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5 California opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Trippetgreen2 sentences2026(See People v. Trippet (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1539 (Trippet); In re Weller (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 44 , 48–50.) Here, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on defendant’s proposed necessity defense after concluding, as a matter of law, that the defense only applies to a defendant who broke the law to prevent significant harm to a human rather than a “non-human.” On appeal, defendant counters that no California court has carved out an animal exception to the “significant evil” element of the necessity defense. 2026(See People v. Trippet (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1539 (Trippet); In re Weller (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 44 , 48–50.) Here, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on defendant’s proposed necessity defense after concluding, as a matter of law, that the defense only applies to a defendant who broke the law to prevent significant harm to a human rather than a “non-human.” On appeal, defendant counters that no California court has carved out an animal exception to the “significant evil” element of the necessity defense. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Kearnsgreen1 sentence2015(People v. Kearns (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1135 (Kearns), [evidence was insufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that all elements of the necessity defense were established and thus the trial court did not commit error in failing to instruct].) In the alternative, appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request an instruction on the necessity defense. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Eichorn
green
2 sentences2026(Eichorn, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 389 .) To justify an instruction on the necessity defense, the defendant must proffer evidence sufficient to establish that he or she “violated the law (1) to prevent a significant evil, (2) with no adequate alternative, (3) without creating a greater danger than the one avoided, (4) with a good faith belief in the necessity, (5) with such belief being objectively reasonable, and (6) under circumstances in which he [or she] did not substantially contribute to the emergency.” (People v. Pepper (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1035 ; Heath, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d 2026(Eichorn, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 389 .) To justify an instruction on the necessity defense, the defendant must proffer evidence sufficient to establish that he or she “violated the law (1) to prevent a significant evil, (2) with no adequate alternative, (3) without creating a greater danger than the one avoided, (4) with a good faith belief in the necessity, (5) with such belief being objectively reasonable, and (6) under circumstances in which he [or she] did not substantially contribute to the emergency.” (People v. Pepper (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1035 ; Heath, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d | 3 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Pepper
green
2 sentences2026(Eichorn, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 389 .) To justify an instruction on the necessity defense, the defendant must proffer evidence sufficient to establish that he or she “violated the law (1) to prevent a significant evil, (2) with no adequate alternative, (3) without creating a greater danger than the one avoided, (4) with a good faith belief in the necessity, (5) with such belief being objectively reasonable, and (6) under circumstances in which he [or she] did not substantially contribute to the emergency.” (People v. Pepper (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1035 ; Heath, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d 2026(Eichorn, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 389 .) To justify an instruction on the necessity defense, the defendant must proffer evidence sufficient to establish that he or she “violated the law (1) to prevent a significant evil, (2) with no adequate alternative, (3) without creating a greater danger than the one avoided, (4) with a good faith belief in the necessity, (5) with such belief being objectively reasonable, and (6) under circumstances in which he [or she] did not substantially contribute to the emergency.” (People v. Pepper (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1035 ; Heath, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d | 3 | 2026–2026 |
In Re Weller
green
2 sentences2026(See People v. Trippet (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1539 (Trippet); In re Weller (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 44 , 48–50.) Here, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on defendant’s proposed necessity defense after concluding, as a matter of law, that the defense only applies to a defendant who broke the law to prevent significant harm to a human rather than a “non-human.” On appeal, defendant counters that no California court has carved out an animal exception to the “significant evil” element of the necessity defense. 2026(See People v. Trippet (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1539 (Trippet); In re Weller (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 44 , 48–50.) Here, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on defendant’s proposed necessity defense after concluding, as a matter of law, that the defense only applies to a defendant who broke the law to prevent significant harm to a human rather than a “non-human.” On appeal, defendant counters that no California court has carved out an animal exception to the “significant evil” element of the necessity defense. | 3 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Heath
green
2 sentences2026(Eichorn, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 389 .) To justify an instruction on the necessity defense, the defendant must proffer evidence sufficient to establish that he or she “violated the law (1) to prevent a significant evil, (2) with no adequate alternative, (3) without creating a greater danger than the one avoided, (4) with a good faith belief in the necessity, (5) with such belief being objectively reasonable, and (6) under circumstances in which he [or she] did not substantially contribute to the emergency.” (People v. Pepper (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1035 ; Heath, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d 2026(Eichorn, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 389 .) To justify an instruction on the necessity defense, the defendant must proffer evidence sufficient to establish that he or she “violated the law (1) to prevent a significant evil, (2) with no adequate alternative, (3) without creating a greater danger than the one avoided, (4) with a good faith belief in the necessity, (5) with such belief being objectively reasonable, and (6) under circumstances in which he [or she] did not substantially contribute to the emergency.” (People v. Pepper (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1035 ; Heath, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d | 3 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Anderson
green
1 sentence2015(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687 ; People v. Hernandez (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1095, 1105 .) “A reviewing court will indulge in a presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.” (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1211 .) Where the record on appeal “does not show the reason for counsel’s challenged actions or omissions, the conviction must be affirmed unless there could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Carter
green
1 sentence2015(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687 ; People v. Hernandez (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1095, 1105 .) “A reviewing court will indulge in a presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.” (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1211 .) Where the record on appeal “does not show the reason for counsel’s challenged actions or omissions, the conviction must be affirmed unless there could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2015(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687 ; People v. Hernandez (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1095, 1105 .) “A reviewing court will indulge in a presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.” (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1211 .) Where the record on appeal “does not show the reason for counsel’s challenged actions or omissions, the conviction must be affirmed unless there could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Hernandez
green
1 sentence2015(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687 ; People v. Hernandez (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1095, 1105 .) “A reviewing court will indulge in a presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.” (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1211 .) Where the record on appeal “does not show the reason for counsel’s challenged actions or omissions, the conviction must be affirmed unless there could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Lovercamp
green
2 sentences1985Sometimes describing the "necessity" defense as the "duress" defense, the Pena court made the following observations about the law in California: "Although California law regarding the `justification' defenses (i.e., `duress,' `necessity,' `compulsion,' etc. see, fn. 2, ante ) appears sparse in comparison to that of most American jurisdictions, there nonetheless exist several Court of Appeal decisions which provide some guidance as to the parameters of those defenses — most recently the court in People v. Patrick (1981) 126 Cal. App.3d 952 [ 179 Cal. Rptr. 276 ], noted that: `[A]lthough the ex 1985Sometimes describing the "necessity" defense as the "duress" defense, the Pena court made the following observations about the law in California: "Although California law regarding the `justification' defenses (i.e., `duress,' `necessity,' `compulsion,' etc. see, fn. 2, ante ) appears sparse in comparison to that of most American jurisdictions, there nonetheless exist several Court of Appeal decisions which provide some guidance as to the parameters of those defenses — most recently the court in People v. Patrick (1981) 126 Cal. App.3d 952 [ 179 Cal. Rptr. 276 ], noted that: `[A]lthough the ex | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Patrick
green
2 sentences1985Sometimes describing the “necessity” defense as the “duress” defense, the Pena court made the following observations about the law in California: “Although California law regarding the ‘justification’ defenses (i.e., ‘duress, ’ ‘necessity, ’ ‘compulsion, ’ etc. see, fn. 2, ante) appears sparse in comparison to that of most American jurisdictions, there nonetheless exist several Court of Appeal decisions which provide some guidance as to the parameters of those defenses—most recently the court in People v. Patrick (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 952 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 276 ], noted that: ‘[Although the exact 1985Sometimes describing the “necessity” defense as the “duress” defense, the Pena court made the following observations about the law in California: “Although California law regarding the ‘justification’ defenses (i.e., ‘duress, ’ ‘necessity, ’ ‘compulsion, ’ etc. see, fn. 2, ante) appears sparse in comparison to that of most American jurisdictions, there nonetheless exist several Court of Appeal decisions which provide some guidance as to the parameters of those defenses—most recently the court in People v. Patrick (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 952 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 276 ], noted that: ‘[Although the exact | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1985Sometimes describing the "necessity" defense as the "duress" defense, the Pena court made the following observations about the law in California: "Although California law regarding the `justification' defenses (i.e., `duress,' `necessity,' `compulsion,' etc. see, fn. 2, ante ) appears sparse in comparison to that of most American jurisdictions, there nonetheless exist several Court of Appeal decisions which provide some guidance as to the parameters of those defenses — most recently the court in People v. Patrick (1981) 126 Cal. App.3d 952 [ 179 Cal. Rptr. 276 ], noted that: `[A]lthough the ex 1985Sometimes describing the "necessity" defense as the "duress" defense, the Pena court made the following observations about the law in California: "Although California law regarding the `justification' defenses (i.e., `duress,' `necessity,' `compulsion,' etc. see, fn. 2, ante ) appears sparse in comparison to that of most American jurisdictions, there nonetheless exist several Court of Appeal decisions which provide some guidance as to the parameters of those defenses — most recently the court in People v. Patrick (1981) 126 Cal. App.3d 952 [ 179 Cal. Rptr. 276 ], noted that: `[A]lthough the ex | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.