criterion test in Texas

1932Rep., 281 , 109 S. W., 138, 140 , “The true criterion and test for determining the admissibility of such statements is: are they necessary to make any other act or declaration of a defendant, which has been proved by the prosecution fully understood, or do they explain the same?” The state having introduced part of the conversation between appellant and said witness, the appellant was entitled to the remainder of the conversation relating to the same.

1928R. 281 , 109 S. W. 138 , Tustice Rdmsey, speaking for the court, fully analyzes the authorities on this subject and in his usual clear and terse style announced the following rule: “The true criterion and test for determining the admissibility of such statements is: Are they necessary to make any other act or declaration of a defendant, which has been proved by the prosecution fully understood, or do they explain same?

1998NOTES [1] If Craddock is to be properly applied in the context of unopposed summary judgments, this criterion of the test must be modified as indicated in note 3. [2] We recognize that a previous panel of this court, citing Cove Investments, Inc. v. Manges, 602 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.1980), stated that a motion for summary judgment may only be granted if the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law; thus, a response is not required.

1998We recognize that a previous panel of this court, citing Cove Investments, Inc. v. Manges, 602 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.1980), stated that a motion for summary judgment may only be granted if the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law; thus, a response is not required.

1986In Hodges v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 573 , 160 S.W.2d 262 (1942), this Court expressly approved the following meaning of the term "fair market value", which is not statutorily defined: "The term [fair] market value means the fair cash value of the property as between one who desires to purchase and one who desires to sell or the cash price for which the property is commonly sold, or the price fixed by buyer and seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of lawful trade and competition.

1986In Hodges v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 573 , 160 S.W.2d 262 (1942), this Court expressly approved the following meaning of the term "fair market value", which is not statutorily defined: "The term [fair] market value means the fair cash value of the property as between one who desires to purchase and one who desires to sell or the cash price for which the property is commonly sold, or the price fixed by buyer and seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of lawful trade and competition.

1981International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).

1981International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).

1981International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).

1981International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).

1981International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).

1981International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).

1980The point to be made, however, is that never did the law consistently spell out a criterion or standard by which the trial court in response to a request by a defendant must measure the propriety of impaneling a jury to determine present competency to stand trial 9 — until, that is, 1975. 10 *612 In Williams v. State, 543 S.W.2d 385 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) the Court contrasted requirements of the 1975 amendments to Article 46.02 with the prior procedure for raising an issue of incompetency, and pointed out: “Article 46.02, Sec. 2, V.A.C.C.P., now provides a different method for raising the issue of

1928Wood v. State, 28 Tex. App. 61 [ 12 S. W. 405 ].