gloss claim in California

2019Both of these tests are defeated where, as here, there is undisputed evidence that the hazard could reasonably have been discovered (by inspecting the ladder) and, once discovered, avoided (by getting another ladder). ( Gonzalez v. Mathis (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 257 , 273-274, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 832 review granted May 16, 2018, S247677 [in premises liability, the reasonableness of a party's actions is a question of fact unless reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion].) *633 3.

2019Both of these tests are defeated where, as here, there is undisputed evidence that the hazard could reasonably have been discovered (by inspecting the ladder) and, once discovered, avoided (by getting another ladder). ( Gonzalez v. Mathis (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 257 , 273-274, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 832 review granted May 16, 2018, S247677 [in premises liability, the reasonableness of a party's actions is a question of fact unless reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion].) *633 3.

2019The Kinsman opinion noted, however, that there may be situations "in which an obvious hazard, for which no warning is necessary, nonetheless gives rise to a duty on a landowner's part to remedy the hazard because knowledge of the hazard is inadequate to prevent injury." ( Kinsman, supra , 37 Cal.4th at p. 673 , 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 495 , 123 P.3d 931 .) This is so when, for example, the practical necessity of encountering the danger, when weighed against the apparent risk involved, is such that, under the circumstances, a person might choose to encounter the danger. ( Ibid. ) This gloss on the rule

2019The Kinsman opinion noted, however, that there may be situations "in which an obvious hazard, for which no warning is necessary, nonetheless gives rise to a duty on a landowner's part to remedy the hazard because knowledge of the hazard is inadequate to prevent injury." ( Kinsman, supra , 37 Cal.4th at p. 673 , 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 495 , 123 P.3d 931 .) This is so when, for example, the practical necessity of encountering the danger, when weighed against the apparent risk involved, is such that, under the circumstances, a person might choose to encounter the danger. ( Ibid. ) This gloss on the rule

2015(People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585 , 611 . . . [‘for the most part . . . the mere erroneous exercise of discretion under such “normal” rules [of evidence] does not implicate the federal Constitution’]; Engle v. Issac (1982) 456 U.S. 107, 121 , fn. 21 . . . [‘We have long recognized that a “mere error of state law” is not a denial of due process. [Citation.] If the contrary were true, then “every erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come [to this Court] as a federal constitutional question.”’].)” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th 335, 413, fn. 34 .) Mo

2015(People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585 , 611 . . . [‘for the most part . . . the mere erroneous exercise of discretion under such “normal” rules [of evidence] does not implicate the federal Constitution’]; Engle v. Issac (1982) 456 U.S. 107, 121 , fn. 21 . . . [‘We have long recognized that a “mere error of state law” is not a denial of due process. [Citation.] If the contrary were true, then “every erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come [to this Court] as a federal constitutional question.”’].)” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th 335, 413, fn. 34 .) Mo

1996It is unclear whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Fretwell, supra, 506 U.S. 364 , alters or supersedes the second (prejudice) prong of the traditional Strickland test (see U.S. v. $30,440 in U.S. Currency (9th Cir. 1993) 2 F.3d 328, 330 [“[f]or Strickland to apply . . . there must. . . have been fundamental unfairness in the trial so . . . its result was unjust,” citing Fretwell]), or is merely a gloss on that test made necessary by the unusual facts of Fretwell .