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6 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Utz v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025“Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, however slight, to establish a fact at issue in the case.” Utz v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 411, 418 (1998) (quoting Ragland v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 913, 918 (1993)). | 1 | 1 |
Galbraith v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025When alleging an improper preservation of exculpatory evidence, “the burden is on [the] appellant to show that the trial court erred.” Gagelonia v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 99, 112 (2008) (quoting Galbraith v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 734, 739 (1994)). | 1 | 1 |
Brian Jeffrey Turner v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen1 sentence2025The trial court properly denied Henderson’s motion in limine regarding Officer Harrell’s body camera video. “[M]ost relevant evidence offered by the Commonwealth in a criminal case is potentially damaging to a defendant.” Turner v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 312, 330 (2015). | 1 | 1 |
Buchanan v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025“The manner in which jury selection is conducted is within the discretion and control of the trial court, guided by statute and rule of court.” Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 400 (1989); see Code § 8.01-358. | 1 | 1 |
Ragland v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025“Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, however slight, to establish a fact at issue in the case.” Utz v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 411, 418 (1998) (quoting Ragland v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 913, 918 (1993)). | 1 | 1 |
Gagelonia v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025When alleging an improper preservation of exculpatory evidence, “the burden is on [the] appellant to show that the trial court erred.” Gagelonia v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 99, 112 (2008) (quoting Galbraith v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 734, 739 (1994)). | 1 | 1 |
Yarborough v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2011See Caprino v. Commonwealth, 53 Va.App. 181, 184 , 670 S.E.2d 36, 37-38 (2008) ("`Absent clear evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment of a trial court comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the law was correctly applied to the facts.'" (quoting Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978 , 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977))); Groves v. Commonwealth, 50 Va.App. 57, 61-62 , 646 S.E.2d 28, 30 (2007) ("This means the `judge is presumed to know the law and apply it correctly in each case.'" (quoting Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 165 , 172 n. 3, 578 S.E.2d 88 , 91 n. 3 (2003))). 2011See Caprino v. Commonwealth, 53 Va.App. 181, 184 , 670 S.E.2d 36, 37-38 (2008) ("`Absent clear evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment of a trial court comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the law was correctly applied to the facts.'" (quoting Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978 , 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977))); Groves v. Commonwealth, 50 Va.App. 57, 61-62 , 646 S.E.2d 28, 30 (2007) ("This means the `judge is presumed to know the law and apply it correctly in each case.'" (quoting Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 165 , 172 n. 3, 578 S.E.2d 88 , 91 n. 3 (2003))). | 1 | 1 |
Fails v. Virginia State Bargreen2 sentences2011See Fails v. Va. State Bar, 265 Va. 3 , 5 n. 1, 574 S.E.2d 530 , 531 n. 1 (2003) (applying the Rule of Court in effect at the time of the proceedings below). [6] The Commonwealth argues that Henderson's objection at trial was based solely upon the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and that this objection was properly overruled because the Sixth Amendment does not apply at revocation hearings. 2011See Fails v. Va. State Bar, 265 Va. 3 , 5 n. 1, 574 S.E.2d 530 , 531 n. 1 (2003) (applying the Rule of Court in effect at the time of the proceedings below). [6] The Commonwealth argues that Henderson's objection at trial was based solely upon the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and that this objection was properly overruled because the Sixth Amendment does not apply at revocation hearings. | 1 | 1 |
Caprino v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2011See Caprino v. Commonwealth, 53 Va.App. 181, 184 , 670 S.E.2d 36, 37-38 (2008) ("`Absent clear evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment of a trial court comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the law was correctly applied to the facts.'" (quoting Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978 , 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977))); Groves v. Commonwealth, 50 Va.App. 57, 61-62 , 646 S.E.2d 28, 30 (2007) ("This means the `judge is presumed to know the law and apply it correctly in each case.'" (quoting Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 165 , 172 n. 3, 578 S.E.2d 88 , 91 n. 3 (2003))). 2011See Caprino v. Commonwealth, 53 Va.App. 181, 184 , 670 S.E.2d 36, 37-38 (2008) ("`Absent clear evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment of a trial court comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the law was correctly applied to the facts.'" (quoting Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978 , 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977))); Groves v. Commonwealth, 50 Va.App. 57, 61-62 , 646 S.E.2d 28, 30 (2007) ("This means the `judge is presumed to know the law and apply it correctly in each case.'" (quoting Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 165 , 172 n. 3, 578 S.E.2d 88 , 91 n. 3 (2003))). | 1 | 1 |
Groves v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2011See Caprino v. Commonwealth, 53 Va.App. 181, 184 , 670 S.E.2d 36, 37-38 (2008) ("`Absent clear evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment of a trial court comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the law was correctly applied to the facts.'" (quoting Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978 , 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977))); Groves v. Commonwealth, 50 Va.App. 57, 61-62 , 646 S.E.2d 28, 30 (2007) ("This means the `judge is presumed to know the law and apply it correctly in each case.'" (quoting Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 165 , 172 n. 3, 578 S.E.2d 88 , 91 n. 3 (2003))). 2011See Caprino v. Commonwealth, 53 Va.App. 181, 184 , 670 S.E.2d 36, 37-38 (2008) ("`Absent clear evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment of a trial court comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the law was correctly applied to the facts.'" (quoting Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978 , 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977))); Groves v. Commonwealth, 50 Va.App. 57, 61-62 , 646 S.E.2d 28, 30 (2007) ("This means the `judge is presumed to know the law and apply it correctly in each case.'" (quoting Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 165 , 172 n. 3, 578 S.E.2d 88 , 91 n. 3 (2003))). | 1 | 1 |
Dynalectric Co. v. Ellisgreen2 sentences2010Collateral estoppel bars the re-litigation of “any issue of fact actually litigated and essential to a valid and final personal judgment in [a prior] action.” Dynalectric Co. v. Ellis, 19 Va. App. 541, 544 , 452 S.E.2d 372, 374 (1995) (emphasis in original). 2010Collateral estoppel bars the re-litigation of “any issue of fact actually litigated and essential to a valid and final personal judgment in [a prior] action.” Dynalectric Co. v. Ellis, 19 Va. App. 541, 544 , 452 S.E.2d 372, 374 (1995) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Moses v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2019Although Henderson, 285 Va. at 326-28, clearly sets out the applicable test for the admission of hearsay in the portion of a revocation hearing in which the trial court must assess whether the probationer has violated the conditions of his suspended sentence, we conclude that Henderson and related appellate decisions leave unanswered whether hearsay offered after the assessment of wrongdoing has been made falls under the Henderson test or the standard for criminal sentencing set out in Moses, 27 Va. App. at 301-02 . 2019Although Henderson, 285 Va. at 326-28, clearly sets out the applicable test for the admission of hearsay in the portion of a revocation hearing in which the trial court must assess whether the probationer has violated the conditions of his suspended sentence, we conclude that Henderson and related appellate decisions leave unanswered whether hearsay offered after the assessment of wrongdoing has been made falls under the Henderson test or the standard for criminal sentencing set out in Moses, 27 Va. App. at 301-02 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Deer v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2013The trial court further found that because Deputy Motley had taken pictures before speaking to Henderson, “any indicia that he consented to further photos would not be consent that meets the standard of being ‘freely and voluntarily given.’ Deer v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 730 (1994).” Finally, the court found that the plain view doctrine did not permit the taking of the photos because Deputy Motley did not have -4- “a lawful right to access the units or the van because of their location on the property,” as her approach to the van and the units “exceeded the scope of the implied consent doct | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences2011"The Sixth Amendment right is limited to `criminal prosecutions,' and a revocation hearing is not a `criminal prosecution.'" Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 417 n. 1, 663 S.E.2d at 550 n. 1 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). 2011"The Sixth Amendment right is limited to `criminal prosecutions,' and a revocation hearing is not a `criminal prosecution.'" Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 417 n. 1, 663 S.E.2d at 550 n. 1 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Dickens v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2011"The Sixth Amendment right is limited to `criminal prosecutions,' and a revocation hearing is not a `criminal prosecution.'" Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 417 n. 1, 663 S.E.2d at 550 n. 1 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). 2011"The Sixth Amendment right is limited to `criminal prosecutions,' and a revocation hearing is not a `criminal prosecution.'" Dickens, 52 Va.App. at 417 n. 1, 663 S.E.2d at 550 n. 1 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Crest v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2011See Caprino v. Commonwealth, 53 Va.App. 181, 184 , 670 S.E.2d 36, 37-38 (2008) ("`Absent clear evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment of a trial court comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the law was correctly applied to the facts.'" (quoting Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978 , 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977))); Groves v. Commonwealth, 50 Va.App. 57, 61-62 , 646 S.E.2d 28, 30 (2007) ("This means the `judge is presumed to know the law and apply it correctly in each case.'" (quoting Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 165 , 172 n. 3, 578 S.E.2d 88 , 91 n. 3 (2003))). 2011See Caprino v. Commonwealth, 53 Va.App. 181, 184 , 670 S.E.2d 36, 37-38 (2008) ("`Absent clear evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment of a trial court comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the law was correctly applied to the facts.'" (quoting Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978 , 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977))); Groves v. Commonwealth, 50 Va.App. 57, 61-62 , 646 S.E.2d 28, 30 (2007) ("This means the `judge is presumed to know the law and apply it correctly in each case.'" (quoting Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 165 , 172 n. 3, 578 S.E.2d 88 , 91 n. 3 (2003))). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Kast v. PPG Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences1988Another federal case is Kast v. PPG Industries, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 237 (W.D. 1988Another federal case is Kast v. PPG Industries, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 237 (W.D. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.