox rule in tort actions is that the applicable limitation period will

1992(Jack v. Wood (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 639, 646-647 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 856 ].) It is not sufficient if the defendant shows only that the action “may be, but is not necessarily, barred." (Moseley v. Abrams (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 355, 360 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 40 ] [error to sustain demurrer and dismiss action where complaint alleged discovery on or about a certain date].) *1065 Statute of Limitations The parties agree that the matter is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in section 338, subdivisions (b) and (d). 3 “The orthodox rule in tort actions is that the applicable limitation period will

1992(Jack v. Wood (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 639, 646-647 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 856 ].) It is not sufficient if the defendant shows only that the action “may be, but is not necessarily, barred." (Moseley v. Abrams (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 355, 360 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 40 ] [error to sustain demurrer and dismiss action where complaint alleged discovery on or about a certain date].) *1065 Statute of Limitations The parties agree that the matter is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in section 338, subdivisions (b) and (d). 3 “The orthodox rule in tort actions is that the applicable limitation period will

1992(Cf. Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1980) § 3.76, pp. 300-301; cf. also 9 Grossman & Van Alstyne, Cal. Practice: Pleading—Civil Actions (2d ed. 1981) § 1557, p. 164.) Nor, in these circumstances, shall we insist upon the orthodox rule that amotion for summary judgment be limited to issues raised by the pleadings (cf. Vanderbilt Growth Fund, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d 628, 635 ): Patently, both parties understood that these immunity issues were implicit in the fact situation, and the issues were fully argued on their merits on essentially un

1992(Cf. Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1980) § 3.76, pp. 300-301; cf. also 9 Grossman & Van Alstyne, Cal. Practice: Pleading—Civil Actions (2d ed. 1981) § 1557, p. 164.) Nor, in these circumstances, shall we insist upon the orthodox rule that amotion for summary judgment be limited to issues raised by the pleadings (cf. Vanderbilt Growth Fund, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d 628, 635 ): Patently, both parties understood that these immunity issues were implicit in the fact situation, and the issues were fully argued on their merits on essentially un

1991“It is an interesting theoretical point but one that we need not address in this case, as the instruction complained of could not have prejudiced [appellants].” (People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 92 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 793 P.2d 23 ].) 11 Moreover, in any event, the facts in the record before us do not indicate appellants could have been convicted here of felony murder as a result of killings which were not natural, reasonable, or probable consequences of the acts they aided and abetted.

1991“It is an interesting theoretical point but one that we need not address in this case, as the instruction complained of could not have prejudiced [appellants].” (People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 92 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 793 P.2d 23 ].) 11 Moreover, in any event, the facts in the record before us do not indicate appellants could have been convicted here of felony murder as a result of killings which were not natural, reasonable, or probable consequences of the acts they aided and abetted.

1991The suggestion is without merit.”], disapproved on another point in People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 287, fn. 36 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ].) The orthodox instruction on the first degree felony murder liability of aiders and abettors, CALJIC No. 8.27 (1984 rev.), ante, contains no such limitation of liability to only “natural and reasonable or probable consequences,” as does CALJIC No. 3.00 (1984 rev.) which the trial court gave in the context of liability for the robbery. 10 The Attorney General actually suggests the giving of CALJIC No. 3.00 (1984 rev.) in this context may h

1991The suggestion is without merit.”], disapproved on another point in People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 287, fn. 36 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ].) The orthodox instruction on the first degree felony murder liability of aiders and abettors, CALJIC No. 8.27 (1984 rev.), ante, contains no such limitation of liability to only “natural and reasonable or probable consequences,” as does CALJIC No. 3.00 (1984 rev.) which the trial court gave in the context of liability for the robbery. 10 The Attorney General actually suggests the giving of CALJIC No. 3.00 (1984 rev.) in this context may h

1986“If appellant is suggesting that he didn’t understand that [repeatedly stabbing] a person . . . [would] result in great bodily injury, his lack of understanding snaps the bounds of credulity.” (People v. Covino (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 660, 668 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 155 ].) Section 12022.7 is constitutional.

1986“If appellant is suggesting that he didn’t understand that [repeatedly stabbing] a person . . . [would] result in great bodily injury, his lack of understanding snaps the bounds of credulity.” (People v. Covino (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 660, 668 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 155 ].) Section 12022.7 is constitutional.

1986The orthodox test under the United States or California constitutions for unconstitutional vagueness is whether the statute “ ‘either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application^] violating] the first essential of due process of law.’” (People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614,619 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ] [citing Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 [ 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 , 46 S.Ct. 126 ]].) However, “a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs w

1986The orthodox test under the United States or California constitutions for unconstitutional vagueness is whether the statute “ ‘either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application^] violating] the first essential of due process of law.’” (People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614,619 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ] [citing Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 [ 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 , 46 S.Ct. 126 ]].) However, “a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs w

1986The orthodox test under the United States or California constitutions for unconstitutional vagueness is whether the statute “ ‘either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application^] violating] the first essential of due process of law.’” (People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614,619 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ] [citing Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 [ 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 , 46 S.Ct. 126 ]].) However, “a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs w

1986The orthodox test under the United States or California constitutions for unconstitutional vagueness is whether the statute “ ‘either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application^] violating] the first essential of due process of law.’” (People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614,619 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ] [citing Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 [ 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 , 46 S.Ct. 126 ]].) However, “a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs w

1986The orthodox test under the United States or California constitutions for unconstitutional vagueness is whether the statute “ ‘either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application^] violating] the first essential of due process of law.’” (People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614,619 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ] [citing Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 [ 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 , 46 S.Ct. 126 ]].) However, “a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs w

1986The orthodox test under the United States or California constitutions for unconstitutional vagueness is whether the statute “ ‘either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application^] violating] the first essential of due process of law.’” (People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614,619 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 772 , 408 P.2d 100 ] [citing Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391 [ 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 , 46 S.Ct. 126 ]].) However, “a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs w

1982Orthodox doctrine holds a stipulation is void only if contrary to public policy in effect when it was signed (e.g., Cooley v. County of Calaveras (1898) 121 Cal. 482, 485-486 [ 53 P. 1075 ]; Russell v. Soldinger (1976) 59 Cal. App.3d 633 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 145 ]).

1982Orthodox doctrine holds a stipulation is void only if contrary to public policy in effect when it was signed (e.g., Cooley v. County of Calaveras (1898) 121 Cal. 482, 485-486 [ 53 P. 1075 ]; Russell v. Soldinger (1976) 59 Cal. App.3d 633 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 145 ]).

1968The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has expressly refused to follow De Sisto (Byrd v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1965) 342 F.2d 939, 940 [119 App.D..C 360]), and the other federal appellate courts also adhere to the orthodox rule (e.g., Brooks v. United States (10th Cir. 1962) 309 F.2d 580, 582 ; United States v. Bernard (7th Cir. 1961) 287 F.2d 715, 723 ; Valentine v. United States (5th Cir. 1959) 272 F.2d 777, 778 ; Clifton v. United States (4th Cir. 1955) 224 F.2d 329, 331 ; United States v. Michener (3d Cir. 1945) 152 F.2d 880 , 884 fn. 3).