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6 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wychegreen2 sentences2025“When the failure to disclose is deliberate, this [C]ourt will not concern itself with the degree of harm caused to the defendant by the prosecution’s misconduct; we shall simply grant the defendant a new trial.” Id. 2025“While the United States Supreme Court has chosen to tailor its analysis toward the impact of nondisclosure on the trial outcome, we * * * adopt[ed] a variable standard of materiality based on the degree of prosecutorial culpability.” State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907, 910 (R.I. 1986). | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Ouimette
green
2 sentences1988Keogh established “a variable standard of materiality, differing in degree with the prosecutor’s culpability in the nondisclosure.” 115 R.I. at 177 , 342 A.2d at 254 . 1988Keogh established “a variable standard of materiality, differing in degree with the prosecutor’s culpability in the nondisclosure.” 115 R.I. at 177 , 342 A.2d at 254 . | 4 | 1982–2004 |
United States v. James Vincent Keogh
green
2 sentences1988The Keogh court stated: “The easy cases — at least they now seem ■ so — are where the prosecutor’s suppression is ‘deliberate,’ by which we include not merely a considered decision to suppress, taken for the very purpose of obstructing, but also a failure to disclose evidence whose high value to the defense could not have escaped the prosecutor’s attention. * * * Such cases rarely present a problem as to ‘the degree of prejudice which must be shown’; almost by definition the evidence is highly material.” Keogh, 391 F.2d at 146-47 . 1986While the United States Supreme Court has chosen to tailor its analysis toward the impact of nondisclosure on the trial outcome, we preferred in Ouimette to “take as our guidepost” the Second Circuit Court of Appeal’s discussion in United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2nd Cir. 1968), and adopt a variable standard of materiality based on the degree of prosecu-torial culpability. 115 R.I. at 177 , 342 A.2d at 254 . | 2 | 1986–1988 |
Lerner v. Moran
green
1 sentence2003Lerner, 542 A.2d at 1091 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.