quid pro quo requirement in Texas

2011See 21 S.W.3d 456, 470 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied) (stating that the elements of a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim are that ―(1) [a] supervisor (2) because of sex (3) subjects an employee to (4) unwelcome conduct that (5) affects a tangible aspect of the employment relationship‖ and citing Ellerth).

2011See 21 S.W.3d 456, 470 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied) (stating that the elements of a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim are that “(1) [a] supervisor (2) because of sex (3) subjects an employee to (4) unwelcome conduct that (5) affects a tangible aspect of the employment relationship” and citing Ellerth ).

2026Code § 21.051(1)), “sexual harassment is actionable ‘only if it is so severe or pervasive as to alter the 8 As TDCJ points out, Deslandes stated in her live pleading that she “is suing the [d]efendants . . . for hostile [work] environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment.” However, as Deslandes acknowledges in her appellate briefing, she actually alleged only a hostile-work-environment claim, not a quid pro quo claim. 9 conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment,’” San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 461 S.W.3d 131, 138 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Clark Cnty.

1997Ewald, 878 S.W.2d at 658-59.

1988As the Court noted in Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 , 50 S.Ct. 57, 58 , 74 L.Ed. 221, 225 (1929), in upholding the Connecticut automobile guest statute against due process attack: "The Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible legislative object." A more rigid standard would, by elevating mere common law actions or defenses to the level of constitutional rights, destroy "the creative potential of the common law." Redish, Legislative Response, 55 Texas L.Rev. at 787.

1988As the Court noted in Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 , 50 S.Ct. 57, 58 , 74 L.Ed. 221, 225 (1929), in upholding the Connecticut automobile guest statute against due process attack: "The Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible legislative object." A more rigid standard would, by elevating mere common law actions or defenses to the level of constitutional rights, destroy "the creative potential of the common law." Redish, Legislative Response, 55 Texas L.Rev. at 787.

1988A quid pro quo requirement may have some appeal when fundamental rights are affected, see Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 Harv.L.Rev. 1683, 1691 (1983), or even where "core" common law rights are abolished, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 94 , 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2047 , 64 L.Ed.2d 741, 760 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring), but its application to every attempted modification of the common law would surely stultify the law.

1988A quid pro quo requirement may have some appeal when fundamental rights are affected, see Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 Harv.L.Rev. 1683, 1691 (1983), or even where "core" common law rights are abolished, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 94 , 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2047 , 64 L.Ed.2d 741, 760 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring), but its application to every attempted modification of the common law would surely stultify the law.