45 California opinions name it 3 courts 1941–2026 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Robbinsgreen2 sentences2024Habeas petitions must be filed without “‘substantial delay.’” (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 779 .) “Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim.” (Id. at p. 780.) Courts will consider the claim on its merits despite a substantial delay if there is a showing of good cause. 2022(In re Reno, at p. 461.) The “basic issue is whether [the petition] was ‘ “ ‘filed as promptly as the circumstances allow.’ ” ’ ” (In re Taylor, at p. 555.) “Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim.” (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 .) A claim that is substantially delayed will nevertheless be considered on the merits if the petitioner can demonstrate good cause for the delay. | 7 | 16 |
In Re Clarkred2 sentences2009Rather, the general rule is that a petition must be filed “as promptly as the circumstances allow.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn. 5 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 855 P.2d 729 ].) “ ‘ “[A]ny significant delay in seeking collateral relief . . . must be fully justified. [Citations.]” [Citation.] . . .’ ” (In re Sodersten (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1221 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 ].) Delay is measured from the time a petitioner knew, or reasonably should have known, the information in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 2009Rather, the general rule is that a petition must be filed “as promptly as the circumstances allow.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn. 5 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509 , 855 P.2d 729 ].) “ ‘ “[A]ny significant delay in seeking collateral relief . . . must be fully justified. [Citations.]” [Citation.] . . .’ ” (In re Sodersten (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1221 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 ].) Delay is measured from the time a petitioner knew, or reasonably should have known, the information in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. | 3 | 5 |
Anson v. County of Mercedgreen2 sentences2017Co. v. Reiswig (1999) 21 Cal.4th 208 , 211, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 , 980 P.2d 895 .) "No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered." ( § 364, subd. (b).) Section 364, subdivision (d) tolls the statute of limitations for 90 days if the notice of intent to sue is served on the health care provider within the last 90 days of the applicable statute of limitations. ( Woods, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 325, 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 .) The purpos 2017Co. v. Reiswig (1999) 21 Cal.4th 208 , 211, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 , 980 P.2d 895 .) "No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered." ( § 364, subd. (b).) Section 364, subdivision (d) tolls the statute of limitations for 90 days if the notice of intent to sue is served on the health care provider within the last 90 days of the applicable statute of limitations. ( Woods, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 325, 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 .) The purpos | 3 | 4 |
In re Douglasgreen2 sentences2022(See Drew, at p. 259.) With a habeas petition, “the trigger for timeliness is when the petitioner or his counsel knew or reasonably should have known the legal basis of the claim and facts in support of that claim.” (In re Douglas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 243 (Douglas), citing In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (Robbins).) This is “an objective, reasonable person standard,” not one that tolerates willful ignorance. 2015People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893 , 908-[90]9.” 3 did nothing to promptly confirm those suspicions, that failure must be justified.’ [Citation.]” (In re Douglas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 244 ; see also People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1097-1098 [“The diligence requirement is not some abstract technical obstacle placed randomly before litigants seeking relief, but instead reflects the balance between the state’s interest in the finality of decided cases and its interest in providing a reasonable avenue of relief for those whose rights have allegedly been violated”].) “Controll | 2 | 2 |
Woods v. Younggreen2 sentences2017Co. v. Reiswig (1999) 21 Cal.4th 208 , 211, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 , 980 P.2d 895 .) "No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered." ( § 364, subd. (b).) Section 364, subdivision (d) tolls the statute of limitations for 90 days if the notice of intent to sue is served on the health care provider within the last 90 days of the applicable statute of limitations. ( Woods, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 325, 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 .) The purpos 2017Co. v. Reiswig (1999) 21 Cal.4th 208 , 211, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 , 980 P.2d 895 .) "No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered." ( § 364, subd. (b).) Section 364, subdivision (d) tolls the statute of limitations for 90 days if the notice of intent to sue is served on the health care provider within the last 90 days of the applicable statute of limitations. ( Woods, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 325, 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 .) The purpos | 1 | 5 |
Kumari v. Hosp. Comm. for the Livermore-Pleasanton Areasgreen2 sentences2023Our colleagues in Division Five of this First District affirmed, 11 stressing that “[w]hat the statute requires is that the notice include ‘the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered.’ ” (Kumari, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 313 .) The appellate court concluded that Kumari’s letter included that necessary information. 2023(Id. at p. 81.) “Section 364 precludes a plaintiff from filing a professional negligence action against a health care provider unless the plaintiff has given the health care provider 90 days’ notice ‘of the intention to commence the action.’ (§ 364, subd. (a); [citation].) ‘No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered.’ (§ 364, subd. (b).) Section 364, subdivision (d) tolls the statute of limitations for 90 days if the notice of intent to | 1 | 2 |
Bennett v. SHAHHALgreen2 sentences2022The claims were predicated on the failure to disclose “the evils associated with Lupron therapy, Effexor, and radioactive gold seeds,” false representations about or concealment of “the known and material risks associated with Lupron therapy and radioactive gold seeds,” and negligent misrepresentations about “the truth concerning the evils of Lupron therapy.” notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered.” (§ 364, subd. (b).) The purpose of the statutory 90-day 2001(See, e.g., Bennett v. Shahhal (1999) 75 Cal. App.4th 384, 390-391, fn. 3 , 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 272 [plaintiffs § 364 notice "clearly evidenced the specific intent to sue"].) The plaintiff decides when to give the statutory notice of intent to sue. ( Woods v. Young, supra, at p. 327 , 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 .) Thus, the triggering event in all cases for accrual purposes is not necessarily service of the section 364 notice of intent to sue; instead, it is awareness of the cause of action, which in this case is shown by Duncan's suspicion of wrongdoing as evidenced by the section 364 notice | 1 | 2 |
People v. Hyung Joon Kimgreen2 sentences2021(People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1097 .) The petition must be filed “as promptly as the circumstances allow.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn. 5 .) A court will not consider the merits of a petition brought after substantial delay unless the petitioner can show good cause. 2015People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893 , 908-[90]9.” 3 did nothing to promptly confirm those suspicions, that failure must be justified.’ [Citation.]” (In re Douglas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 244 ; see also People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1097-1098 [“The diligence requirement is not some abstract technical obstacle placed randomly before litigants seeking relief, but instead reflects the balance between the state’s interest in the finality of decided cases and its interest in providing a reasonable avenue of relief for those whose rights have allegedly been violated”].) “Controll | 1 | 2 |
In re Simsgreen2 sentences2024“A criminal defendant mounting a collateral attack on a final judgment of conviction must do so in a timely manner. [Citation.] Thus, a petitioner is required to explain and justify any significant delay in seeking habeas corpus relief. [Citation.] An unjustified delay in presenting a claim bars consideration of the merits.” (In re Sims (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 195, 204 (Sims).) “[T]he petitioner has the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness. [¶] Substantial delay is meas 2024Since we found the first claim was not untimely, we likewise find this claim is not untimely. 13. presenting a claim bars consideration of the merits.” (Sims, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 204 .) “[T]he petitioner has the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness. [¶] Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Harrisgreen1 sentence2023(See In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 828, fn. 7 [habeas corpus properly used to raise “issues that could not be raised on appeal because they are based on matters outside the appellate record” if “filed within a reasonable time after the petitioner or counsel knew, or with due diligence should have known, the facts underlying the claim as well as the legal basis of the claim”], disapproved on another ground in Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2021) 11 Cal.5th 842, 854 .) The People filed a return in October 2022, conceding petitioner is entitled to his requested relief due to the intervening cha | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2022“Whether a claim has been timely presented is assessed based on an indeterminate reasonableness standard.” (Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 890 (Robinson).) We assume for purposes of our analysis that as of the Supreme Court’s issuance of Canizales in June 2019 (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 591 ), Sambrano “‘“knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim”’” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 727-729 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Denham v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Soderstengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Adler v. Vaiciusgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Shermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brochtrup v. Intepgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Stankewitzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lesko v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance v. Reiswig
green
2 sentences2023Co. v. Reiswig (1999) 21 Cal.4th 208, 211 .) “No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered.” (§ 364, subd. (b).) Section 364, subdivision (d) tolls the statute of limitations for 90 days if the notice of intent to sue is served on the health care provider within the last 90 days of the applicable statute of limitations. 2017Co. v. Reiswig (1999) 21 Cal.4th 208 , 211, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 , 980 P.2d 895 .) "No particular form of notice is required, but it shall notify the defendant of the legal basis of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injuries suffered." ( § 364, subd. (b).) Section 364, subdivision (d) tolls the statute of limitations for 90 days if the notice of intent to sue is served on the health care provider within the last 90 days of the applicable statute of limitations. ( Woods, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 325, 279 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 807 P.2d 455 .) The purpos | 4 | 2013–2023 |
In re Reno
green
2 sentences2022“Whether a claim has been timely presented is assessed based on an indeterminate reasonableness standard.” (Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 890 (Robinson).) We assume for purposes of our analysis that as of the Supreme Court’s issuance of Canizales in June 2019 (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 591 ), Sambrano “‘“knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim”’” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 727-729 ). 2020(In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460 .) Delay is measured from the date a petitioner knew, or reasonably should have known, of the legal basis for a claim. | 3 | 2020–2024 |
In Re Nunez
green
2 sentences2015(In re Nunez (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 709, 723 .) Delay is measured from the time a petitioner knew, or reasonably should have known, the information in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim. 2015(In re Nunez (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 709, 723 .) Delay is measured from the time a petitioner knew, or reasonably should have known, the information in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim. | 3 | 2015–2020 |
Cal. Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd.
green
2 sentences2023(California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Board (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1041 .) “Our primary task ‘in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent, giving effect to the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We consider first the words of a statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) We reject as lacking a legal basis the claim that section 3287(a) and CCP section 998 can be read, separately or together, to provide that a successful CCP section 998 offer sufficiently liquidates a claim for damages and establi 2023(California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Board (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1041 .) “Our primary task ‘in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent, giving effect to the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We consider first the words of a statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) We reject as lacking a legal basis the claim that section 3287(a) and CCP section 998 can be read, separately or together, to provide that a successful CCP section 998 offer sufficiently liquidates a claim for damages and establi | 2 | 2023–2023 |
In Re Caffey
green
2 sentences2015(In re Huddleston, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p.1034.) Indeed, “[a] defendant could not be expected to raise at the time of his conviction points of law which had not yet been pronounced.” (Ibid.; In re Caffey (1968) 68 Cal.2d 762, 773 .) Wilson’s petition is not untimely. 2015(In re Huddleston, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p.1034.) Indeed, “[a] defendant could not be expected to raise at the time of his conviction points of law which had not yet been pronounced.” (Ibid.; In re Caffey (1968) 68 Cal.2d 762, 773 .) Wilson’s petition is not untimely. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
In Re Huddleston
green
2 sentences2015(In re Huddleston, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p.1034.) Indeed, “[a] defendant could not be expected to raise at the time of his conviction points of law which had not yet been pronounced.” (Ibid.; In re Caffey (1968) 68 Cal.2d 762, 773 .) Wilson’s petition is not untimely. 2015(In re Huddleston, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p.1034.) Indeed, “[a] defendant could not be expected to raise at the time of his conviction points of law which had not yet been pronounced.” (Ibid.; In re Caffey (1968) 68 Cal.2d 762, 773 .) Wilson’s petition is not untimely. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Walker v. Martin
green
2 sentences2012The basic instruction provided by the California Supreme Court is simply that ‘a [habeas corpus] petition should be filed as promptly as the circumstances allow ....’” (Walker v. Martin, supra, 562 U.S. at p. _ [ 131 S.Ct. at p. 1125 ].) “A prisoner must seek habeas relief without ‘substantial delay,’ [citations], as ‘measured from the time the petitioner or counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim,’ [citation].” (Ibid.; see In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780 [“Substantial *461 delay is measured 2012The basic instruction provided by the California Supreme Court is simply that ‗a [habeas] petition should be filed as promptly as the circumstances allow . . . .‘ ‖ (Walker v. Martin, supra, 562 U.S. at p. ___ [ 131 S.Ct. at p. 1125 ].) ―A prisoner must seek habeas relief without ‗substantial delay,‘ [citations], as ‗measured from the time the petitioner or counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim,‘ [citation].‖ (Ibid.; see also In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780 [―Substantial delay is measured f | 2 | 2012–2012 |
People v. McKale
green
2 sentences2007However, she was entitled to attorney fees incurred in defending the nuisance cause of action because she “had a legal basis to claim recovery of such fees grounded in the [MRL]____” (Id. at p. 948.) *677 People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 811 , 602 P.2d 731 ] (McKale) is another situation where the plaintiff did not allege a cause of action under the MRL, yet the underlying case discussed a specific factual situation addressed by the MRL. 2007However, she was entitled to attorney fees incurred in defending the nuisance cause of action because she “had a legal basis to claim recovery of such fees grounded in the [MRL]____” (Id. at p. 948.) *677 People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 811 , 602 P.2d 731 ] (McKale) is another situation where the plaintiff did not allege a cause of action under the MRL, yet the underlying case discussed a specific factual situation addressed by the MRL. | 2 | 2006–2007 |
People v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2026(Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995 , 1008 [“[F]ailure to offer reasoned analysis of [an] issue constitutes a waiver. ‘“‘When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.’”’”].) Even if we were to assume a viable legal basis for defendant’s claim of error for the purpose of resolving it in this appeal, “‘[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that [a] sentencing decision was irrational or arb | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Ass'n v. Hazelbaker
green
1 sentence2025While the Davis-Stirling Act authorizes the recovery of appellate attorneys’ fees by a prevailing party (Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 265 ), the Association does not cite the Act as the basis for its fee request or state in its brief whether that statute or another authority forms the basis for its claim. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Chiu
red
2 sentences2024(In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460 .) Here, petitioner first filed a petition asserting an error pursuant to Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155 , on August 25, 2021, that is, seven years after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Chiu. 2024(In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460 .) Here, petitioner first filed a petition asserting an error pursuant to Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155 , on August 25, 2021, that is, seven years after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Chiu. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Shalabi v. City of Fontana
green
1 sentence2023(See In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 828, fn. 7 [habeas corpus properly used to raise “issues that could not be raised on appeal because they are based on matters outside the appellate record” if “filed within a reasonable time after the petitioner or counsel knew, or with due diligence should have known, the facts underlying the claim as well as the legal basis of the claim”], disapproved on another ground in Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2021) 11 Cal.5th 842, 854 .) The People filed a return in October 2022, conceding petitioner is entitled to his requested relief due to the intervening cha | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In re Friend
green
1 sentence2022“Whether a claim has been timely presented is assessed based on an indeterminate reasonableness standard.” (Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 890 (Robinson).) We assume for purposes of our analysis that as of the Supreme Court’s issuance of Canizales in June 2019 (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 591 ), Sambrano “‘“knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim”’” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 727-729 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Canizales
green
1 sentence2022“Whether a claim has been timely presented is assessed based on an indeterminate reasonableness standard.” (Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 890 (Robinson).) We assume for purposes of our analysis that as of the Supreme Court’s issuance of Canizales in June 2019 (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 591 ), Sambrano “‘“knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim”’” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 727-729 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Kelly
green
1 sentence2015Having ensured appellant received adequate and effective appellate review, we thus affirm the trial court’s decision.3 (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441-442; People v. Kelly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 112-113.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. _________________________ Jenkins, J. 3 We have also considered and denied appellant’s request to augment the record to include documents from 1981 and 1982 that relate to his underlying conviction and sentencing. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Philpot
green
1 sentence2015People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893 , 908-[90]9.” 3 did nothing to promptly confirm those suspicions, that failure must be justified.’ [Citation.]” (In re Douglas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 236, 244 ; see also People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1097-1098 [“The diligence requirement is not some abstract technical obstacle placed randomly before litigants seeking relief, but instead reflects the balance between the state’s interest in the finality of decided cases and its interest in providing a reasonable avenue of relief for those whose rights have allegedly been violated”].) “Controll | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Zaidi
green
1 sentence2014However, he insists the timeliness of his petition must be measured from the time he or his counsel became aware of the legal basis for his claim, which, he contends was not until 2006, 2007 or perhaps even 2010, when new governing case law was decided – to wit, People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 , People v. Zaidi (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1470 and People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Picklesimer
green
1 sentence2014However, he insists the timeliness of his petition must be measured from the time he or his counsel became aware of the legal basis for his claim, which, he contends was not until 2006, 2007 or perhaps even 2010, when new governing case law was decided – to wit, People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 , People v. Zaidi (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1470 and People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Hofsheier
red
1 sentence2014However, he insists the timeliness of his petition must be measured from the time he or his counsel became aware of the legal basis for his claim, which, he contends was not until 2006, 2007 or perhaps even 2010, when new governing case law was decided – to wit, People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 , People v. Zaidi (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1470 and People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. McClellan green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| People v. Derrick B. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| In Re Crockett green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Del Cerro Mobile Estates v. Proffer green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Santisas v. Goodin green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| City of Ontario v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Lutz v. Tri-City Hospital green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Roberts v. Brae green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Price v. De Reyes green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.