non-participation requirement in Texas

2025Liberally construing the non-participation requirement, as we must, see id., we conclude that the record shows Block did not participate in the hearing resulting in the default judgment.

2024“For over half a century,” the Texas Supreme Court has required us “to liberally construe the non-participation requirement for restricted appeals in favor of the right to appeal.” Pike-Grant v. Grant, 447 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam); see also Campsey v. Campsey, 111 S.W.3d 767, 770 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).

2011Texaco, Inc. v. Central Power & Light Co., 925 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1996).

2010Texaco, Inc. v. Central Power & Light Co., 925 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1996).

2013Ibarra, 2012 WL 3025709 , at *5 (citing Dillard v. Patel, 809 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied)).

2007Dillard v. Patel, 809 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1991, writ denied).

2015In our review, we must “liberally construe the non-participation requirement for restricted appeals in favor of the right to appeal.” Pike-Grant, 447 S.W.3d at 886 (citing Stubbs v. Stubbs, 685 S.W.2d 643 , 644–45 (Tex. 1985)). -3- 04-14-00741-CV ANALYSIS Deidre contends she met all the requirements of a restricted appeal. 1 Deidre argues the face of the record shows she was not served and, despite the enforcement order’s recitals, she did not appear on April 14, 2014, for trial because no trial was held.

2011Stubbs v. Stubbs, 685 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. 1985). -3- 04-10-00778-CV Mary Louise contends she meets the non-participation requirement because she was not at the hearing that resulted in the final judgment.

2010It argues that, because the court did not need to have a "formal fact-finding hearing" and because Bahar "actually did file written responses to each motion," Bahar participated in the "key decision-making event." See Cox , 298 S.W.3d at 730 ("To determine whether [the appellant] meets the non-participation requirement of a restricted appeal, we ask whether he took part in the decision-making event that resulted in the adjudication of his rights.").

2010It argues that, because the court did not need to have a “formal fact-finding hearing” and because Bahar “actually did file written responses to each motion,” Ba-har participated in the “key decision-making event.” See Cox, 298 S.W.3d at 730 (“To determine whether [the appellant] meets the non-participation requirement of a restricted appeal, we ask whether he took part in the decision-making event that resulted in the adjudication of his rights.”).

2009Texaco, Inc. v. Central Power & Light Co., 925 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex.1996); Parsons v. Dallas County, 182 S.W.3d 451, 453 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).

2009Texaco, Inc. v. Central Power & Light Co. , 925 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. 1996); Parsons v. Dallas County , 182 S.W.3d 451, 453 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2006, no pet.).

2015See Starks, 153 S.W.3d at 626 (“Because the non-participation requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional, when an appellate court determines that an appellant participated in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of, the appropriate action is to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”).

2015Starks, 153 S.W.3d at 626 .

2021With respect to the non-participation requirement, any doubts or ambiguities will be resolved in Appellant’s favor because, “[f]or over half a century, [the Texas Supreme Court] ha[s] required courts to liberally construe the non-participation requirement for restricted appeals in favor of the right of appeal.” Pike-Grant v. Grant, 447 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex. 2014); see also Lawyers Lloyds of Texas v. Webb, 152 S.W.2d 1096, 1098 (Tex. 1941) (“statutes giving and regulating the right of appeal . . . should be liberally construed in favor of the right of appeal”).

2014Stubbs v. Stubbs, 685 S.W.2d 643, 644-45 (Tex.1985) (citing Lawyers Lloyds of Tex. v. Webb, 137 Tex. 107 , 152 S.W.2d 1096, 1098 (1941) (interpreting statutory predecessor to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30)).

2008See Withem v. Underwood , 922 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Tex. 1996) (discussing the non-participation requirement under former Tex. R.

2008See Withem v. Underwood, 922 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Tex. 1996) (discussing the non-participation requirement under former Tex. R.

2024“For over half a century,” the Texas Supreme Court has required us “to liberally construe the non-participation requirement for restricted appeals in favor of the right to appeal.” Pike-Grant v. Grant, 447 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam); see also Campsey v. Campsey, 111 S.W.3d 767, 770 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).

2021Contractors, Inc., 668 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that defendant’s actions of filing of general denials did not participate to such an extent that they are now precluded to appeal by writ of error on a non-participation ground).

2021See Ex parte Vega, 510 S.W.3d at 547 (holding that appellant met the non-participation requirement because even though it filed an answer, it did not participate in the hearing on appellee’s petition that resulted in the expunction order); Schulz v. Schulz, 726 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ) (holding that appearance does not preclude appeal by writ of error); Sunbelt Const. Corp. v. S & D Mech.

2021See Ex parte Vega, 510 S.W.3d at 547 (holding that appellant met the non-participation requirement because even though it filed an answer, it did not participate in the hearing on appellee’s petition that resulted in the expunction order); Schulz v. Schulz, 726 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ) (holding that appearance does not preclude appeal by writ of error); Sunbelt Const. Corp. v. S & D Mech.

2014See Lejeune, 297 S.W.3d at 255 .