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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1935–1968 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
California Employment Commission v. Arrow Mill Co.green2 sentences1944(Merron v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 60, 63 [ 113 P.2d 481 ]; California Employment Com. v. Arrow Mill Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 668, 671 [ 114 P.2d 727 ].) Finally, it may be said that appellant confines his attack solely to the findings in favor of defendant on the latter’s first affirmative defense. 1944(Merron v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 60, 63 [ 113 P.2d 481 ]; California Employment Com. v. Arrow Mill Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 668, 671 [ 114 P.2d 727 ].) Finally, it may be said that appellant confines his attack solely to the findings in favor of defendant on the latter’s first affirmative defense. | 1 | 1 |
Merron v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.green2 sentences1944(Merron v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 60, 63 [ 113 P.2d 481 ]; California Employment Com. v. Arrow Mill Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 668, 671 [ 114 P.2d 727 ].) Finally, it may be said that appellant confines his attack solely to the findings in favor of defendant on the latter’s first affirmative defense. 1944(Merron v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 60, 63 [ 113 P.2d 481 ]; California Employment Com. v. Arrow Mill Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 668, 671 [ 114 P.2d 727 ].) Finally, it may be said that appellant confines his attack solely to the findings in favor of defendant on the latter’s first affirmative defense. | 1 | 1 |
McGuinness v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1944(McGuinness v. Superior Court (1925), 196 Cal. 222, 229 [ 237 P. 42 , 40 A.L.R. 1110]; Gump v. Gump (1940), 42 Cal.App.2d 64 [ 108 P.2d 21 ], and cases cited.) It is quite obvious that the first affirmative defense does not state a defense to this second cause of action, for in that defense the defendant does no more than set up the bringing of the Santa Barbara action, the entries of the interlocutory and of the final decrees, and that, as to each decree, it “has not been appealed from, annulled, vacated or modified in any manner whatsoever and ever since [its entry] said decree has been and 1944(McGuinness v. Superior Court (1925), 196 Cal. 222, 229 [ 237 P. 42 , 40 A.L.R. 1110]; Gump v. Gump (1940), 42 Cal.App.2d 64 [ 108 P.2d 21 ], and cases cited.) It is quite obvious that the first affirmative defense does not state a defense to this second cause of action, for in that defense the defendant does no more than set up the bringing of the Santa Barbara action, the entries of the interlocutory and of the final decrees, and that, as to each decree, it “has not been appealed from, annulled, vacated or modified in any manner whatsoever and ever since [its entry] said decree has been and | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Cliffordgreen2 sentences1935(Green v. Clifford, 94 Cal. 49, 52 [ 29 Pac. 331 ]; Treweek v. Howard, 105 Cal. 434, 442 [ 39 Pac. 20 ].) Considered, then, as a whole, does the cross-complaint state a cause of action against respondents [plaintiffs] ? 1935(Green v. Clifford, 94 Cal. 49, 52 [ 29 Pac. 331 ]; Treweek v. Howard, 105 Cal. 434, 442 [ 39 Pac. 20 ].) Considered, then, as a whole, does the cross-complaint state a cause of action against respondents [plaintiffs] ? | 1 | 1 |
Treweek v. Howardgreen2 sentences1935(Green v. Clifford, 94 Cal. 49, 52 [ 29 Pac. 331 ]; Treweek v. Howard, 105 Cal. 434, 442 [ 39 Pac. 20 ].) Considered, then, as a whole, does the cross-complaint state a cause of action against respondents [plaintiffs] ? 1935(Green v. Clifford, 94 Cal. 49, 52 [ 29 Pac. 331 ]; Treweek v. Howard, 105 Cal. 434, 442 [ 39 Pac. 20 ].) Considered, then, as a whole, does the cross-complaint state a cause of action against respondents [plaintiffs] ? | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard
green
2 sentences1968The leading .case which sets forth this modern trend relative to the defence of impracticability is Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289 [ 156 P. 458 , L.R.A. 1916F 1 ]; in that litigation, the defendants," who were building a bridge, contracted to buy all of the gravel which they might need for the construction work from plaintiff’s pits. 1968The leading .case which sets forth this modern trend relative to the defence of impracticability is Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289 [ 156 P. 458 , L.R.A. 1916F 1 ]; in that litigation, the defendants," who were building a bridge, contracted to buy all of the gravel which they might need for the construction work from plaintiff’s pits. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Wilson v. Sharp
green
2 sentences1955(Wilson v. Sharp, 42 Cal.2d 675 [ 268 P.2d 1062 ].) However, the only defect in the complaint specified by appellant, either at the trial or upon this appeal, is that paragraph X thereof is an incorrect and insufficient allegation of damage. 1955(Wilson v. Sharp, 42 Cal.2d 675 [ 268 P.2d 1062 ].) However, the only defect in the complaint specified by appellant, either at the trial or upon this appeal, is that paragraph X thereof is an incorrect and insufficient allegation of damage. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Gump v. Gump
green
2 sentences1944(McGuinness v. Superior Court (1925), 196 Cal. 222, 229 [ 237 P. 42 , 40 A.L.R. 1110]; Gump v. Gump (1940), 42 Cal.App.2d 64 [ 108 P.2d 21 ], and cases cited.) It is quite obvious that the first affirmative defense does not state a defense to this second cause of action, for in that defense the defendant does no more than set up the bringing of the Santa Barbara action, the entries of the interlocutory and of the final decrees, and that, as to each decree, it “has not been appealed from, annulled, vacated or modified in any manner whatsoever and ever since [its entry] said decree has been and 1944(McGuinness v. Superior Court (1925), 196 Cal. 222, 229 [ 237 P. 42 , 40 A.L.R. 1110]; Gump v. Gump (1940), 42 Cal.App.2d 64 [ 108 P.2d 21 ], and cases cited.) It is quite obvious that the first affirmative defense does not state a defense to this second cause of action, for in that defense the defendant does no more than set up the bringing of the Santa Barbara action, the entries of the interlocutory and of the final decrees, and that, as to each decree, it “has not been appealed from, annulled, vacated or modified in any manner whatsoever and ever since [its entry] said decree has been and | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.