legal basis claim (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

legal basis claim in California

45 California opinions name it 3 courts 1941–2026 15 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (18)

CaseFollowedCited
In Re Robbinsgreen
cal · 1998 · cited in 16 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–2024
2 sentences

2024Habeas petitions must be filed without “‘substantial delay.’” (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 779 .) “Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim.” (Id. at p. 780.) Courts will consider the claim on its merits despite a substantial delay if there is a showing of good cause.

2022(In re Reno, at p. 461.) The “basic issue is whether [the petition] was ‘ “ ‘filed as promptly as the circumstances allow.’ ” ’ ” (In re Taylor, at p. 555.) “Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim.” (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 .) A claim that is substantially delayed will nevertheless be considered on the merits if the petitioner can demonstrate good cause for the delay.

716
In Re Clarkred
cal · 1993 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–2021
2 sentences

2009Rather, the general rule is that a petition must be filed “as promptly as the circumstances allow.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn. 5 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 855 P.2d 729 ].) “ ‘ “[A]ny significant delay in seeking collateral relief . . . must be fully justified. [Citations.]” [Citation.] . . .’ ” (In re Sodersten (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1221 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 ].) Delay is measured from the time a petitioner knew, or reasonably should have known, the information in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.

2009Rather, the general rule is that a petition must be filed “as promptly as the circumstances allow.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn. 5 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 855 P.2d 729 ].) “ ‘ “[A]ny significant delay in seeking collateral relief . . . must be fully justified. [Citations.]” [Citation.] . . .’ ” (In re Sodersten (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1221 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 ].) Delay is measured from the time a petitioner knew, or reasonably should have known, the information in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.

35
Anson v. County of Mercedgreen
calctapp · 1988 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–2023
2 sentences

2017Co. v. Reiswig (1999) 21 Cal.4th 208 , 211, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 , 980 P.2d 895 .) "No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered." ( § 364, subd. (b).) Section 364, subdivision (d) tolls the statute of limitations for 90 days if the notice of intent to sue is served on the health care provider within the last 90 days of the applicable statute of limitations. ( Woods, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 325, 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 .) The purpos

2017Co. v. Reiswig (1999) 21 Cal.4th 208 , 211, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 , 980 P.2d 895 .) "No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered." ( § 364, subd. (b).) Section 364, subdivision (d) tolls the statute of limitations for 90 days if the notice of intent to sue is served on the health care provider within the last 90 days of the applicable statute of limitations. ( Woods, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 325, 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 .) The purpos

34
In re Douglasgreen
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2022
2 sentences

2022(See Drew, at p. 259.) With a habeas petition, “the trigger for timeliness is when the petitioner or his counsel knew or reasonably should have known the legal basis of the claim and facts in support of that claim.” (In re Douglas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 243 (Douglas), citing In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (Robbins).) This is “an objective, reasonable person standard,” not one that tolerates willful ignorance.

2015People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893 , 908-[90]9.” 3 did nothing to promptly confirm those suspicions, that failure must be justified.’ [Citation.]” (In re Douglas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 244 ; see also People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1097-1098 [“The diligence requirement is not some abstract technical obstacle placed randomly before litigants seeking relief, but instead reflects the balance between the state’s interest in the finality of decided cases and its interest in providing a reasonable avenue of relief for those whose rights have allegedly been violated”].) “Controll

22
Woods v. Younggreen
cal · 1991 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 1996–2023
2 sentences

2017Co. v. Reiswig (1999) 21 Cal.4th 208 , 211, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 , 980 P.2d 895 .) "No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered." ( § 364, subd. (b).) Section 364, subdivision (d) tolls the statute of limitations for 90 days if the notice of intent to sue is served on the health care provider within the last 90 days of the applicable statute of limitations. ( Woods, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 325, 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 .) The purpos

2017Co. v. Reiswig (1999) 21 Cal.4th 208 , 211, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 , 980 P.2d 895 .) "No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered." ( § 364, subd. (b).) Section 364, subdivision (d) tolls the statute of limitations for 90 days if the notice of intent to sue is served on the health care provider within the last 90 days of the applicable statute of limitations. ( Woods, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 325, 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 .) The purpos

15
Kumari v. Hosp. Comm. for the Livermore-Pleasanton Areasgreen
calctapp5d · 2017 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
2 sentences

2023Our colleagues in Division Five of this First District affirmed, 11 stressing that “[w]hat the statute requires is that the notice include ‘the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered.’ ” (Kumari, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 313 .) The appellate court concluded that Kumari’s letter included that necessary information.

2023(Id. at p. 81.) “Section 364 precludes a plaintiff from filing a professional negligence action against a health care provider unless the plaintiff has given the health care provider 90 days’ notice ‘of the intention to commence the action.’ (§ 364, subd. (a); [citation].) ‘No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered.’ (§ 364, subd. (b).) Section 364, subdivision (d) tolls the statute of limitations for 90 days if the notice of intent to

12
Bennett v. SHAHHALgreen
calctapp · 1999 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2022
2 sentences

2022The claims were predicated on the failure to disclose “the evils associated with Lupron therapy, Effexor, and radioactive gold seeds,” false representations about or concealment of “the known and material risks associated with Lupron therapy and radioactive gold seeds,” and negligent misrepresentations about “the truth concerning the evils of Lupron therapy.” notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered.” (§ 364, subd. (b).) The purpose of the statutory 90-day

2001(See, e.g., Bennett v. Shahhal (1999) 75 Cal. App.4th 384, 390-391, fn. 3 , 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 272 [plaintiffs § 364 notice "clearly evidenced the specific intent to sue"].) The plaintiff decides when to give the statutory notice of intent to sue. ( Woods v. Young, supra, at p. 327 , 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 .) Thus, the triggering event in all cases for accrual purposes is not necessarily service of the section 364 notice of intent to sue; instead, it is awareness of the cause of action, which in this case is shown by Duncan's suspicion of wrongdoing as evidenced by the section 364 notice

12
People v. Hyung Joon Kimgreen
cal · 2009 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2021
2 sentences

2021(People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1097 .) The petition must be filed “as promptly as the circumstances allow.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn. 5 .) A court will not consider the merits of a petition brought after substantial delay unless the petitioner can show good cause.

2015People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893 , 908-[90]9.” 3 did nothing to promptly confirm those suspicions, that failure must be justified.’ [Citation.]” (In re Douglas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 244 ; see also People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1097-1098 [“The diligence requirement is not some abstract technical obstacle placed randomly before litigants seeking relief, but instead reflects the balance between the state’s interest in the finality of decided cases and its interest in providing a reasonable avenue of relief for those whose rights have allegedly been violated”].) “Controll

12
In re Simsgreen
calctapp5d · 2018 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
2 sentences

2024“A criminal defendant mounting a collateral attack on a final judgment of conviction must do so in a timely manner. [Citation.] Thus, a petitioner is required to explain and justify any significant delay in seeking habeas corpus relief. [Citation.] An unjustified delay in presenting a claim bars consideration of the merits.” (In re Sims (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 195, 204 (Sims).) “[T]he petitioner has the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness. [¶] Substantial delay is meas

2024Since we found the first claim was not untimely, we likewise find this claim is not untimely. 13. presenting a claim bars consideration of the merits.” (Sims, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 204 .) “[T]he petitioner has the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness. [¶] Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim.

11
In Re Harrisgreen
cal · 1993 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023(See In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 828, fn. 7 [habeas corpus properly used to raise “issues that could not be raised on appeal because they are based on matters outside the appellate record” if “filed within a reasonable time after the petitioner or counsel knew, or with due diligence should have known, the facts underlying the claim as well as the legal basis of the claim”], disapproved on another ground in Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2021) 11 Cal.5th 842, 854 .) The People filed a return in October 2022, conceding petitioner is entitled to his requested relief due to the intervening cha

11
Robinson v. Lewisgreen
cal · 2020 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022“Whether a claim has been timely presented is assessed based on an indeterminate reasonableness standard.” (Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 890 (Robinson).) We assume for purposes of our analysis that as of the Supreme Court’s issuance of Canizales in June 2019 (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 591 ), Sambrano “‘“knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim”’” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 727-729 ).

11
Denham v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1970 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
11
In Re Soderstengreen
calctapp · 2007 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
11
Adler v. Vaiciusgreen
calctapp · 1993 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
11
Anderson v. Shermangreen
calctapp · 1981 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
Brochtrup v. Intepgreen
calctapp · 1987 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
In Re Stankewitzgreen
cal · 1985 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
11
Lesko v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1982 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (28)

CaseCitedYears
Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance v. Reiswig green
cal · 1999
2 sentences

2023Co. v. Reiswig (1999) 21 Cal.4th 208, 211 .) “No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered.” (§ 364, subd. (b).) Section 364, subdivision (d) tolls the statute of limitations for 90 days if the notice of intent to sue is served on the health care provider within the last 90 days of the applicable statute of limitations.

2017Co. v. Reiswig (1999) 21 Cal.4th 208 , 211, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 , 980 P.2d 895 .) "No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered." ( § 364, subd. (b).) Section 364, subdivision (d) tolls the statute of limitations for 90 days if the notice of intent to sue is served on the health care provider within the last 90 days of the applicable statute of limitations. ( Woods, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 325, 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 .) The purpos

42013–2023
In re Reno green
cal · 2012
2 sentences

2022“Whether a claim has been timely presented is assessed based on an indeterminate reasonableness standard.” (Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 890 (Robinson).) We assume for purposes of our analysis that as of the Supreme Court’s issuance of Canizales in June 2019 (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 591 ), Sambrano “‘“knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim”’” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 727-729 ).

2020(In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460 .) Delay is measured from the date a petitioner knew, or reasonably should have known, of the legal basis for a claim.

32020–2024
In Re Nunez green
calctapp · 2009
2 sentences

2015(In re Nunez (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 709, 723 .) Delay is measured from the time a petitioner knew, or reasonably should have known, the information in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim.

2015(In re Nunez (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 709, 723 .) Delay is measured from the time a petitioner knew, or reasonably should have known, the information in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim.

32015–2020
Cal. Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. green
cal · 2018
2 sentences

2023(California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Board (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1041 .) “Our primary task ‘in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent, giving effect to the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We consider first the words of a statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) We reject as lacking a legal basis the claim that section 3287(a) and CCP section 998 can be read, separately or together, to provide that a successful CCP section 998 offer sufficiently liquidates a claim for damages and establi

2023(California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Board (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1041 .) “Our primary task ‘in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent, giving effect to the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We consider first the words of a statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) We reject as lacking a legal basis the claim that section 3287(a) and CCP section 998 can be read, separately or together, to provide that a successful CCP section 998 offer sufficiently liquidates a claim for damages and establi

22023–2023
In Re Caffey green
cal · 1968
2 sentences

2015(In re Huddleston, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p.1034.) Indeed, “[a] defendant could not be expected to raise at the time of his conviction points of law which had not yet been pronounced.” (Ibid.; In re Caffey (1968) 68 Cal.2d 762, 773 .) Wilson’s petition is not untimely.

2015(In re Huddleston, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p.1034.) Indeed, “[a] defendant could not be expected to raise at the time of his conviction points of law which had not yet been pronounced.” (Ibid.; In re Caffey (1968) 68 Cal.2d 762, 773 .) Wilson’s petition is not untimely.

22015–2015
In Re Huddleston green
cal · 1969
2 sentences

2015(In re Huddleston, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p.1034.) Indeed, “[a] defendant could not be expected to raise at the time of his conviction points of law which had not yet been pronounced.” (Ibid.; In re Caffey (1968) 68 Cal.2d 762, 773 .) Wilson’s petition is not untimely.

2015(In re Huddleston, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p.1034.) Indeed, “[a] defendant could not be expected to raise at the time of his conviction points of law which had not yet been pronounced.” (Ibid.; In re Caffey (1968) 68 Cal.2d 762, 773 .) Wilson’s petition is not untimely.

22015–2015
Walker v. Martin green
scotus · 2011
2 sentences

2012The basic instruction provided by the California Supreme Court is simply that ‘a [habeas corpus] petition should be filed as promptly as the circumstances allow ....’” (Walker v. Martin, supra, 562 U.S. at p. _ [ 131 S.Ct. at p. 1125 ].) “A prisoner must seek habeas relief without ‘substantial delay,’ [citations], as ‘measured from the time the petitioner or counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim,’ [citation].” (Ibid.; see In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780 [“Substantial *461 delay is measured

2012The basic instruction provided by the California Supreme Court is simply that ‗a [habeas] petition should be filed as promptly as the circumstances allow . . . .‘ ‖ (Walker v. Martin, supra, 562 U.S. at p. ___ [ 131 S.Ct. at p. 1125 ].) ―A prisoner must seek habeas relief without ‗substantial delay,‘ [citations], as ‗measured from the time the petitioner or counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim,‘ [citation].‖ (Ibid.; see also In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780 [―Substantial delay is measured f

22012–2012
People v. McKale green
cal · 1979
2 sentences

2007However, she was entitled to attorney fees incurred in defending the nuisance cause of action because she “had a legal basis to claim recovery of such fees grounded in the [MRL]____” (Id. at p. 948.) *677 People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 811 , 602 P.2d 731 ] (McKale) is another situation where the plaintiff did not allege a cause of action under the MRL, yet the underlying case discussed a specific factual situation addressed by the MRL.

2007However, she was entitled to attorney fees incurred in defending the nuisance cause of action because she “had a legal basis to claim recovery of such fees grounded in the [MRL]____” (Id. at p. 948.) *677 People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 811 , 602 P.2d 731 ] (McKale) is another situation where the plaintiff did not allege a cause of action under the MRL, yet the underlying case discussed a specific factual situation addressed by the MRL.

22006–2007
People v. Superior Court green
cal · 1997
1 sentence

2026(Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995 , 1008 [“[F]ailure to offer reasoned analysis of [an] issue constitutes a waiver. ‘“‘When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.’”’”].) Even if we were to assume a viable legal basis for defendant’s claim of error for the purpose of resolving it in this appeal, “‘[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that [a] sentencing decision was irrational or arb

12026–2026
Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Ass'n v. Hazelbaker green
calctapp · 2016
1 sentence

2025While the Davis-Stirling Act authorizes the recovery of appellate attorneys’ fees by a prevailing party (Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 265 ), the Association does not cite the Act as the basis for its fee request or state in its brief whether that statute or another authority forms the basis for its claim.

12025–2025
People v. Chiu red
cal · 2014
2 sentences

2024(In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460 .) Here, petitioner first filed a petition asserting an error pursuant to Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155 , on August 25, 2021, that is, seven years after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Chiu.

2024(In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460 .) Here, petitioner first filed a petition asserting an error pursuant to Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155 , on August 25, 2021, that is, seven years after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Chiu.

12024–2024
Shalabi v. City of Fontana green
cal · 2021
1 sentence

2023(See In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 828, fn. 7 [habeas corpus properly used to raise “issues that could not be raised on appeal because they are based on matters outside the appellate record” if “filed within a reasonable time after the petitioner or counsel knew, or with due diligence should have known, the facts underlying the claim as well as the legal basis of the claim”], disapproved on another ground in Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2021) 11 Cal.5th 842, 854 .) The People filed a return in October 2022, conceding petitioner is entitled to his requested relief due to the intervening cha

12023–2023
In re Friend green
cal · 2021
1 sentence

2022“Whether a claim has been timely presented is assessed based on an indeterminate reasonableness standard.” (Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 890 (Robinson).) We assume for purposes of our analysis that as of the Supreme Court’s issuance of Canizales in June 2019 (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 591 ), Sambrano “‘“knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim”’” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 727-729 ).

12022–2022
People v. Canizales green
cal · 2019
1 sentence

2022“Whether a claim has been timely presented is assessed based on an indeterminate reasonableness standard.” (Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 890 (Robinson).) We assume for purposes of our analysis that as of the Supreme Court’s issuance of Canizales in June 2019 (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 591 ), Sambrano “‘“knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim”’” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 727-729 ).

12022–2022
People v. Kelly green
cal · 2006
1 sentence

2015Having ensured appellant received adequate and effective appellate review, we thus affirm the trial court’s decision.3 (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441-442; People v. Kelly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 112-113.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. _________________________ Jenkins, J. 3 We have also considered and denied appellant’s request to augment the record to include documents from 1981 and 1982 that relate to his underlying conviction and sentencing.

12015–2015
People v. Philpot green
calctapp · 2004
1 sentence

2015People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893 , 908-[90]9.” 3 did nothing to promptly confirm those suspicions, that failure must be justified.’ [Citation.]” (In re Douglas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 244 ; see also People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1097-1098 [“The diligence requirement is not some abstract technical obstacle placed randomly before litigants seeking relief, but instead reflects the balance between the state’s interest in the finality of decided cases and its interest in providing a reasonable avenue of relief for those whose rights have allegedly been violated”].) “Controll

12015–2015
People v. Zaidi green
calctapp · 2007
1 sentence

2014However, he insists the timeliness of his petition must be measured from the time he or his counsel became aware of the legal basis for his claim, which, he contends was not until 2006, 2007 or perhaps even 2010, when new governing case law was decided – to wit, People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 , People v. Zaidi (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1470 and People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330 .

12014–2014
People v. Picklesimer green
cal · 2010
1 sentence

2014However, he insists the timeliness of his petition must be measured from the time he or his counsel became aware of the legal basis for his claim, which, he contends was not until 2006, 2007 or perhaps even 2010, when new governing case law was decided – to wit, People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 , People v. Zaidi (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1470 and People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330 .

12014–2014
People v. Hofsheier red
cal · 2006
1 sentence

2014However, he insists the timeliness of his petition must be measured from the time he or his counsel became aware of the legal basis for his claim, which, he contends was not until 2006, 2007 or perhaps even 2010, when new governing case law was decided – to wit, People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 , People v. Zaidi (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1470 and People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330 .

12014–2014
People v. McClellan green
cal · 1993
12011–2011
People v. Derrick B. green
cal · 2006
12011–2011
In Re Crockett green
calctapp · 2008
12011–2011
Del Cerro Mobile Estates v. Proffer green
calctapp · 2001
12006–2006
Santisas v. Goodin green
calctapp · 1998
12001–2001
City of Ontario v. Superior Court green
cal · 1970
11994–1994
Lutz v. Tri-City Hospital green
calctapp · 1986
11989–1989
Roberts v. Brae green
cal · 1936
11941–1941
Price v. De Reyes green
cal · 1911
11941–1941

Statutes the citing opinions construe

USC § 28u.s.c.2244 (5) USC § 28u.s.c.2254 (4) CA § Cal. Government Code § 900 (3) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 190.2 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 45 (1941–2026) TX 34 (1963–2026) FL 22 (1991–2024) TN 16 (2015–2026) IL 15 (1889–2026) OK 14 (1997–2023) UT 11 (1988–2020) MI 10 (1907–2025) CO 8 (1988–2025) MN 8 (1986–2002) NY 6 (1988–2016) NV 6 (2011–2020) MA 5 (1997–2025) MO 4 (1994–2025) NC 3 (1993–2019) PA 3 (1973–2026) WA 3 (1994–2025) OR 3 (2019–2023) MS 2 (2009–2019) WI 2 (1994–2010) AL 2 (1989–2005) ND 2 (2010–2010) CT 2 (1992–2020) LA 2 (1992–1993) NJ 2 (1959–2006) NM 2 (1971–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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