44 California opinions name it 3 courts 1934–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc.green2 sentences2016The complaint alleges defendants used 8 false documents, manufactured documents, used robo-signers, and used other unlawful practices “to facilitate quicker foreclosures.” A plaintiff alleging an unfair business practice “must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 619 .) A demurrer is properly sustained where the complaint “identifies no particular section of the statutory scheme which was violated and fails to describe with any reasonable particularity the facts suppor 2015(Khoury v. Maly’s California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 [demurrer dismissal affirmed where the plaintiff had failed to identify which section of the law had been violated or describe with any particularity the facts supporting the violation].) Penal Code section 532f, subdivision (a)(4) provides that “[a] person commits mortgage fraud if, with the intent to defraud, the person . . . files or causes to be filed with the recorder of any county in connection with a mortgage loan transaction any document the person knows to contain a deliberate misstatement, misrepresentation, or omissio | 3 | 6 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Tomas L.green2 sentences2016(In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534 .) "Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re 8 Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.); accord, In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 283, 290 .) At the section 366.26 hearing, if the court finds a child cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds a compelling reason for determining that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one or more of 2014(Ibid.) "Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.); accord In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 283, 290 .) If the court finds a child cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds a compelling reason for determining that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one or more of the enumerated statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) & (B)(i)-(vi).) | 3 | 3 |
In Re Mirandagreen2 sentences2009However, in any type of proceeding, the movant (or petitioner) bears the burden of alleging and showing entitlement to the relief sought. ( People v. Lopez (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 233, 251 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 ]; see also Conservatorship of Hume (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1388-1389 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 906 ] [a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting].) In habeas corpus proceedings, analogous in nature to a petition for release from involuntary treatment, a discretionary writ will be s 2009However, in any type of proceeding, the movant (or petitioner) bears the burden of alleging and showing entitlement to the relief sought. ( People v. Lopez (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 233, 251 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 ]; see also Conservatorship of Hume (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1388-1389 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 906 ] [a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting].) In habeas corpus proceedings, analogous in nature to a petition for release from involuntary treatment, a discretionary writ will be s | 2 | 3 |
In Re Autumn H.green2 sentences2016(In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534 .) "Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re 8 Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.); accord, In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 283, 290 .) At the section 366.26 hearing, if the court finds a child cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds a compelling reason for determining that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one or more of 2014(Ibid.) "Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.); accord In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 283, 290 .) If the court finds a child cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds a compelling reason for determining that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one or more of the enumerated statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) & (B)(i)-(vi).) | 2 | 3 |
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Sara D.green2 sentences2016(In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 553 (C.F.).) Father relied on section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), which provides an exception to the adoption preference if terminating parental rights would be "detrimental to the child" because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (Italics added.) We have interpreted the phrase "benefit from continuing the relationship" to refer to a parent-child relationship that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-bei 2014(In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 553 (C.F.).) Because a selection and implementation hearing occurs "after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child's needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for adoptive placement." (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 .) In this case, Father relied on section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), which provides an exception to the adoption preference if terminating parental rights would be "detrimental to the child" because "[t] | 2 | 3 |
People v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2010(People v. Lopez (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 233, 251 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 ]; see also Conservatorship of Hume (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1388-1389 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 906 ] [a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting].) In habeas corpus proceedings, analogous in nature to a petition for release from involuntary treatment, a discretionary writ will be summarily denied without a hearing unless the petitioner meets his burden of alleging and proving the facts supporting his claim for relief. 2010(People v. Lopez (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 233, 251 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 ]; see also Conservatorship of Hume (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1388-1389 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 906 ] [a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting].) In habeas corpus proceedings, analogous in nature to a petition for release from involuntary treatment, a discretionary writ will be summarily denied without a hearing unless the petitioner meets his burden of alleging and proving the facts supporting his claim for relief. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Conservatorship Humegreen2 sentences2010(People v. Lopez (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 233, 251 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 ]; see also Conservatorship of Hume (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1388-1389 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 906 ] [a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting].) In habeas corpus proceedings, analogous in nature to a petition for release from involuntary treatment, a discretionary writ will be summarily denied without a hearing unless the petitioner meets his burden of alleging and proving the facts supporting his claim for relief. 2010(People v. Lopez (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 233, 251 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 511 ]; see also Conservatorship of Hume (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1388-1389 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 906 ] [a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting].) In habeas corpus proceedings, analogous in nature to a petition for release from involuntary treatment, a discretionary writ will be summarily denied without a hearing unless the petitioner meets his burden of alleging and proving the facts supporting his claim for relief. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Petznickgreen2 sentences2025(People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1116 ; People v. Miceli (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 256, 267 ) Substantial evidence in this context does not mean “any evidence . . . no matter how weak[,]” but rather “ ‘ “evidence 7 from which a jury composed of reasonable [people] could have concluded” ’ that the specific facts supporting the instruction existed.” (People v. Petznick (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 663, 677 ; accord, People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810 , 823- 824.) Since entrapment is an affirmative defense that the defense must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, (People v. Mowe 2023Instead, the jury must be instructed when there is evidence that ‘deserve[s] consideration by the jury, i.e., “evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [people] could have concluded” ’ that the specific facts supporting the instruction existed. [Citation.]” (People v. Petznick (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 663, 677 , italics omitted.) Generally, CALCRIM No. 3475 applies to cases in which the owner or occupant of property is charged with using excessive force to remove a trespasser. | 1 | 9 |
People v. Larsengreen2 sentences2025(People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1116 ; People v. Miceli (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 256, 267 ) Substantial evidence in this context does not mean “any evidence . . . no matter how weak[,]” but rather “ ‘ “evidence 7 from which a jury composed of reasonable [people] could have concluded” ’ that the specific facts supporting the instruction existed.” (People v. Petznick (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 663, 677 ; accord, People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810 , 823- 824.) Since entrapment is an affirmative defense that the defense must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, (People v. Mowe 2023Instead, the jury must be instructed when there is evidence that “deserve[s] consideration by the jury, i.e., ‘evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [people] could have concluded’ ” ’ that the specific facts supporting the instruction existed.” (Larsen, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 824 .) Absent expert testimony that Dupuis even suffered from a mental disorder, no specific facts supported the instruction. | 1 | 4 |
Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.green2 sentences2016(See Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 751 P.2d 923 ].) On December 17, 2013, the jury returned a verdict in favor of TAT and Putney. 2016(See Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 751 P.2d 923 ].) On December 17, 2013, the jury returned a verdict in favor of TAT and Putney. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Mowergreen1 sentence2025(People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1116 ; People v. Miceli (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 256, 267 ) Substantial evidence in this context does not mean “any evidence . . . no matter how weak[,]” but rather “ ‘ “evidence 7 from which a jury composed of reasonable [people] could have concluded” ’ that the specific facts supporting the instruction existed.” (People v. Petznick (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 663, 677 ; accord, People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810 , 823- 824.) Since entrapment is an affirmative defense that the defense must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, (People v. Mowe | 1 | 1 |
People v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2023(People v. Johnson (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 702, 709 (Johnson).) “The principles set forth in CALCRIM No. 3475 might also apply when there is an issue of whether a trespasser had any right to defend himself against the use of force by the owner/occupant of the property. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ivansgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Verdugogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Edwardsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Heathgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Heller v. Doe Ex Rel. Doegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LPgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Doe v. City of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Leonardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Betz v. Pankowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sinclairgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ervingreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Blackshergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Carrgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Superior Court (Zamudio)green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Diazgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mendoza Tellogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Andersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lutz v. De Laurentiisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Kapellas v. Kofmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Forsher v. Bugliosigreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Amadiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Saavedra
green
2 sentences2016Instead, the jury must be instructed when there is evidence that ‘deserve[s] consideration by the jury, i.e., “evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [people] could have concluded” ’ that the specific facts supporting the instruction existed.” (People v. Petznick (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 663, 677 .) “The defense of duress is available to defendants who commit crimes, except murder, ‘under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused.’ ” (People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 331 (Wilson).) “An 2014(People v. Saavedra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 561, 570-571 ; People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 340-341 ; see CALCRIM No. 3470.) To support a claim of self-defense, the defendant must honestly and reasonably believe there is a threat of imminent bodily injury. | 2 | 2014–2016 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Margaret M.
green
2 sentences2016(In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534 .) "Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re 8 Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.); accord, In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 283, 290 .) At the section 366.26 hearing, if the court finds a child cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds a compelling reason for determining that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one or more of 2014(In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534 .) "Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 ; accord In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 283, 290 .) If the court finds a child cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds a compelling reason for determining that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one or more of the enumerated statutory exceptions. (§ 366. | 2 | 2014–2016 |
People v. Moore
green
1 sentence2025(People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1116 ; People v. Miceli (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 256, 267 ) Substantial evidence in this context does not mean “any evidence . . . no matter how weak[,]” but rather “ ‘ “evidence 7 from which a jury composed of reasonable [people] could have concluded” ’ that the specific facts supporting the instruction existed.” (People v. Petznick (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 663, 677 ; accord, People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810 , 823- 824.) Since entrapment is an affirmative defense that the defense must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, (People v. Mowe | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Miceli
green
1 sentence2025(People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1116 ; People v. Miceli (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 256, 267 ) Substantial evidence in this context does not mean “any evidence . . . no matter how weak[,]” but rather “ ‘ “evidence 7 from which a jury composed of reasonable [people] could have concluded” ’ that the specific facts supporting the instruction existed.” (People v. Petznick (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 663, 677 ; accord, People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810 , 823- 824.) Since entrapment is an affirmative defense that the defense must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, (People v. Mowe | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Ayala
green
1 sentence2024(See People v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 705 ; People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 299 ; People v. Lamb, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 581 ; People v. Garbutt, supra, 197 Cal. at p. 205 .) While a trial court may not ignore the defendant’s right to offer testimony of a witness in his favor, “the mere invocation of that right cannot automatically and invariably outweigh countervailing public interests.” (Taylor v. Illinois, supra, 484 U.S. at p. 414 .) “The integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Gonzales
green
1 sentence2024(See People v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 705 ; People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 299 ; People v. Lamb, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 581 ; People v. Garbutt, supra, 197 Cal. at p. 205 .) While a trial court may not ignore the defendant’s right to offer testimony of a witness in his favor, “the mere invocation of that right cannot automatically and invariably outweigh countervailing public interests.” (Taylor v. Illinois, supra, 484 U.S. at p. 414 .) “The integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Lamb
green
1 sentence2024(See People v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 705 ; People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 299 ; People v. Lamb, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 581 ; People v. Garbutt, supra, 197 Cal. at p. 205 .) While a trial court may not ignore the defendant’s right to offer testimony of a witness in his favor, “the mere invocation of that right cannot automatically and invariably outweigh countervailing public interests.” (Taylor v. Illinois, supra, 484 U.S. at p. 414 .) “The integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Ledesma
green
1 sentence2024(See People v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 705 ; People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 299 ; People v. Lamb, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 581 ; People v. Garbutt, supra, 197 Cal. at p. 205 .) While a trial court may not ignore the defendant’s right to offer testimony of a witness in his favor, “the mere invocation of that right cannot automatically and invariably outweigh countervailing public interests.” (Taylor v. Illinois, supra, 484 U.S. at p. 414 .) “The integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Rodriguez
green
1 sentence2024(People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 439 .) The evidence must support a conclusion that the probationer willfully violated a term of probation. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Garbutt
green
1 sentence2024(See People v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 705 ; People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 299 ; People v. Lamb, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 581 ; People v. Garbutt, supra, 197 Cal. at p. 205 .) While a trial court may not ignore the defendant’s right to offer testimony of a witness in his favor, “the mere invocation of that right cannot automatically and invariably outweigh countervailing public interests.” (Taylor v. Illinois, supra, 484 U.S. at p. 414 .) “The integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Taylor v. Illinois
green
1 sentence2024(See People v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 705 ; People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 299 ; People v. Lamb, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 581 ; People v. Garbutt, supra, 197 Cal. at p. 205 .) While a trial court may not ignore the defendant’s right to offer testimony of a witness in his favor, “the mere invocation of that right cannot automatically and invariably outweigh countervailing public interests.” (Taylor v. Illinois, supra, 484 U.S. at p. 414 .) “The integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Green v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2023(Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 449 ; Green, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 138 .) 1. 2023(Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 449 ; Green, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 138 .) 1. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Boyer
red
1 sentence2023(Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 449 ; Green, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 138 .) 1. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. O'CONNELL
green
1 sentence2022We are mindful that the standard of proof for a violation of probation is a preponderance of the evidence (People v. O’Connell (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066 ), but the jury verdicts indicate the facts supporting the violation of probation were found true beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Duvall
green
1 sentence2021(In re Miranda (2008) 43 Cal.4th 541, 575 ; People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 .) “[A] postconviction challenge to a special circumstance finding under Banks and Clark presents a legal question for the reviewing court. [Citation.] The challenge ‘does not require resolution of disputed facts; the facts are a given’—the appellate court simply determines if they are sufficient to support the special circumstance finding under the multifactor guidance articulated in Banks and Clark.” (Jones, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 483, rev.gr.) The underlying judgment is presumed valid (In re Bacigalu | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Martin
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1111 .) F. Analysis None of the three witnesses in this case testified they smelled alcohol on defendant’s breath or person. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Lopez
green
1 sentence2021Instead, the jury must be instructed when there is evidence that ‘deserve[s] consideration by the jury, i.e., “evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [people] could have concluded”’ that the specific facts supporting the instruction existed.” (People v. Petznick (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 663, 677 .) “‘The duty to instruct, sua sponte, on general principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court also encompasses an obligation to instruct on defenses,’” (People v. Lopez (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1120 ), but only if they are “supported by substantial evidence [and] | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In re Bacigalupo green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Montoya green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2021Instead, the jury must be instructed when there is evidence that ‘deserve[s] consideration by the jury, i.e., “evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [people] could have concluded”’ that the specific facts supporting the instruction existed.” (People v. Petznick (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 663, 677 .) “A defendant is entitled to such an instruction only when there is substantial evidence of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication and the intoxication affected the defendant’s ‘actual formation of specific intent.’” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677 ; accord, People v. Verdugo | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In re Bennett green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Debro v. Los Angeles Raiders green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Trujeque green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Saddler green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Breverman green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Alexander green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Manriquez green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Dowdell green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Adrian green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In Re Jasmine D. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Wilson v. Hynek green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Matheney v. State green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Howard green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Rose v. Bank of America green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Flannel red | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Ochoa green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Salas green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Sinclair neutral | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.