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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1930–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Warrengreen2 sentences1962(People v. Booth, 111 Cal.App.2d 106, 109 [ 243 P.2d 872 ].) Such error is not prejudicial however, unless it appears from the circumstances that the jury could have been misled in applying the two instructions (People v. Warren, 175 Cal.App.2d 233, 240 [346 P.2d 64]; People v. Hewitt, 198 Cal.App.2d 247, 252 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 5 ].) In the case before us the instruction on specific intent clearly pointed out the state of mind that is necessary for the crime of burglary and in view of the substantial evidence of guilt present in this case we cannot conceive how the jury could have been reasonably 1962(People v. Booth, 111 Cal.App.2d 106, 109 [ 243 P.2d 872 ].) Such error is not prejudicial however, unless it appears from the circumstances that the jury could have been misled in applying the two instructions (People v. Warren, 175 Cal.App.2d 233, 240 [346 P.2d 64]; People v. Hewitt, 198 Cal.App.2d 247, 252 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 5 ].) In the case before us the instruction on specific intent clearly pointed out the state of mind that is necessary for the crime of burglary and in view of the substantial evidence of guilt present in this case we cannot conceive how the jury could have been reasonably | 1 | 1 |
People v. Boothgreen2 sentences1962(People v. Booth, 111 Cal.App.2d 106, 109 [ 243 P.2d 872 ].) Such error is not prejudicial however, unless it appears from the circumstances that the jury could have been misled in applying the two instructions (People v. Warren, 175 Cal.App.2d 233, 240 [346 P.2d 64]; People v. Hewitt, 198 Cal.App.2d 247, 252 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 5 ].) In the case before us the instruction on specific intent clearly pointed out the state of mind that is necessary for the crime of burglary and in view of the substantial evidence of guilt present in this case we cannot conceive how the jury could have been reasonably 1962(People v. Booth, 111 Cal.App.2d 106, 109 [ 243 P.2d 872 ].) Such error is not prejudicial however, unless it appears from the circumstances that the jury could have been misled in applying the two instructions (People v. Warren, 175 Cal.App.2d 233, 240 [346 P.2d 64]; People v. Hewitt, 198 Cal.App.2d 247, 252 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 5 ].) In the case before us the instruction on specific intent clearly pointed out the state of mind that is necessary for the crime of burglary and in view of the substantial evidence of guilt present in this case we cannot conceive how the jury could have been reasonably | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hewittgreen2 sentences1962(People v. Booth, 111 Cal.App.2d 106, 109 [ 243 P.2d 872 ].) Such error is not prejudicial however, unless it appears from the circumstances that the jury could have been misled in applying the two instructions (People v. Warren, 175 Cal.App.2d 233, 240 [346 P.2d 64]; People v. Hewitt, 198 Cal.App.2d 247, 252 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 5 ].) In the case before us the instruction on specific intent clearly pointed out the state of mind that is necessary for the crime of burglary and in view of the substantial evidence of guilt present in this case we cannot conceive how the jury could have been reasonably 1962(People v. Booth, 111 Cal.App.2d 106, 109 [ 243 P.2d 872 ].) Such error is not prejudicial however, unless it appears from the circumstances that the jury could have been misled in applying the two instructions (People v. Warren, 175 Cal.App.2d 233, 240 [346 P.2d 64]; People v. Hewitt, 198 Cal.App.2d 247, 252 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 5 ].) In the case before us the instruction on specific intent clearly pointed out the state of mind that is necessary for the crime of burglary and in view of the substantial evidence of guilt present in this case we cannot conceive how the jury could have been reasonably | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Pacific Electric Railway Co.green2 sentences1930Co., 177 Cal. 235, 237, 238 [ 170 Pac. 423 ].) As was said in Swartz v. Acme Express & Drayage Co., 102 Cal. App. 615 [ 283 Pac. 658 ], “in the absence of some rule of conduct which is established by statute, by judicial decision, or by established custom or practice, we cannot say that any particular method employed to avoid injury is negligence as a matter of law because it is not the method that we would have used under the same circumstances.” In the case before us the rule of conduct prescribed by statute is found in section 130 of the Motor Vehicle Act (Stats. 1923, p. 558) and reads: “T 1930Co., 177 Cal. 235, 237, 238 [ 170 Pac. 423 ].) As was said in Swartz v. Acme Express & Drayage Co., 102 Cal. App. 615 [ 283 Pac. 658 ], “in the absence of some rule of conduct which is established by statute, by judicial decision, or by established custom or practice, we cannot say that any particular method employed to avoid injury is negligence as a matter of law because it is not the method that we would have used under the same circumstances.” In the case before us the rule of conduct prescribed by statute is found in section 130 of the Motor Vehicle Act (Stats. 1923, p. 558) and reads: “T | 1 | 1 |
Donat v. Dillongreen2 sentences1930Here we have a statutory rule of conduct to which all motorists similarly situated must conform, and which casts upon the motorists “the duty of exercising greater care than is ordinarily required of them.” (Donat v. Dillon, 192 Cal. 426, 430 [ 221 Pac. 193, 195 ].) But we have not been cited any statute or rule of decision which determines what is a breach of this duty under any state of facts. 1930Here we have a statutory rule of conduct to which all motorists similarly situated must conform, and which casts upon the motorists “the duty of exercising greater care than is ordinarily required of them.” (Donat v. Dillon, 192 Cal. 426, 430 [ 221 Pac. 193, 195 ].) But we have not been cited any statute or rule of decision which determines what is a breach of this duty under any state of facts. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Rojas
green
1 sentence2021People v. Rojas (1962) 57 Cal.2d 676 , is not applicable because in contrast to the case before us where defense counsel did not request an updated probation report, in Rojas, “counsel for defendants requested that the matter again be referred to the probation officer for a new and current report. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Mercant
green
1 sentence2021The deputy district attorney also asked that the matter be then referred to the probation department . . . .” (Id. at p. 679.) Finally, defendant’s reliance on People v. Mercant (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1192 is misplaced because the court that decided that case has since repudiated it. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Hutton v. Gill
green
2 sentences1944(Hutton v. Gill, 212 Ind. 164 [ 8 N.E.2d 818, 820 ].)" "In the case before us the rule enforced against petitioner by the reductions of her salary ignores successful experiences and efficiency as a factor in determining salaries, in contravention of section 5.734 of the School Code; it arbitrarily assumes that a teacher becomes not more, but less efficient *451 with experience; that failure to take additional college work makes a teacher less competent; it also assumes arbitrarily that the taking of any six (or four) units of college work every four yers will restore efficiency (though only by 1944(Hutton v. Gill, 212 Ind. 164 [ 8 N.E.2d 818, 820 ].)" "In the case before us the rule enforced against petitioner by the reductions of her salary ignores successful experiences and efficiency as a factor in determining salaries, in contravention of section 5.734 of the School Code; it arbitrarily assumes that a teacher becomes not more, but less efficient *451 with experience; that failure to take additional college work makes a teacher less competent; it also assumes arbitrarily that the taking of any six (or four) units of college work every four yers will restore efficiency (though only by | 1 | 1944–1944 |
La Shells v. Hench
green
2 sentences1933P. Co., 35 Cal. App. 439 [ 170 Pac. 446 ]; La Shells v. Hench, 98 Cal. App. 6 [ 276 Pac. 377 ].) If the general rule which we have stated be applied to the facts of the case before us the defense of laches cannot be sustained because of the lack of any prejudice or injury to respondents and the San Diego Trust and Savings Bank from the mere lapse of time. 1933P. Co., 35 Cal. App. 439 [ 170 Pac. 446 ]; La Shells v. Hench, 98 Cal. App. 6 [ 276 Pac. 377 ].) If the general rule which we have stated be applied to the facts of the case before us the defense of laches cannot be sustained because of the lack of any prejudice or injury to respondents and the San Diego Trust and Savings Bank from the mere lapse of time. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Carr v. Sacramento Clay Products Co.
green
2 sentences1933P. Co., 35 Cal. App. 439 [ 170 Pac. 446 ]; La Shells v. Hench, 98 Cal. App. 6 [ 276 Pac. 377 ].) If the general rule which we have stated be applied to the facts of the case before us the defense of laches cannot be sustained because of the lack of any prejudice or injury to respondents and the San Diego Trust and Savings Bank from the mere lapse of time. 1933P. Co., 35 Cal. App. 439 [ 170 Pac. 446 ]; La Shells v. Hench, 98 Cal. App. 6 [ 276 Pac. 377 ].) If the general rule which we have stated be applied to the facts of the case before us the defense of laches cannot be sustained because of the lack of any prejudice or injury to respondents and the San Diego Trust and Savings Bank from the mere lapse of time. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Swartz v. Acme Express & Drayage Co.
green
1 sentence1930Co., 177 Cal. 235, 237, 238 [ 170 Pac. 423 ].) As was said in Swartz v. Acme Express & Drayage Co., 102 Cal. App. 615 [ 283 Pac. 658 ], “in the absence of some rule of conduct which is established by statute, by judicial decision, or by established custom or practice, we cannot say that any particular method employed to avoid injury is negligence as a matter of law because it is not the method that we would have used under the same circumstances.” In the case before us the rule of conduct prescribed by statute is found in section 130 of the Motor Vehicle Act (Stats. 1923, p. 558) and reads: “T | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.