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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Washingtongreen2 sentences1994When the doctrine was still nascent, the Supreme Court wrote, “Except when the common law felony-murder doctrine is applicable, an essential element of murder is an intent to kill or an intent with conscious disregard for life to commit acts likely to kill.” (People v. Washington, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 780.) Several months later, the Supreme Court formulated the “principles [to] be invoked to convict a defendant of first degree murder for a killing committed by another.” (People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 704 .) The first element was ‘‘Proof of malice aforethought. . . . 1966(People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ].) The felony-murder doctrine imputes malice aforethought to the felon who kills another in the commission of one of the felonies enumerated in Penal Code, section 189. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Ferugiagreen2 sentences2009(See People v. Olsen (1889) 80 Cal. 122, 126-127 [ 22 P. 125 ]; People v. Ferugia (1928) 95 Cal.App. 711, 718 [ 273 P. 99 ]; People v. Hubbard (1923) 64 Cal.App. 27, 33 [ 220 P. 315 ].) For these reasons, we conclude that the Legislature’s replacement of the proviso language of section 25 of the Act of 1850 with the shorthand language “not amounting to felony” in section 192 did not imply an abrogation of the common law felony-murder rule. 2009(See People v. Olsen (1889) 80 Cal. 122, 126-127 [ 22 P. 125 ]; People v. Ferugia (1928) 95 Cal.App. 711, 718 [ 273 P. 99 ]; People v. Hubbard (1923) 64 Cal.App. 27, 33 [ 220 P. 315 ].) For these reasons, we conclude that the Legislature’s replacement of the proviso language of section 25 of the Act of 1850 with the shorthand language “not amounting to felony” in section 192 did not imply an abrogation of the common law felony-murder rule. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hubbardgreen2 sentences2009(See People v. Olsen (1889) 80 Cal. 122, 126-127 [ 22 P. 125 ]; People v. Ferugia (1928) 95 Cal.App. 711, 718 [ 273 P. 99 ]; People v. Hubbard (1923) 64 Cal.App. 27, 33 [ 220 P. 315 ].) For these reasons, we conclude that the Legislature’s replacement of the proviso language of section 25 of the Act of 1850 with the shorthand language “not amounting to felony” in section 192 did not imply an abrogation of the common law felony-murder rule. 2009(See People v. Olsen (1889) 80 Cal. 122, 126-127 [ 22 P. 125 ]; People v. Ferugia (1928) 95 Cal.App. 711, 718 [ 273 P. 99 ]; People v. Hubbard (1923) 64 Cal.App. 27, 33 [ 220 P. 315 ].) For these reasons, we conclude that the Legislature’s replacement of the proviso language of section 25 of the Act of 1850 with the shorthand language “not amounting to felony” in section 192 did not imply an abrogation of the common law felony-murder rule. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Olsengreen2 sentences2009(See People v. Olsen (1889) 80 Cal. 122, 126-127 [ 22 P. 125 ]; People v. Ferugia (1928) 95 Cal.App. 711, 718 [ 273 P. 99 ]; People v. Hubbard (1923) 64 Cal.App. 27, 33 [ 220 P. 315 ].) For these reasons, we conclude that the Legislature’s replacement of the proviso language of section 25 of the Act of 1850 with the shorthand language “not amounting to felony” in section 192 did not imply an abrogation of the common law felony-murder rule. 2009(See People v. Olsen (1889) 80 Cal. 122, 126-127 [ 22 P. 125 ]; People v. Ferugia (1928) 95 Cal.App. 711, 718 [ 273 P. 99 ]; People v. Hubbard (1923) 64 Cal.App. 27, 33 [ 220 P. 315 ].) For these reasons, we conclude that the Legislature’s replacement of the proviso language of section 25 of the Act of 1850 with the shorthand language “not amounting to felony” in section 192 did not imply an abrogation of the common law felony-murder rule. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Russellgreen2 sentences1983The opinion points out (299 N.W.2d at pp. 321-323) that *464 the statute is a copy of the first legislation in the nation on this topic, enacted in Pennsylvania in 1794, and that it has long been construed by Michigan courts to be no more than a degree-fixing device, i.e., that when a "murder" is otherwise proved — to wit, an unlawful killing with malice aforethought — the statute simply fixes the degree thereof at first degree if it was committed by one of the listed means or during one of the listed felonies; it does not automatically transform all killings so committed into first degree mur 1983The opinion points out (299 N.W.2d at pp. 321-323) that *464 the statute is a copy of the first legislation in the nation on this topic, enacted in Pennsylvania in 1794, and that it has long been construed by Michigan courts to be no more than a degree-fixing device, i.e., that when a "murder" is otherwise proved — to wit, an unlawful killing with malice aforethought — the statute simply fixes the degree thereof at first degree if it was committed by one of the listed means or during one of the listed felonies; it does not automatically transform all killings so committed into first degree mur | 1 | 1 |
People v. Schmelgreen2 sentences1983First, “It is ordinarily to be presumed that the Legislature by deleting an express provision of a statute intended a substantial change in the law.” (People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 142 [ 169 P.2d 1 ]; accord, People v. Schmel (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 46, 51 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 317 ].) Under this principle, the Legislature’s decision not to reenact the felony-murder provision of section 25 in the 1872 codification implied an intent to abrogate the common law felony-murder rule that the section had embodied since 1850. 1983First, “It is ordinarily to be presumed that the Legislature by deleting an express provision of a statute intended a substantial change in the law.” (People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 142 [ 169 P.2d 1 ]; accord, People v. Schmel (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 46, 51 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 317 ].) Under this principle, the Legislature’s decision not to reenact the felony-murder provision of section 25 in the 1872 codification implied an intent to abrogate the common law felony-murder rule that the section had embodied since 1850. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Valentinegreen2 sentences1983First, “It is ordinarily to be presumed that the Legislature by deleting an express provision of a statute intended a substantial change in the law.” (People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 142 [ 169 P.2d 1 ]; accord, People v. Schmel (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 46, 51 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 317 ].) Under this principle, the Legislature’s decision not to reenact the felony-murder provision of section 25 in the 1872 codification implied an intent to abrogate the common law felony-murder rule that the section had embodied since 1850. 1983First, “It is ordinarily to be presumed that the Legislature by deleting an express provision of a statute intended a substantial change in the law.” (People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 142 [ 169 P.2d 1 ]; accord, People v. Schmel (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 46, 51 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 317 ].) Under this principle, the Legislature’s decision not to reenact the felony-murder provision of section 25 in the 1872 codification implied an intent to abrogate the common law felony-murder rule that the section had embodied since 1850. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gilbert
green
1 sentence1994When the doctrine was still nascent, the Supreme Court wrote, “Except when the common law felony-murder doctrine is applicable, an essential element of murder is an intent to kill or an intent with conscious disregard for life to commit acts likely to kill.” (People v. Washington, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 780.) Several months later, the Supreme Court formulated the “principles [to] be invoked to convict a defendant of first degree murder for a killing committed by another.” (People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 704 .) The first element was ‘‘Proof of malice aforethought. . . . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Aaron
green
2 sentences1984In People v. Aaron (1980) 409 Mich. 672 [ 299 N.W.2d 304 , 113 A.L.R.4th 1180 ], the Michigan Supreme Court, interpreting a statute similar to Penal Code section 189, concluded after an exhaustive and scholarly analysis that the statute did not codify the common law felony-murder rule but merely elevated any murder otherwise proven to murder of the first degree when committed during the perpetration of one of the named felonies. 1984In People v. Aaron (1980) 409 Mich. 672 [ 299 N.W.2d 304 , 113 A.L.R.4th 1180 ], the Michigan Supreme Court, interpreting a statute similar to Penal Code section 189, concluded after an exhaustive and scholarly analysis that the statute did not codify the common law felony-murder rule but merely elevated any murder otherwise proven to murder of the first degree when committed during the perpetration of one of the named felonies. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.