first affirmative defense in Washington

1941As a first affirmative defense, the copartners pleaded *8 the financing agreement of March 5, 1938, between the copartners and Suryan’s, which contract was before this court in Ropes, Inc. v. Rubinstein, 4 Wn. (2d) 380, 104 P. (2d) 329 , and Whiting v. Rubinstein, 7 Wn. (2d) 204, 109 P. (2d) 312 .

1941As a first affirmative defense, the copartners pleaded *8 the financing agreement of March 5, 1938, between the copartners and Suryan’s, which contract was before this court in Ropes, Inc. v. Rubinstein, 4 Wn. (2d) 380, 104 P. (2d) 329 , and Whiting v. Rubinstein, 7 Wn. (2d) 204, 109 P. (2d) 312 .

1925The third affirmative defense has been decided adversely to the contention of appellants by the supreme court of the United States in Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 , involving the same legislation.

1925The first affirmative defense is untenable under our decision in State v. O’Connell, 121 Wash. 542 , 209 Pac. 865 . *465 The second affirmative defense as to the article and section of the state constitution prohibiting discrimination between citizens, of course, has no application to aliens who are not protected by that constitutional provision, and therefore is not available to appellants.

1925The first affirmative defense is untenable under our decision in State v. O’Connell, 121 Wash. 542 , 209 Pac. 865 . *465 The second affirmative defense as to the article and section of the state constitution prohibiting discrimination between citizens, of course, has no application to aliens who are not protected by that constitutional provision, and therefore is not available to appellants.

1924This affirmative defense then set forth in full the proceedings leading up to and ending in the decision of the supreme court of Illinois in the case of Steen v. Modern Woodmen of America, 296 Ill. 104 , 129 N. E. 546 , setting up the opinion of the court in full, wherein that court held that the by-law in question was reasonable and valid, and appellant therefore alleged that that decision was the law governing the contract in question, and unless it was so construed appellant would be deprived of the benefits of the due faith and credit provisions of the United States constitution, § 1, art.

1924This affirmative defense then set forth in full the proceedings leading up to and ending in the decision of the supreme court of Illinois in the case of Steen v. Modern Woodmen of America, 296 Ill. 104 , 129 N. E. 546 , setting up the opinion of the court in full, wherein that court held that the by-law in question was reasonable and valid, and appellant therefore alleged that that decision was the law governing the contract in question, and unless it was so construed appellant would be deprived of the benefits of the due faith and credit provisions of the United States constitution, § 1, art.

1916As to the first affirmative defense, this case is a replica of the case of Fischer v. Kittinger, 39 Wash. 174 , 81 Pac. 551 .

1916As to the first affirmative defense, this case is a replica of the case of Fischer v. Kittinger, 39 Wash. 174 , 81 Pac. 551 .

1911The neglect there charged was solely against the city: that it failed to install proper ground wires to protect the secondary circuit against becoming overcharged by the powerful primary circuit, and thereby become dangerous to human life; that it failed to detect the dangerous overcharge after notice thereof, and that it failed to cut off the known and dangerous current upon its secondary wires; and these acts of negligence were relied upon and proved in the Ohrstrom case (see Ohrstrom v. Tacoma, 57 Wash. 121 , 106 Pac. 629 ), and by reason thereof the city was held liable in damages.

1911The neglect there charged was solely against the city: that it failed to install proper ground wires to protect the secondary circuit against becoming overcharged by the powerful primary circuit, and thereby become dangerous to human life; that it failed to detect the dangerous overcharge after notice thereof, and that it failed to cut off the known and dangerous current upon its secondary wires; and these acts of negligence were relied upon and proved in the Ohrstrom case (see Ohrstrom v. Tacoma, 57 Wash. 121 , 106 Pac. 629 ), and by reason thereof the city was held liable in damages.

1904Phillips v. Port Townsend Lodge, 8 Wash. 529 , 36 Pac. 476 ; Gore v. Altice, 33 Wash. 335 , 74 Pac. 556 ; Morris v. Healy Lumber Co., 33 Wash. 451 , 74 Pac. 662 .

1904Phillips v. Port Townsend Lodge, 8 Wash. 529 , 36 Pac. 476 ; Gore v. Altice, 33 Wash. 335 , 74 Pac. 556 ; Morris v. Healy Lumber Co., 33 Wash. 451 , 74 Pac. 662 .

1904Phillips v. Port Townsend Lodge, 8 Wash. 529 , 36 Pac. 476 ; Gore v. Altice, 33 Wash. 335 , 74 Pac. 556 ; Morris v. Healy Lumber Co., 33 Wash. 451 , 74 Pac. 662 .

1904Phillips v. Port Townsend Lodge, 8 Wash. 529 , 36 Pac. 476 ; Gore v. Altice, 33 Wash. 335 , 74 Pac. 556 ; Morris v. Healy Lumber Co., 33 Wash. 451 , 74 Pac. 662 .

1904Phillips v. Port Townsend Lodge, 8 Wash. 529 , 36 Pac. 476 ; Gore v. Altice, 33 Wash. 335 , 74 Pac. 556 ; Morris v. Healy Lumber Co., 33 Wash. 451 , 74 Pac. 662 .

1904Phillips v. Port Townsend Lodge, 8 Wash. 529 , 36 Pac. 476 ; Gore v. Altice, 33 Wash. 335 , 74 Pac. 556 ; Morris v. Healy Lumber Co., 33 Wash. 451 , 74 Pac. 662 .