right to an evidentiary hearing in California

2016(Ibid.; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 .) 1 Section 388 provides, in part: “Any parent . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) The court must set a hearing if “it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed change of order . . . .” (§ 388, subd. (d).)

2016(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319 (Stephanie M.); In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 .) To establish the right to an evidentiary hearing, the petition must include facts which make a prima facie showing that there is a change in circumstances and “the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change in order.” (In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 672-673 ; see also In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806 ; In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414 ; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(e)(1).) “In determining whether the petition

2025A. Legal Principles A parent petitioning the court to modify a prior dependency order pursuant to section 388 must show the existence of changed circumstances or new evidence justifying the proposed change and that the proposed change is in the best interests of the child. (§ 388; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 .) A parent need only make a prima facie showing of these elements to trigger the right to an evidentiary hearing, and courts must liberally construe a section 388 petition in favor of its sufficiency.

2025A. Legal Principles A parent petitioning the court to modify a prior dependency order pursuant to section 388 must show the existence of changed circumstances or new evidence justifying the proposed change and that the proposed change is in the best interests of the child. (§ 388; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 .) A parent need only make a prima facie showing of these elements to trigger the right to an evidentiary hearing, and courts must liberally construe a section 388 petition in favor of its sufficiency.

2016(Ibid.; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 .) 1 Section 388 provides, in part: “Any parent . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) The court must set a hearing if “it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed change of order . . . .” (§ 388, subd. (d).)

2016(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319 (Stephanie M.); In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 .) To establish the right to an evidentiary hearing, the petition must include facts which make a prima facie showing that there is a change in circumstances and “the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change in order.” (In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 672-673 ; see also In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806 ; In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414 ; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(e)(1).) “In determining whether the petition

2016(Ibid.; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 .) 1 Section 388 provides, in part: “Any parent . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) The court must set a hearing if “it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed change of order . . . .” (§ 388, subd. (d).)

2016(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319 (Stephanie M.); In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 .) To establish the right to an evidentiary hearing, the petition must include facts which make a prima facie showing that there is a change in circumstances and “the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change in order.” (In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 672-673 ; see also In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806 ; In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414 ; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(e)(1).) “In determining whether the petition

2016(Ibid.; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 .) 1 Section 388 provides, in part: “Any parent . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) The court must set a hearing if “it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed change of order . . . .” (§ 388, subd. (d).)

2016(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319 (Stephanie M.); In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 .) To establish the right to an evidentiary hearing, the petition must include facts which make a prima facie showing that there is a change in circumstances and “the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change in order.” (In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 672-673 ; see also In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806 ; In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414 ; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(e)(1).) “In determining whether the petition

2025“Section 388 allows a person having an interest in a dependent child of the juvenile court to petition the court to change, modify, or set aside a prior order on the grounds of changed circumstances or new evidence. (§ 388, subd. (a).)” (In re R.F. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 718 , 728.) “A section 388 petition must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief in order to trigger the right to an evidentiary hearing on the petition. [Citation.] The petition may be denied without a hearing ‘only if the [petition] fails to reveal any change of circumstance or new evidence which might require a c

2015(In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593 .) “The prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence . . . would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.” (In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 806 .) Where the petitioner does not plead facts showing the proposed change is in the minor’s best interests, the court can properly deny the petition for modification on that ground without holding a hearing.

2025(In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063 , 1080.) “The change of circumstances or new evidence ‘must be of such significant nature that it requires . . . modification of the challenged prior order.’ ” (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615 .) “In assessing the best interests of the child, ‘a primary consideration . . . is the goal of assuring stability and continuity.’ ” (Id. at p. 616.) Furthermore, the petitioner “must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief in order to trigger the right to an evidentiary hearing on the petition.” (In re R.F. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 7

2024(In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063 , 1080.) “The change of circumstances or new evidence ‘must be of such significant nature that it requires . . . modification of the challenged prior order.’ ” (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615 (Mickel O.).) “In assessing the best interests of the child, ‘a primary consideration . . . is the goal of assuring stability and continuity.’ ” (Id. at p. 616.) The petitioner “must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief in order to trigger the right to an evidentiary hearing on the petition.” (In re R.F. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 718

2026However expressed, the point is that section 388 requires a change that is relevant and substantial (rather than irrelevant or de minimis) when considered in light of all of the circumstances of the case.’” (Ibid.) The fact circumstances might change or are changing for the better “‘does not promote stability for the child or the child’s best interests. [Citation.] “‘[C]hildhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.’”’” (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 206 .) “A parent establishes a substantial change of circumstances for purposes of section 388 by showing that, during the

2022A. Section 388 Petition Section 388, subdivision (a) allows a parent to change, modify, or set aside a prior juvenile court order “ ‘if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist[,] and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child.’ ” (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 205 (Mary G.).) A parent who makes a prima facie showing of both elements has a right to an evidentiary hearing, and the petition must be liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing.

2026We affirmed this holding in People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771 (Cooper), clarifying that “the conservation of judicial resources and public funds,” and the “convenien[ce of] witnesses, attorneys, and others, including interested citizens of . . . the county of the crime” are relevant factors.

2009(People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 790-791 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543 , 897 P.2d 481 ]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 804 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 809 P.2d 865 ]; McGown v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 648, 652 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 262 ].) “The presence or absence of prejudicial publicity in [a successor county] is one of many facts and circumstances which should be considered by [a] court in the exercise of its discretion to decide where the cause should be transferred.” (McGown, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 653 .) Even if the magnitude of pretrial publicity in a successor county may no

2026The court stated: “And I cannot order them to do so, only the Chief Justice through the [AOC] can make that order. . . . [¶] . . . [¶][14] Consequently, any 13 In McGown v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 648 (McGown), the court held that the parties have a right to an evidentiary hearing to address (1) the “presence or absence of prejudicial publicity” in any new venue under consideration (id. at p. 653) and (2) the “relative hardship involved in trying the case in various locations” (id. at p. 652, fn. 5).

2026(See McGown, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d 648 .) Substantively, the selection of a new venue is governed by factual considerations, including pretrial publicity and hardship.

2004Adoption of Baby Girl B. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 43, 50-55 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 ], involved a different statutory scheme, that is, the adoption statutes, and the denial of an evidentiary hearing on a petition for adoption.

2004Adoption of Baby Girl B. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 43, 50-55 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 ], involved a different statutory scheme, that is, the adoption statutes, and the denial of an evidentiary hearing on a petition for adoption.

2026J. to the new venue, the parties have a right to an evidentiary hearing to determine where the case should be transferred.” (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 574 (Davis).) At such a hearing — which is sometimes called a “McGown hearing” — the parties present evidence as to the suitability of the various courts that the Judicial Council has put forward, after which, the transferring court decides the question.

2024(People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 415, 417, 419 ; People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1255 .) Indeed, our Supreme Court has acknowledged the value of an evidentiary hearing when material facts are in dispute.

2022(See Evangelho v. Presoto (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 615, 620 [“ ‘where the parties do not object to the use of affidavits in evidence, and where both parties adopt that means of supporting their positions, the parties cannot question the propriety of the procedure on appeal’ ”].) Lensch, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 667 and Dunlap, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th 419 , cited by Dolch, do not compel a contrary conclusion.

2016(Ibid.; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 .) 1 Section 388 provides, in part: “Any parent . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) The court must set a hearing if “it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed change of order . . . .” (§ 388, subd. (d).)

2016(See City of Oakland, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 236-237; Ahmadi-Kashani v. Regents of University of California (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 449, 458 (Ahmadi-Kashani) [grievance procedure without a right to an evidentiary hearing before a neutral decisionmaker was inadequate and need not be exhausted]; Unfair Fire Tax Com., supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430 [exhaustion of “nebulous” administrative procedure is not required]; Life Care Centers of America v. CalOptima (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1177 [“[t]o constitute an internal or administrative remedy requiring exhaustion before filing su

2016(See Glendale City Employees’ Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 342-343 [“[a] procedure which provides merely for the submission of a grievance form, without the taking of testimony, the submission of legal briefs, or resolution by an impartial finder of fact is manifestly inadequate to handle disputes of the crucial and complex nature”]; accord, Payne, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 741-742.) Because the post-termination administrative remedy was inadequate, Bazua was not required to exhaust it.

2016(See City of Oakland, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 236-237; Ahmadi-Kashani v. Regents of University of California (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 449, 458 (Ahmadi-Kashani) [grievance procedure without a right to an evidentiary hearing before a neutral decisionmaker was inadequate and need not be exhausted]; Unfair Fire Tax Com., supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429-1430 [exhaustion of “nebulous” administrative procedure is not required]; Life Care Centers of America v. CalOptima (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1177 [“[t]o constitute an internal or administrative remedy requiring exhaustion before filing su

2016(See Glendale City Employees’ Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 342-343 [“[a] procedure which provides merely for the submission of a grievance form, without the taking of testimony, the submission of legal briefs, or resolution by an impartial finder of fact is manifestly inadequate to handle disputes of the crucial and complex nature”]; accord, Payne, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 741-742.) Because the post-termination administrative remedy was inadequate, Bazua was not required to exhaust it.