Crowley motion in California

2011The “prayer [of the complaint] determines the amount in controversy [citation].” (Minor v. Municipal Court, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 1547 .) The small claims court therefore had subject matter jurisdiction over Crowley’s de novo request pursuant to section 6204(c) and Code of Civil Procedure section 116.220, subdivision (a)(4), respectively, since “the amount of money in controversy” and the “fee dispute involve[ed] no more than five thousand dollars ... in controversy.” Although not part of the complaint, to the extent that Crowley’s claim against Giorgianni for fees and costs exceeded $5,

2002(Id. at p. 674, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 386 , 881 P.2d 1083 .) In their demurrer to the malicious prosecution action, the defendants contended, "by denying Crowley's motion for summary adjudication of issues as to all grounds of the will contest except lack of due execution, the probate court `necessarily determined' there was probable cause for the remaining grounds ...." (Id. at p. 675, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 386 , 881 P.2d 1083 .) We, however, rejected this contention in a footnote, finding it "was without merit for the reasons stated in Lucchesi ...." ( Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 675, fn. 5 , 34 Cal

2002(Id. at p. 674, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 386 , 881 P.2d 1083 .) In their demurrer to the malicious prosecution action, the defendants contended, "by denying Crowley's motion for summary adjudication of issues as to all grounds of the will contest except lack of due execution, the probate court `necessarily determined' there was probable cause for the remaining grounds ...." (Id. at p. 675, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 386 , 881 P.2d 1083 .) We, however, rejected this contention in a footnote, finding it "was without merit for the reasons stated in Lucchesi ...." ( Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 675, fn. 5 , 34 Cal

2001But as an intermediate appellate court, we are bound by the holdings of our Supreme Court whether we think that they are well-reasoned or not. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 , 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 .) That is particularly true here, where the opinion in question is consistent with a line of authority reaching back over a hundred years.

2001But as an intermediate appellate court, we are bound by the holdings of our Supreme Court whether we think that they are well-reasoned or not. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 , 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 .) That is particularly true here, where the opinion in question is consistent with a line of authority reaching back over a hundred years.

1994In their points and authorities defendants contended that (1) Crowley “tacitly acknowledged” that the undue influence ground of the will contest was legally tenable by omitting it from the list of grounds alleged to lack probable cause; 4 (2) by denying Crowley’s motion for summary adjudication of issues as to all grounds of the will contest except lack of due execution, the probate court “necessarily determined” there was probable cause for the remaining grounds; (3) under Friedberg v. Cox (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 381 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 851 ] (Friedberg), the absence of probable cause for one groun

1994In their points and authorities defendants contended that (1) Crowley “tacitly acknowledged” that the undue influence ground of the will contest was legally tenable by omitting it from the list of grounds alleged to lack probable cause; 4 (2) by denying Crowley’s motion for summary adjudication of issues as to all grounds of the will contest except lack of due execution, the probate court “necessarily determined” there was probable cause for the remaining grounds; (3) under Friedberg v. Cox (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 381 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 851 ] (Friedberg), the absence of probable cause for one groun

1994Cal. Edison Co. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 337, 340 [ 139 P.2d 20 ]; Fairchild v. Adams, supra, 170 Cal.App.2d 10, 15 .) Neither in Bertero nor in the case at bar was there any such interim judgment; as the Court of Appeal herein correctly held, the denial of Crowley’s motion for summary adjudication of issues as to all grounds except lack of due execution was not a judgment on the merits for that purpose.

1994Cal. Edison Co. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 337, 340 [ 139 P.2d 20 ]; Fairchild v. Adams, supra, 170 Cal. App.2d 10, 15 .) Neither in Bertero nor in the case at bar was there any such interim judgment; as the Court of Appeal herein correctly held, the denial of Crowley's motion for summary adjudication of issues as to all grounds except lack of due execution was not a judgment on the merits for that purpose. ( Lucchesi v. Giannini & Uniack, supra, 158 Cal. App.3d 777, 785-788 .) [16] Indeed, at common law to promote such litigation constituted the offense of barratry.

1994(See Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1190 .) [17] In view of this conclusion we need not reach defendants' secondary contention that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that judicial notice of the trial testimony of two witnesses to the will would not establish probable cause as a matter of law for the ground of lack of due execution. [1] In point of fact, I am not at all persuaded that the use of a "primary right" analysis would fail to provide a workable means of segregating those malicious prosecution actions that should go forward and those that should be barred in favor of sanctions within

1940It has been repeatedly held that the question of what facts or circumstances amount to probable cause is a pure question of law for the court (Booraem v. Potter Hotel Co., 154 Cal. 99 [ 97 Pac. 65 ] ; Holliday v. Holliday, 123 Cal. 26 [ 55 Pac. 703 ].) The jury may be called upon to determine whether such facts and circumstances exist when there is a substantial conflict in the evidence bearing upon this issue, but in the absence of any substantial conflict in such evidence it is the province of the court to determine whether such facts and circumstances do or do not establish a want of probab

1940It has been repeatedly held that the question of what facts or circumstances amount to probable cause is a pure question of law for the court (Booraem v. Potter Hotel Co., 154 Cal. 99 [ 97 Pac. 65 ] ; Holliday v. Holliday, 123 Cal. 26 [ 55 Pac. 703 ].) The jury may be called upon to determine whether such facts and circumstances exist when there is a substantial conflict in the evidence bearing upon this issue, but in the absence of any substantial conflict in such evidence it is the province of the court to determine whether such facts and circumstances do or do not establish a want of probab

1940It has been repeatedly held that the question of what facts or circumstances amount to probable cause is a pure question of law for the court (Booraem v. Potter Hotel Co., 154 Cal. 99 [ 97 Pac. 65 ] ; Holliday v. Holliday, 123 Cal. 26 [ 55 Pac. 703 ].) The jury may be called upon to determine whether such facts and circumstances exist when there is a substantial conflict in the evidence bearing upon this issue, but in the absence of any substantial conflict in such evidence it is the province of the court to determine whether such facts and circumstances do or do not establish a want of probab

1940It has been repeatedly held that the question of what facts or circumstances amount to probable cause is a pure question of law for the court (Booraem v. Potter Hotel Co., 154 Cal. 99 [ 97 Pac. 65 ] ; Holliday v. Holliday, 123 Cal. 26 [ 55 Pac. 703 ].) The jury may be called upon to determine whether such facts and circumstances exist when there is a substantial conflict in the evidence bearing upon this issue, but in the absence of any substantial conflict in such evidence it is the province of the court to determine whether such facts and circumstances do or do not establish a want of probab

1940It has been repeatedly held that the question of what facts or circumstances amount to probable cause is a pure question of law for the court (Booraem v. Potter Hotel Co., 154 Cal. 99 [ 97 Pac. 65 ] ; Holliday v. Holliday, 123 Cal. 26 [ 55 Pac. 703 ].) The jury may be called upon to determine whether such facts and circumstances exist when there is a substantial conflict in the evidence bearing upon this issue, but in the absence of any substantial conflict in such evidence it is the province of the court to determine whether such facts and circumstances do or do not establish a want of probab

1940It has been repeatedly held that the question of what facts or circumstances amount to probable cause is a pure question of law for the court (Booraem v. Potter Hotel Co., 154 Cal. 99 [ 97 Pac. 65 ] ; Holliday v. Holliday, 123 Cal. 26 [ 55 Pac. 703 ].) The jury may be called upon to determine whether such facts and circumstances exist when there is a substantial conflict in the evidence bearing upon this issue, but in the absence of any substantial conflict in such evidence it is the province of the court to determine whether such facts and circumstances do or do not establish a want of probab