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5 California opinions name it 1 courts 1975–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sikogreen2 sentences2016However, the court found that the fact that section 1001.80 was enacted after Vehicle Code section 23640 was not dispositive because repeals by implication are disfavored (citing People v. Siko (1988) 45 Cal.3d 820, 824 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 755 P.2d 294 ]). 2016However, the court found that the fact that section 1001.80 was enacted after Vehicle Code section 23640 was not dispositive because repeals by implication are disfavored (citing People v. Siko (1988) 45 Cal.3d 820, 824 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 755 P.2d 294 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Marcario v. County of Orangegreen2 sentences2014(Marcario v. County of Orange (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 397, 408 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 903 ] (Marcario) [“ ‘[W]e are compelled to affirm the trial court’s rejection of the theory [of equitable tolling] if there is substantial evidence to support its determination.’ [Citation.]”].) Accordingly, we reject Hopkins’s claim that the court erred in refusing to toll the statute of limitations on the basis of purported settlement negotiations between the parties. 2014(Marcario v. County of Orange (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 397, 408 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 903 ] (Marcario) [“ ‘[W]e are compelled to affirm the trial court’s rejection of the theory [of equitable tolling] if there is substantial evidence to support its determination.’ [Citation.]”].) Accordingly, we reject Hopkins’s claim that the court erred in refusing to toll the statute of limitations on the basis of purported settlement negotiations between the parties. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Tategreen2 sentences2010The facts are therefore taken from the certified documents attached to Hopkins's motion for additional credits and other documents in the clerk's transcripts. [4] EPRD is an acronym for earliest possible release date, which is calculated for each inmate by the CDCR. (§ 2932, subd. (e); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3043, subd. (c)(5); Cal. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Operations Manual (2010) § 73030.8.13.) After determining an inmate's maximum release date by taking the date of sentencing, adding the total prison term and subtracting any presentence credits awarded, the EPRD is dete 2010The facts are therefore taken from the certified documents attached to Hopkins's motion for additional credits and other documents in the clerk's transcripts. [4] EPRD is an acronym for earliest possible release date, which is calculated for each inmate by the CDCR. (§ 2932, subd. (e); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3043, subd. (c)(5); Cal. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Operations Manual (2010) § 73030.8.13.) After determining an inmate's maximum release date by taking the date of sentencing, adding the total prison term and subtracting any presentence credits awarded, the EPRD is dete | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plangreen2 sentences2009(Carmona, supra, 544 F.3d at p. 1003 , citing McGowan v. NJR Service Corp. (3d Cir. 2005) 423 F.3d 241, 246 , disapproved on another ground in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan (2009) 555 U.S. _ , _, fn. 4 [ 172 L.Ed.2d 662 , 129 S.Ct. 865, 870, fn. 4 ].) The court also embraced the actuarial certainty and finality rationale as noted in Hopkins, supra, 105 F.3d at page 157 , footnote 7. 2009(Carmona, supra, 544 F.3d at p. 1003 , citing McGowan v. NJR Service Corp. (3d Cir. 2005) 423 F.3d 241, 246 , disapproved on another ground in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan (2009) 555 U.S. _ , _, fn. 4 [ 172 L.Ed.2d 662 , 129 S.Ct. 865, 870, fn. 4 ].) The court also embraced the actuarial certainty and finality rationale as noted in Hopkins, supra, 105 F.3d at page 157 , footnote 7. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 771363green2 sentences2009(Carmona, at p. 993.) Joining the Fourth Circuit in Hopkins , the Ninth Circuit held “that QJSA surviving spouse benefits irrevocably vest in the participant’s spouse at the time of the annuity start date—in this case the participant’s retirement—and may not be reassigned to a subsequent spouse.” 0Carmona, at p. 993, fn. omitted.) The court identified the issue as one “of first impression in this Circuit: whether a ‘plan participant’s retirement cuts off a putative alternate payee’s right to obtain an enforceable QDRO’ with regard to the surviving spouse benefits of a QJSA.” (Id. at p. 1000, c 2009(Carmona, at p. 993.) Joining the Fourth Circuit in Hopkins , the Ninth Circuit held “that QJSA surviving spouse benefits irrevocably vest in the participant’s spouse at the time of the annuity start date—in this case the participant’s retirement—and may not be reassigned to a subsequent spouse.” 0Carmona, at p. 993, fn. omitted.) The court identified the issue as one “of first impression in this Circuit: whether a ‘plan participant’s retirement cuts off a putative alternate payee’s right to obtain an enforceable QDRO’ with regard to the surviving spouse benefits of a QJSA.” (Id. at p. 1000, c | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Weatherill
green
2 sentences2016The People opposed Hopkins’s motion on the ground that Vehicle Code section 23640 precludes diversion in any DUI case, citing People v. Weatherill (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1569 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 298 ] (Weatherill). 2016The People opposed Hopkins’s motion on the ground that Vehicle Code section 23640 precludes diversion in any DUI case, citing People v. Weatherill (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1569 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 298 ] (Weatherill). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Elkins v. Derby
green
1 sentence2014(Id. at p. 100.) Thus, where a plaintiff has “ ‘several legal remedies’ ” (Elkins, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 414 , quoting Myers, supra, 6 Cal.App.3d at p. 634 ), the plaintiff may rationally pursue the first action even if it does not afford the plaintiff all of the relief that she might be able to obtain in the second action. 11 *754 Similarly, Hopkins’s claim of equitable tolling cannot be defeated merely because she could have filed her tort claim within the ordinary limitation period. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Myers v. County of Orange
green
1 sentence2014(Id. at p. 100.) Thus, where a plaintiff has “ ‘several legal remedies’ ” (Elkins, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 414 , quoting Myers, supra, 6 Cal.App.3d at p. 634 ), the plaintiff may rationally pursue the first action even if it does not afford the plaintiff all of the relief that she might be able to obtain in the second action. 11 *754 Similarly, Hopkins’s claim of equitable tolling cannot be defeated merely because she could have filed her tort claim within the ordinary limitation period. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Rojas
green
2 sentences2010Pursuant to In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 649 , 588 P.2d 789 ], the defendant is not entitled to any custody credits prior to his release on parole." Hopkins's motion was heard and denied on March 18, 2009. 2010Pursuant to In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 649 , 588 P.2d 789 ], the defendant is not entitled to any custody credits prior to his release on parole." Hopkins's motion was heard and denied on March 18, 2009. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Vera Mae Hopkins v. At & T Global Information Solutions Company, Formerly Known as Ncr Corporation
green
2 sentences2009(Carmona, supra, 544 F.3d at p. 1002 .) Like the Fourth Circuit in Hopkins, supra, 105 F.3d 153 , the Ninth Circuit in Carmona was also persuaded by the fact that surviving spouse benefits may be paid to a spouse who is married on the day of the participant’s retirement, regardless of whether the participant and spouse are married at the participant’s death. {Carmona, at p. 1002.) “Following this reasoning, we conclude that once a participant retires, the spouse at the time becomes the ‘surviving spouse’ entitled to the QJSA benefits.” {Ibid.) Carmona found the ultimate objectives of Congress 2009(Carmona, supra, 544 F.3d at p. 1002 .) Like the Fourth Circuit in Hopkins, supra, 105 F.3d 153 , the Ninth Circuit in Carmona was also persuaded by the fact that surviving spouse benefits may be paid to a spouse who is married on the day of the participant’s retirement, regardless of whether the participant and spouse are married at the participant’s death. {Carmona, at p. 1002.) “Following this reasoning, we conclude that once a participant retires, the spouse at the time becomes the ‘surviving spouse’ entitled to the QJSA benefits.” {Ibid.) Carmona found the ultimate objectives of Congress | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Boggs v. Boggs
green
2 sentences2009“ERISA’s surviving spouse benefits established in section 1055 were created in part ‘to ensure a stream of income to surviving spouses.’ [Citation.]” (Carmona, at p. 1002, citing Boggs v. Boggs, supra, 520 U.S. 833, 843 .) We see no distinction between qualified joint and survivor annuity benefits and qualified preretirement survivor annuity benefits for purposes of the QDRO qualification requirements. 2009“ERISA’s surviving spouse benefits established in section 1055 were created in part ‘to ensure a stream of income to surviving spouses.’ [Citation.]” (Carmona, at p. 1002, citing Boggs v. Boggs, supra, 520 U.S. 833, 843 .) We see no distinction between qualified joint and survivor annuity benefits and qualified preretirement survivor annuity benefits for purposes of the QDRO qualification requirements. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
James M. McGowan Sr. v. Njr Service Corporation New Jersey Natural Gas Company
green
1 sentence2009(Carmona, supra, 544 F.3d at p. 1003 , citing McGowan v. NJR Service Corp. (3d Cir. 2005) 423 F.3d 241, 246 , disapproved on another ground in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan (2009) 555 U.S. _ , _, fn. 4 [ 172 L.Ed.2d 662 , 129 S.Ct. 865, 870, fn. 4 ].) The court also embraced the actuarial certainty and finality rationale as noted in Hopkins, supra, 105 F.3d at page 157 , footnote 7. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1975(See discussion in People v. Superior Court (Loar) supra, 28 Cal.App.3d at p. 610 .) The case at bench involves only a determination by the trial court that the nonstatutory procedure was not appropriate for the adjudication of Hopkins’ claim. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.