presumption upon presumption in Texas

1978Furr’s, Inc. v. Leyva, 553 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1977, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Whitfield v. Furr’s, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1973, no writ).

1978Furr’s, Inc. v. Leyva, 553 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1977, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Whitfield v. Furr’s, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1973, no writ).

1978The grape or the banana may have been black or withered before it got on the floor, and, in some of these cases, it would have required an inference upon inference, or a presumption upon presumption. * * * ” Again, in Furr’s, Inc. v. McCaslin, supra, this Court said: “Where it is equally as probable that the withering, blackening and deterioration, or the melting of the ice cream, occurred before it got on the floor, a finding that it took place afterward is an unwarranted inference and may not be sustained. * * *” The Plaintiff’s burden of proof cannot be sustained by a reliance upon an infer

1958Co. v. Jones, 106 Tex. 345 , 166 S.W. 1130 , and many others.

1958Co. v. Jones, 106 Tex. 345 , 166 S.W. 1130 , and many others.

1958It is true that there was an attempt to draw an inference upon an assumption to establish that this appellee, Sherman’s Power Tongs, Inc., had placed the stabbing board in the der *383 rick; but this court, in the case of Bullock v. Atlantic Refining Co., 289 S.W.2d 618, 620 , said: “At any rate, a presumption upon presumption is not countenanced in our law.” This is further supported by Rounsaville v. Bullard, 154 Tex. 260 , 276 S.W.2d 791 , and Fort Worth Belt Ry.

1958It is true that there was an attempt to draw an inference upon an assumption to establish that this appellee, Sherman’s Power Tongs, Inc., had placed the stabbing board in the der *383 rick; but this court, in the case of Bullock v. Atlantic Refining Co., 289 S.W.2d 618, 620 , said: “At any rate, a presumption upon presumption is not countenanced in our law.” This is further supported by Rounsaville v. Bullard, 154 Tex. 260 , 276 S.W.2d 791 , and Fort Worth Belt Ry.

1958It is true that there was an attempt to draw an inference upon an assumption to establish that this appellee, Sherman’s Power Tongs, Inc., had placed the stabbing board in the der *383 rick; but this court, in the case of Bullock v. Atlantic Refining Co., 289 S.W.2d 618, 620 , said: “At any rate, a presumption upon presumption is not countenanced in our law.” This is further supported by Rounsaville v. Bullard, 154 Tex. 260 , 276 S.W.2d 791 , and Fort Worth Belt Ry.

1941Co., 134 Tex. 588 , 137 S.W.2d 760 , points 3, 4, page 765.

1941Co., 134 Tex. 588 , 137 S.W.2d 760 , points 3, 4, page 765.

1940We agree with the appellee that the opinion in William Leigh v. Byrd Linthecum, 30 Tex. 100, 101 , is most nearly, if not in fact in point in this case.

1940Kleis v. McGrath, 127 Iowa 459 , 103 N.W. 371 , 372, 69 L.R.A. 260 , 109 Am.St.Rep. 396 .” In substance and effect it would be like resting a presumption upon a presumption.

1939International Traveler’s Ass’n v. Bettis, 120 Tex. 67 , 35 S.W.2d 1040 ; Ft.

1939International Traveler’s Ass’n v. Bettis, 120 Tex. 67 , 35 S.W.2d 1040 ; Ft.

1924Reasoning from the decisions above quoted, we are of the opinion that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in reversing and remanding this case, because in doing so they had to first presume that the statement of facts was incomplete, there being no affirmative showing that it is not complete, and then presume that, if the statement of facts had been complete, they would have been justified in reaching a different conclusion with reference to the case from the one that they did reach, and this would be in effect basing a presumption upon a presumption against the correctness of the judgment of the

1924Reasoning from the decisions above quoted, we are of the opinion that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in reversing and remanding this case, because in doing so they had to first presume that the statement of facts was incomplete, there being no affirmative showing that it is not complete, and then presume that, if the statement of facts had been complete, they would have been justified in reaching a different conclusion with reference to the case from the one that they did reach, and this would be in effect basing a presumption upon a presumption against the correctness of the judgment of the