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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Marr. of Evansgreen1 sentence2015(Cf. In re Marriage of Evans (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 374, 380 [plain meaning rule of statutory construction is not absolute; a literal construction should not be adopted if it defeats purpose of the statute or leads to absurd results].) A literal interpretation of the deeds of trust makes sense in this context because it is favorable to the lender—the party that prepared the deed of trust—by making the borrower responsible for investing time and other resources in pursuing the litigation while allowing the lender to benefit from the results achieved by the borrower.8 Thus, a literal interpretat | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. City of Chowchillagreen1 sentence2014(Robinson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 391 [appellate courts pay particular attention to trial court’s stated reasons for denying fees under § 1021.5].) The trial court made general findings that plaintiffs had an individual stake in the litigation and the litigation resulted in a pecuniary benefit to them. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV
red
2 sentences2001The last step of our analysis is a consideration of the consequences of allowing the discrimination claim asserted by the Hessians. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1165 , 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 .) We believe allowing a discrimination claim of this nature would lead to endless, increasingly frivolous challenges to dress codes and other neutral admission "policies common in many restaurants and retail establishments. 2001The last step of our analysis is a consideration of the consequences of allowing the discrimination claim asserted by the Hessians. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1165 , 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 .) We believe allowing a discrimination claim of this nature would lead to endless, increasingly frivolous challenges to dress codes and other neutral admission "policies common in many restaurants and retail establishments. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Mary Jane Wickman v. Northwestern National Insurance Company
green
2 sentences1994Co. v. Kent (6th Cir. 1934) 73 F.2d 685 .) 31 The last step in the analysis is an alternative to the previous step: “Finally, if the fact-finder, in attempting to ascertain the insured’s actual expectation, finds the evidence insufficient to accurately determine the insured’s subjective expectation, the fact-finder should then engage in an objective analysis of the insured’s expectations.” (Wickman, supra, 908 F.2d at p. 1088 .) Yet even though the factfinder would no longer focus in that event on the actual insured but on a hypothetical “reasonable person,” the factfinder must always keep in 1994Co. v. Kent (6th Cir.1934) 73 F.2d 685 .) [31] The last step in the analysis is an alternative to the previous step: "Finally, if the fact-finder, in attempting to ascertain the insured's actual expectation, finds the evidence insufficient to accurately determine the insured's subjective expectation, the fact-finder should then engage in an objective analysis of the insured's expectations." ( Wickman, supra, 908 F.2d at p. 1088 .) Yet even though the factfinder would no longer focus in that event on the actual insured but on a hypothetical "reasonable person," the factfinder must always keep i | 1 | 1994–1994 |
ætna Life Ins. Co. v. Kent
green
2 sentences1994Co. v. Kent (6th Cir. 1934) 73 F.2d 685 .) 31 The last step in the analysis is an alternative to the previous step: “Finally, if the fact-finder, in attempting to ascertain the insured’s actual expectation, finds the evidence insufficient to accurately determine the insured’s subjective expectation, the fact-finder should then engage in an objective analysis of the insured’s expectations.” (Wickman, supra, 908 F.2d at p. 1088 .) Yet even though the factfinder would no longer focus in that event on the actual insured but on a hypothetical “reasonable person,” the factfinder must always keep in 1994Co. v. Kent (6th Cir.1934) 73 F.2d 685 .) [31] The last step in the analysis is an alternative to the previous step: "Finally, if the fact-finder, in attempting to ascertain the insured's actual expectation, finds the evidence insufficient to accurately determine the insured's subjective expectation, the fact-finder should then engage in an objective analysis of the insured's expectations." ( Wickman, supra, 908 F.2d at p. 1088 .) Yet even though the factfinder would no longer focus in that event on the actual insured but on a hypothetical "reasonable person," the factfinder must always keep i | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.