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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1964–2001 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Adamsongreen2 sentences1969The language of the court in People v. Adamson, supra, 225 Cal.App.2d 74 , at page 79 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 894 ], is appropriate: ‘If admission of proof of other crimes were to be hinged upon a showing of methods common to most or many robbery practitioners, then application of the inclusionary rule would be so broad as to nullify the principle that a defendant is not to be convicted because the prosecution can prove, on his prior (or subsequent) record, that he is a bad man. 1969The language of the court in People v. Adamson, supra, 225 Cal.App.2d 74 , at page 79 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 894 ], is appropriate: ‘If admission of proof of other crimes were to be hinged upon a showing of methods common to most or many robbery practitioners, then application of the inclusionary rule would be so broad as to nullify the principle that a defendant is not to be convicted because the prosecution can prove, on his prior (or subsequent) record, that he is a bad man. | 1 | 3 |
City of Berkeley v. City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Boardgreen2 sentences2001HBA contends the waiver clause does not preclude a facial challenge because it does not state expressly that a waiver may be granted based on a lack of a “fair return.” However the power of an agency to make adjustments to guarantee a fair return is “not limited to those literally granted by the ordinance . . . .” (City of Berkeley v. City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 951, 962 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 317 ].) When this standard is not expressly stated, it is “present by implication.” (Ibid.) *200 E. 2001HBA contends the waiver clause does not preclude a facial challenge because it does not state expressly that a waiver may be granted based on a lack of a “fair return.” However the power of an agency to make adjustments to guarantee a fair return is “not limited to those literally granted by the ordinance . . . .” (City of Berkeley v. City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 951, 962 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 317 ].) When this standard is not expressly stated, it is “present by implication.” (Ibid.) *200 E. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hastongreen2 sentences1985(Cf. People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 247-248 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 419 , 444 P.2d 91 ]; People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 632 .) “If admission of proof of other crimes were to be hinged upon a showing of methods common to most or many robbery practitioners, then application of the inclusionary rule would be so broad as to nullify the principle that a defendant is not to be convicted because the prosecution can prove, on his prior (or subsequent) record, that he is a bad man. 1985(Cf. People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 247-248 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 419 , 444 P.2d 91 ]; People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 632 .) “If admission of proof of other crimes were to be hinged upon a showing of methods common to most or many robbery practitioners, then application of the inclusionary rule would be so broad as to nullify the principle that a defendant is not to be convicted because the prosecution can prove, on his prior (or subsequent) record, that he is a bad man. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fisher v. City of Berkeley
green
1 sentence2001(See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 684 .) Here, as we have noted, City’s ordinance includes a clause that allows city officials to reduce, modify or waive the requirements contained in the ordinance “based upon the absence of any reasonable relationship or nexus between the impact of the development and . . . the inclusionary requirement.” Since City has the authority to completely waive a developer’s obligations, a facial challenge under the due process clause must necessarily fail. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Alcala
red
1 sentence1985(Cf. People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 247-248 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 419 , 444 P.2d 91 ]; People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 632 .) “If admission of proof of other crimes were to be hinged upon a showing of methods common to most or many robbery practitioners, then application of the inclusionary rule would be so broad as to nullify the principle that a defendant is not to be convicted because the prosecution can prove, on his prior (or subsequent) record, that he is a bad man. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Claborn
green
2 sentences1964As we stated recently in People v. Claborn, 224 Cal.App.2d 38 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 132 ], Dean Wigmore has expressed the opinion that the rules of admissibility are “not an exception to the exclusionary rule; in fact, the latter is the exception to the general principle ‘that all facts affording any reasonable inference as to the act charged are relevant and admissible,’ ” (1 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) § 316, p. 716.) 2 We state this evidence in some detail, conscious of criticism which we think has been justly directed at the courts (by legal essayists and dissenting jurists alike) for a "seeming 1964As we stated recently in People v. Claborn, 224 Cal.App.2d 38 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 132 ], Dean Wigmore has expressed the opinion that the rules of admissibility are “not an exception to the exclusionary rule; in fact, the latter is the exception to the general principle ‘that all facts affording any reasonable inference as to the act charged are relevant and admissible,’ ” (1 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) § 316, p. 716.) 2 We state this evidence in some detail, conscious of criticism which we think has been justly directed at the courts (by legal essayists and dissenting jurists alike) for a "seeming | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.