legal basis claim in Texas

2026“In short, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to supply a legal basis for his claim but not so much that he affirmatively negates his right to relief.” Guillory v. Seaton, LLC, 470 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).

2025“In short, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to supply a legal basis for his claim but not so much that he affirmatively negates his right to relief.” Guillory v. Seaton, LLC, 470 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).

2021Barbee–Page 4 See Ex parte Staley, 160 S.W.3d 56, 63 (Tex. Crim.

2007In Ex Parte Staley, 160 S.W.3d 56, 64 (Tex.Crim.App.2005), we stated that “a death-row inmate may file a subsequent writ application based upon the newly available legal claim of mental retardation under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) but if his application states that his I.Q. has repeatedly been tested at 120-130, he has failed to state sufficient specific facts establishing a cognizable claim under Atkins.” While Article 11.071, section 5(a)(1) does not state that the application must include facts establishing that the applicant has a prima facie

2015App. 2007) ("Amador Buchanan v. State, 207 S.W.3d 772, 773, 776 (Tex. Crim.

2015Buchanan, 207 S.W. 3d at 775 .

2023Yet, by art of legal argument, HOAIC 9 See also Medina, 627 S.W.3d at 631 (concluding the exceptions relied on by the rule 91a movant were not established by the non-movant’s pleadings and, as a result, denial of motions to dismiss under rule 91a was proper); Reaves, 518 S.W.3d at 609 (“In short, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to supply a legal basis for his claim but not so much that he affirmatively negates his right to relief.”) (quoting Guillory v. Seaton, LLC, 470 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied)). 10 For purposes of this appeal, we assume but d

2019“In short, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to supply a legal basis for his claim but not so much that he affirmatively negates his right to relief.” Reaves v. City of Corpus Christi, 518 S.W.3d 594, 609 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2017, no pet.) (quoting Guillory v. Seaton, LLC, 470 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied)).

2015The debtor must disclose any potential causes of action even if she does not know the legal basis of the claim.” (citation omitted)); see also Flugence, 738 F.3d at 128 (“We agree . . . that there is a continuing duty to disclose in a Chapter 13 proceeding”); Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 208 (explaining that if the debtor has enough information to suggest that it may have a “possible cause of action,” then the action must be disclosed).

2007Id.

2025“In conducting our review, . . . we must construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to the pleader’s intent, and accept as true the factual allegations in the pleadings to determine if the cause of 3 action has a basis in law or fact.” Wooley v. Schaffer, 447 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

2024Metts concerned the judicial “disqualification” provisions in the Texas Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure.8 No one has alleged that Judge Hyde 4 Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Id. 6 United States v. Martinez, 446 F.3d 878 , (8th Cir. 2006) (prosecutor who had presented the defendant’s case to the grand jury, signed the indictment, represented the United States in the early pretrial phase of the prosecution, and cross-examined the defendant at a suppression hearing became a law clerk for the trial judge but assigned to work exc

2024Metts concerned the judicial “disqualification” provisions in the Texas Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure.8 No one has alleged that Judge Hyde 4 Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Id. 6 United States v. Martinez, 446 F.3d 878 , (8th Cir. 2006) (prosecutor who had presented the defendant’s case to the grand jury, signed the indictment, represented the United States in the early pretrial phase of the prosecution, and cross-examined the defendant at a suppression hearing became a law clerk for the trial judge but assigned to work exc

2024Metts concerned the judicial “disqualification” provisions in the Texas Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure.8 No one has alleged that Judge Hyde 4 Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Id. 6 United States v. Martinez, 446 F.3d 878 , (8th Cir. 2006) (prosecutor who had presented the defendant’s case to the grand jury, signed the indictment, represented the United States in the early pretrial phase of the prosecution, and cross-examined the defendant at a suppression hearing became a law clerk for the trial judge but assigned to work exc

2023See Sheetz v. Slaughter, 503 S.W.3d 495, 505 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.)(finding that in light of facts demonstrating a legal basis for the claim being defended there was no evidence damages resulting from any alleged legal malpractice).

2021Thus, [plaintiff’s] harm-to-credit claim has no basis in law. . . .”); Dailey v. Thorpe, 445 S.W.3d 785, 789 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (holding that breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim had no basis in law because pleaded facts affirmatively demonstrated that alleged breach occurred after fiduciary relationship ceased).

2021See Guillory, 470 S.W.3d at 240 (“In short, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to supply a legal basis for his claim but not so much that he affirmatively negates his right to 20 relief.”); Dailey, 445 S.W.3d at 789 .

2017See id.

2015See Local Neon Co. v. Strayhorn, No. 03-04-00261-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 4667 , at *13–15 (Tex. App.—Austin June 16, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (discussing protest letter and what was required “to state fully and in detail each reason”); see also In re Nestle, USA, Inc., 359 S.W.3d 207 , 208–09 21 (Tex. 2012) (generally discussing requirements of protest letter); H.K.

2015The debtor must disclose any potential causes of action even if she does not know the legal basis of the claim.” (citation omitted)); see also Flugence, 738 F.3d at 128 (“We agree . . . that there is a continuing duty to disclose in a Chapter 13 proceeding”); Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 208 (explaining that if the debtor has enough information to suggest that it may have a “possible cause of action,” then the action must be disclosed).

2014See id. art. 11.07, § 4(a)(1) ("If a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus is filed after final disposition of an initial application challenging the same conviction, a court may not consider the merits of or grant relief based on the subsequent application unless the application contains sufficient specific facts establishing that ... the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously in an original application or in a previously considered application filed under this article because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable o

2007This section reads, If a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus is filed after filing an initial application, a court may not consider the merits of or grant relief based on the subsequent application unless the application contains sufficient specific facts establishing that: (1) the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously in a timely initial application or in a previously considered application filed under this article or Article 11.07 because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the

2007This section reads, If a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus is filed after filing an initial application, a court may not consider the merits of or grant relief based on the subsequent application unless the application contains sufficient specific facts establishing that: (1) the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously in a timely initial application or in a previously considered application filed under this article or Article 11.07 because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the