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6 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 2011–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
The City of El Paso v. Lilli M. Heinrichgreen2 sentences2026Stone v. Harris Cnty., No. 01-21-00384-CV, 2023 WL 5615812 , at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Schroeder v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Ass’n, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 329 , 332 (Tex. 2022); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 , 369–70 (Tex. 2009)7 (same; noting that “[w]ith the limited ultra vires exception . . . governmental immunity protects government officers sued in their 7 “[G]overnmental immunity has two components: immunity from liability, which bars enforcement of a judgment against a governmental entity, and immunity from suit, which bars su 2013See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 380 ("With the limited ultra vires exception ... governmental [or sovereign] immunity protects government officers sued in their official capacities to the extent that it protects their employers.”). *573 But regardless how appellees might have labeled their injunctive claims, it remains that they seek the type of relief that distinguishes claims that can only be brought under the ultra vires exception. | 4 | 5 |
Spurlock v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2015CODE ANN. § 103.001 (West Supp. 2011) (providing that a person is entitled to compensation if, among other things, he served time in prison and has received a full pardon on the basis of innocence or has been granted relief in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus -none of which apply here); Smith v. City of League City, 338 S.W.3d 114, 127 (Tex. App.-H ouston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) ("The due process provisions of the Texas Constitution do not imply a cause of action for damages."); Spurlock, 94 S.W.3d at 658 ("However, the Texas Jackson v. Thaler Page7 Penal Code does not create privat 2012CODE ANN. § 103.001 (West Supp. 2011) (providing that a person is entitled to compensation if, among other things, he served time in prison and has received a full pardon on the basis of innocence or has been granted relief in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus—none of which apply here); Smith v. City of League City, 338 S.W.3d 114, 127 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“The due process provisions of the Texas Constitution do not imply a cause of action for damages.”); Spurlock, 94 S.W.3d at 658 (“However, the Texas Jackson v. Thaler Page 7 Penal Code does not create private | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. City of League Citygreen2 sentences2015CODE ANN. § 103.001 (West Supp. 2011) (providing that a person is entitled to compensation if, among other things, he served time in prison and has received a full pardon on the basis of innocence or has been granted relief in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus -none of which apply here); Smith v. City of League City, 338 S.W.3d 114, 127 (Tex. App.-H ouston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) ("The due process provisions of the Texas Constitution do not imply a cause of action for damages."); Spurlock, 94 S.W.3d at 658 ("However, the Texas Jackson v. Thaler Page7 Penal Code does not create privat 2012CODE ANN. § 103.001 (West Supp. 2011) (providing that a person is entitled to compensation if, among other things, he served time in prison and has received a full pardon on the basis of innocence or has been granted relief in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus—none of which apply here); Smith v. City of League City, 338 S.W.3d 114, 127 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“The due process provisions of the Texas Constitution do not imply a cause of action for damages.”); Spurlock, 94 S.W.3d at 658 (“However, the Texas Jackson v. Thaler Page 7 Penal Code does not create private | 2 | 2 |
Texas a & M University System v. Koseoglugreen2 sentences2011City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 380 (Tex.2009) ("With the limited ultra vires exception ..., governmental immunity protects government officers sued in their official capacities to the extent that it protects their employers.”); Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 844 ("When a state official files a plea to the jurisdiction, the official is invoking the sovereign immunity from suit held by the government itself.”). 34 . 2011Id. at 380 ("With the limited ultra vires exception ..., governmental immunity protects government officers sued in their official capacities to the extent that it protects their employers.”); Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 844 (“When a state official files a plea to the jurisdiction, the official is invoking the sovereign immunity from suit held by the government itself.”). . | 2 | 2 |
Tooke v. City of Mexiagreen1 sentence2026Stone v. Harris Cnty., No. 01-21-00384-CV, 2023 WL 5615812 , at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Schroeder v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Ass’n, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 329 , 332 (Tex. 2022); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 , 369–70 (Tex. 2009)7 (same; noting that “[w]ith the limited ultra vires exception . . . governmental immunity protects government officers sued in their 7 “[G]overnmental immunity has two components: immunity from liability, which bars enforcement of a judgment against a governmental entity, and immunity from suit, which bars su | 1 | 1 |
Texas Department of Transportation v. Sefzikgreen1 sentence2013See Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618 , 621 n. 2 (Tex.2011) (per curiam) (similarly ignoring plaintiff's "refus[al] to apply the ultra vires label” and holding that underlying nature of claims — which sought "to compel a government official ... to perform some act that [the plaintiff] considers to be nondiscretion-ary" — placed the claims "within the ultra vires rationale”). | 1 | 1 |
Franka v. Velasquezgreen2 sentences2011By moving for summary judgment on section 101.106(0, defendants were asserting claims of governmental immunity. . 216 S.W.3d 409, 413 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006). . 2011By moving for summary judgment on section 101.106(f), defendants were asserting claims of governmental immunity. [10] 216 S.W.3d 409, 413 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006). [11] Id. (internal citation omitted). [12] 51 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 771 (Apr. 18, 2008). | 1 | 1 |
Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc.green1 sentence2011Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex.2002); Leonard v. Abbott, 366 S.W.2d 925, 928-929 (Tex. 1963). [72] House v. Houston Waterworks Co., 88 Tex. 233 , 31 S.W. 179, 181 (1895) ("It is well settled that a public officer or other person who takes upon himself a public employment is liable to third persons in an action on the case for any injury occasioned by his own personal negligence or default in the discharge of his duties." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). [73] Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 n. 7 ("State officials may, of course, be sued in both their official and individ | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Keysergreen1 sentence2011Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex.2002); Leonard v. Abbott, 366 S.W.2d 925, 928-929 (Tex. 1963). [72] House v. Houston Waterworks Co., 88 Tex. 233 , 31 S.W. 179, 181 (1895) ("It is well settled that a public officer or other person who takes upon himself a public employment is liable to third persons in an action on the case for any injury occasioned by his own personal negligence or default in the discharge of his duties." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). [73] Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 n. 7 ("State officials may, of course, be sued in both their official and individ | 1 | 1 |
Leonard v. Abbottgreen1 sentence2011Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex.2002); Leonard v. Abbott, 366 S.W.2d 925, 928-929 (Tex. 1963). [72] House v. Houston Waterworks Co., 88 Tex. 233 , 31 S.W. 179, 181 (1895) ("It is well settled that a public officer or other person who takes upon himself a public employment is liable to third persons in an action on the case for any injury occasioned by his own personal negligence or default in the discharge of his duties." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). [73] Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 n. 7 ("State officials may, of course, be sued in both their official and individ | 1 | 1 |
House v. Houston Waterworks Companygreen2 sentences2011Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex.2002); Leonard v. Abbott, 366 S.W.2d 925, 928-929 (Tex. 1963). [72] House v. Houston Waterworks Co., 88 Tex. 233 , 31 S.W. 179, 181 (1895) ("It is well settled that a public officer or other person who takes upon himself a public employment is liable to third persons in an action on the case for any injury occasioned by his own personal negligence or default in the discharge of his duties." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). [73] Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 n. 7 ("State officials may, of course, be sued in both their official and individ 2011Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex.2002); Leonard v. Abbott, 366 S.W.2d 925, 928-929 (Tex. 1963). [72] House v. Houston Waterworks Co., 88 Tex. 233 , 31 S.W. 179, 181 (1895) ("It is well settled that a public officer or other person who takes upon himself a public employment is liable to third persons in an action on the case for any injury occasioned by his own personal negligence or default in the discharge of his duties." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). [73] Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 n. 7 ("State officials may, of course, be sued in both their official and individ | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Josh Schroeder, in His Official Capacity as Chair of the City of Georgetown Planning and Zoning Commission, Along With the Following Members of the Planning and Zoning Commission Also in Their Official Capacities: Tim Bargainer, John Marler, Ercel Brashear, Kayla McCord, Gary Newman, and Ben Stewart v. Escalera Ranch Owners' Association, Inc.
green
1 sentence2026Stone v. Harris Cnty., No. 01-21-00384-CV, 2023 WL 5615812 , at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Schroeder v. Escalera Ranch Owners’ Ass’n, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 329 , 332 (Tex. 2022); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 , 369–70 (Tex. 2009)7 (same; noting that “[w]ith the limited ultra vires exception . . . governmental immunity protects government officers sued in their 7 “[G]overnmental immunity has two components: immunity from liability, which bars enforcement of a judgment against a governmental entity, and immunity from suit, which bars su | 1 | 2026–2026 |