burden results rule in California

2017We accordingly limit our analysis to Rhoades’s RLUIPA claim and express no view on the merits of the claims on which the trial court did not rule. 10 RLUIPA provides that ‘“[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person— [¶] (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and [¶] (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governm

2017We accordingly limit our analysis to Rhoades’s RLUIPA claim and express no view on the merits of the claims on which the trial court did not rule. 10 RLUIPA provides that ‘“[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person— [¶] (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and [¶] (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governm

2012In City of Boerne [v. Flores (1997) 521 U.S. 507 [ 138 L.Ed.2d 624 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 ]], [the United States Supreme Court] invalidated RFRA as applied to States and their subdivisions, holding that the Act exceeded Congress’ remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.

2012In City of Boerne [v. Flores (1997) 521 U.S. 507 [ 138 L.Ed.2d 624 , 117 S.Ct. 2157 ]], [the United States Supreme Court] invalidated RFRA as applied to States and their subdivisions, holding that the Act exceeded Congress’ remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.

2012(Koger v. Bryan (7th Cir. 2008) 523 F.3d 789, 796 .) In pursuing a claim under RLUIPA, “the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing (1) that he seeks to engage in an exercise of religion, and (2) that the challenged practice substantially burdens that exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b).

1996Under the heading “Purposes,” RFRA states that it “restore[s] the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) . . . .” (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l).) RFRA goes on to state that “[government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).” (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a).) Under subsection (b), “[gjovemment may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the

1996Under the heading "Purposes," RFRA states that it "restore[s] the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)...." (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).) RFRA goes on to state that "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b)." (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).) Under subsection (b), "[g]overnment may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the

1996The petition for rehearing in Smith was subscribed to by public interest groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union, numerous religious interest groups (including Baptist, Catholic, Jewish, Lutheran, Evangelical, Unitarian and Seventh Day Adventist groups), as well as an unprecedented coalition of over 50 law professors, among them Gerald Gunther of Standford, Laurence Tribe of Harvard, Kent Greenawalt of Columbia, and Michael McConnell of Chicago. { Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , rehg., den. (1990) 496 U.S. 913 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 285 , 110 S.Ct. 2605 ].) Title 42 United States Code section 20

1996The petition for rehearing in Smith was subscribed to by public interest groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union, numerous religious interest groups (including Baptist, Catholic, Jewish, Lutheran, Evangelical, Unitarian and Seventh Day Adventist groups), as well as an unprecedented coalition of over 50 law professors, among them Gerald Gunther of Standford, Laurence Tribe of Harvard, Kent Greenawalt of Columbia, and Michael McConnell of Chicago. { Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , rehg., den. (1990) 496 U.S. 913 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 285 , 110 S.Ct. 2605 ].) Title 42 United States Code section 20

1996Under the heading “Purposes,” RFRA states that it “restore[s] the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) . . . .” (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l).) RFRA goes on to state that “[government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).” (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a).) Under subsection (b), “[gjovemment may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the

1996Under the heading "Purposes," RFRA states that it "restore[s] the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)...." (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).) RFRA goes on to state that "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b)." (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).) Under subsection (b), "[g]overnment may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the

1996The petition for rehearing in Smith was subscribed to by public interest groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union, numerous religious interest groups (including Baptist, Catholic, Jewish, Lutheran, Evangelical, Unitarian and Seventh Day Adventist groups), as well as an unprecedented coalition of over 50 law professors, among them Gerald Gunther of Standford, Laurence Tribe of Harvard, Kent Greenawalt of Columbia, and Michael McConnell of Chicago. { Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872 , rehg., den. (1990) 496 U.S. 913 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 285 , 110 S.Ct. 2605 ].) Title 42 United States Code section 20

1996(Ibid.) It further held the state was not required to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest outweighing the employees’ right of free exercise. ( 494 U.S. at p. 885 [110 S.Ct. at pp. 1603-1604].) In reaction to Employment Division v. Smith , Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.) RFRA provides that government, including a state, “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless application of the law is the “least restrictive means” of furthering a

1996(U.S. v. Meyers (10th Cir. 1996) 95 F.3d 1475, 1481 ; see Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1143 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 700 , 913 P.2d 909 ] (plur. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) Since defendant’s argument here is based on his contention there is no compelling state interest, if he has a claim at all it arises under RFRA, not the First Amendment.

1963(Tesseyman v. Fisher, 113 Cal.App.2d 404 [ 248 P.2d 471 ]; Cooper v. Cooper, 168 Cal.App.2d 326 [ 335 P.2d 983 ].) Notwithstanding appellant’s disregard of the rules, we have examined all of the evidence; viewing the same in a light most favorable to respondent and resolving all conflicts and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict (Primm v. Primm, 46 Cal.2d 690 [ 299 P.2d 231 ]; Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal.2d 805 [ 313 P.2d 848 ]; Crawford v. Southern Pac.

1963(Tesseyman v. Fisher, 113 Cal.App.2d 404 [ 248 P.2d 471 ]; Cooper v. Cooper, 168 Cal.App.2d 326 [ 335 P.2d 983 ].) Notwithstanding appellant’s disregard of the rules, we have examined all of the evidence; viewing the same in a light most favorable to respondent and resolving all conflicts and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict (Primm v. Primm, 46 Cal.2d 690 [ 299 P.2d 231 ]; Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal.2d 805 [ 313 P.2d 848 ]; Crawford v. Southern Pac.

1963(Tesseyman v. Fisher, 113 Cal.App.2d 404 [ 248 P.2d 471 ]; Cooper v. Cooper, 168 Cal.App.2d 326 [ 335 P.2d 983 ].) Notwithstanding appellant’s disregard of the rules, we have examined all of the evidence; viewing the same in a light most favorable to respondent and resolving all conflicts and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict (Primm v. Primm, 46 Cal.2d 690 [ 299 P.2d 231 ]; Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal.2d 805 [ 313 P.2d 848 ]; Crawford v. Southern Pac.

1963(Tesseyman v. Fisher, 113 Cal.App.2d 404 [ 248 P.2d 471 ]; Cooper v. Cooper, 168 Cal.App.2d 326 [ 335 P.2d 983 ].) Notwithstanding appellant’s disregard of the rules, we have examined all of the evidence; viewing the same in a light most favorable to respondent and resolving all conflicts and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict (Primm v. Primm, 46 Cal.2d 690 [ 299 P.2d 231 ]; Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal.2d 805 [ 313 P.2d 848 ]; Crawford v. Southern Pac.

1963(Tesseyman v. Fisher, 113 Cal.App.2d 404 [ 248 P.2d 471 ]; Cooper v. Cooper, 168 Cal.App.2d 326 [ 335 P.2d 983 ].) Notwithstanding appellant’s disregard of the rules, we have examined all of the evidence; viewing the same in a light most favorable to respondent and resolving all conflicts and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict (Primm v. Primm, 46 Cal.2d 690 [ 299 P.2d 231 ]; Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal.2d 805 [ 313 P.2d 848 ]; Crawford v. Southern Pac.

1963(Tesseyman v. Fisher, 113 Cal.App.2d 404 [ 248 P.2d 471 ]; Cooper v. Cooper, 168 Cal.App.2d 326 [ 335 P.2d 983 ].) Notwithstanding appellant’s disregard of the rules, we have examined all of the evidence; viewing the same in a light most favorable to respondent and resolving all conflicts and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict (Primm v. Primm, 46 Cal.2d 690 [ 299 P.2d 231 ]; Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal.2d 805 [ 313 P.2d 848 ]; Crawford v. Southern Pac.

1963(Tesseyman v. Fisher, 113 Cal.App.2d 404 [ 248 P.2d 471 ]; Cooper v. Cooper, 168 Cal.App.2d 326 [ 335 P.2d 983 ].) Notwithstanding appellant’s disregard of the rules, we have examined all of the evidence; viewing the same in a light most favorable to respondent and resolving all conflicts and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict (Primm v. Primm, 46 Cal.2d 690 [ 299 P.2d 231 ]; Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal.2d 805 [ 313 P.2d 848 ]; Crawford v. Southern Pac.

1963(Tesseyman v. Fisher, 113 Cal.App.2d 404 [ 248 P.2d 471 ]; Cooper v. Cooper, 168 Cal.App.2d 326 [ 335 P.2d 983 ].) Notwithstanding appellant’s disregard of the rules, we have examined all of the evidence; viewing the same in a light most favorable to respondent and resolving all conflicts and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict (Primm v. Primm, 46 Cal.2d 690 [ 299 P.2d 231 ]; Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal.2d 805 [ 313 P.2d 848 ]; Crawford v. Southern Pac.

1963Co., 177 Cal.App.2d 539 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 325 ]; Zint v. Topp Industries Inc., 184 Cal.App.2d 240 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 302 ].) Failure *787 to sustain this burden results in a waiver of the error assigned.

1963Co., 177 Cal.App.2d 539 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 325 ]; Zint v. Topp Industries Inc., 184 Cal.App.2d 240 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 302 ].) Failure *787 to sustain this burden results in a waiver of the error assigned.

1963Co., 177 Cal.App.2d 539 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 325 ]; Zint v. Topp Industries Inc., 184 Cal.App.2d 240 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 302 ].) Failure *787 to sustain this burden results in a waiver of the error assigned.

1963Co., 177 Cal.App.2d 539 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 325 ]; Zint v. Topp Industries Inc., 184 Cal.App.2d 240 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 302 ].) Failure *787 to sustain this burden results in a waiver of the error assigned.