LPS hearing in California

2022For example, in Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228 , 253-254, we concluded individuals facing an SVP probable cause hearing were not similarly situated with those seeking habeas review of a short-term detention under the LPS Act because the purposes served by the standard of proof at the LPS hearing had no rational application in the SVP context.

2022For example, in Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228 , 253-254, we concluded individuals facing an SVP probable cause hearing were not similarly situated with those seeking habeas review of a short-term detention under the LPS Act because the purposes served by the standard of proof at the LPS hearing had no rational application in the SVP context.

2022“Courts may not render advisory opinions on disputes which the parties anticipate might arise but which do not presently exist.” (Stonehouse Homes LLC v. City of Sierra Madre (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 531, 542 .) “The ripeness element of the doctrine of justiciability is intended to prevent courts from issuing purely advisory opinions. [Citation.] It is ‘primarily bottomed on the recognition that judicial decisionmaking is best conducted in the context of an actual set That we found no merit in the 2021 writ petition does not 8 mean the timeliness issue it raised evaded our review. 9 of facts so

2022“Courts may not render advisory opinions on disputes which the parties anticipate might arise but which do not presently exist.” (Stonehouse Homes LLC v. City of Sierra Madre (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 531, 542 .) “The ripeness element of the doctrine of justiciability is intended to prevent courts from issuing purely advisory opinions. [Citation.] It is ‘primarily bottomed on the recognition that judicial decisionmaking is best conducted in the context of an actual set That we found no merit in the 2021 writ petition does not 8 mean the timeliness issue it raised evaded our review. 9 of facts so

2007LPS proceedings are civil in nature; the conservatee is not a criminal defendant and the LPS Act's aims and objectives are not similar to that of the criminal law. ( Ben C, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 537, 538, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 , 150 P.3d 738 ; Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1015 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 884 P.2d 988 ( Susan T. ).) Because John's right to his presence at the LPS hearing as provided in Probate Code section 1825 is a matter of legislative grant, it may be waived by counsel with the express consent of the proposed conservatee.

2007LPS proceedings are civil in nature; the conservatee is not a criminal defendant and the LPS Act's aims and objectives are not similar to that of the criminal law. ( Ben C, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 537, 538, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 , 150 P.3d 738 ; Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1015 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 884 P.2d 988 ( Susan T. ).) Because John's right to his presence at the LPS hearing as provided in Probate Code section 1825 is a matter of legislative grant, it may be waived by counsel with the express consent of the proposed conservatee.

2007LPS proceedings are civil in nature; the conservatee is not a criminal defendant and the LPS Act's aims and objectives are not similar to that of the criminal law. ( Ben C, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 537, 538, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 , 150 P.3d 738 ; Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1015 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 884 P.2d 988 ( Susan T. ).) Because John's right to his presence at the LPS hearing as provided in Probate Code section 1825 is a matter of legislative grant, it may be waived by counsel with the express consent of the proposed conservatee.

2007LPS proceedings are civil in nature; the conservatee is not a criminal defendant and the LPS Act's aims and objectives are not similar to that of the criminal law. ( Ben C, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 537, 538, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 , 150 P.3d 738 ; Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1015 , 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 884 P.2d 988 ( Susan T. ).) Because John's right to his presence at the LPS hearing as provided in Probate Code section 1825 is a matter of legislative grant, it may be waived by counsel with the express consent of the proposed conservatee.

2007(E.g., People v. Rowell (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 447, 451, 452 , 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 843 ; Conservatorship of Mary K. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 265, 271 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 618 [proposed conservatee's right to a jury trial on an LPS conservatorship petition, which exists only as provided by statute, was validly waived by counsel who communicated her client's wishes and does not require an on-the-record personal waiver]; Conservatorship of Maldonado (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 144, 148 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 796 [same]; Christopher A, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 612-613, *404 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [counsel may not without

2007(E.g., People v. Rowell (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 447, 451, 452 , 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 843 ; Conservatorship of Mary K. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 265, 271 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 618 [proposed conservatee's right to a jury trial on an LPS conservatorship petition, which exists only as provided by statute, was validly waived by counsel who communicated her client's wishes and does not require an on-the-record personal waiver]; Conservatorship of Maldonado (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 144, 148 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 796 [same]; Christopher A, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 612-613, *404 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [counsel may not without

2007(E.g., People v. Rowell (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 447, 451, 452 , 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 843 ; Conservatorship of Mary K. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 265, 271 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 618 [proposed conservatee's right to a jury trial on an LPS conservatorship petition, which exists only as provided by statute, was validly waived by counsel who communicated her client's wishes and does not require an on-the-record personal waiver]; Conservatorship of Maldonado (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 144, 148 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 796 [same]; Christopher A, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 612-613, *404 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [counsel may not without

2007(E.g., People v. Rowell (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 447, 451, 452 , 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 843 ; Conservatorship of Mary K. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 265, 271 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 618 [proposed conservatee's right to a jury trial on an LPS conservatorship petition, which exists only as provided by statute, was validly waived by counsel who communicated her client's wishes and does not require an on-the-record personal waiver]; Conservatorship of Maldonado (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 144, 148 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 796 [same]; Christopher A, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 612-613, *404 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [counsel may not without

2007"Issues of statutory construction as well as the application of that construction to a particular set of facts are questions of law." ( Coburn v. Sievert (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1492 , 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 596 .) Whether procedural due process requires John's presence and on-record voir dire at his LPS hearing is also a question subject to our independent review. ( Christopher A, supra, 139 Cal. App.4th at pp. 609-610, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 .) II.

2007"Issues of statutory construction as well as the application of that construction to a particular set of facts are questions of law." ( Coburn v. Sievert (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1492 , 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 596 .) Whether procedural due process requires John's presence and on-record voir dire at his LPS hearing is also a question subject to our independent review. ( Christopher A, supra, 139 Cal. App.4th at pp. 609-610, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 .) II.

2007"Issues of statutory construction as well as the application of that construction to a particular set of facts are questions of law." ( Coburn v. Sievert (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1492 , 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 596 .) Whether procedural due process requires John's presence and on-record voir dire at his LPS hearing is also a question subject to our independent review. ( Christopher A, supra, 139 Cal. App.4th at pp. 609-610, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 .) II.

2007Therefore, we review this issue de novo." ( Id. at pp. 609-610, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 .) John's contentions here likewise raise issues of law, because the underlying facts are undisputed and the question of whether the trial court met the requirements relating to a proposed conservatee's presence at his or her LPS hearing requires the interpretation of provisions of the Probate Code and LPS Act and their application to those facts.

2007(E.g., People v. Rowell (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 447, 451, 452 , 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 843 ; Conservatorship of Mary K. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 265, 271 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 618 [proposed conservatee's right to a jury trial on an LPS conservatorship petition, which exists only as provided by statute, was validly waived by counsel who communicated her client's wishes and does not require an on-the-record personal waiver]; Conservatorship of Maldonado (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 144, 148 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 796 [same]; Christopher A, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 612-613, *404 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [counsel may not without

2007(E.g., People v. Rowell (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 447, 451, 452 , 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 843 ; Conservatorship of Mary K. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 265, 271 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 618 [proposed conservatee's right to a jury trial on an LPS conservatorship petition, which exists only as provided by statute, was validly waived by counsel who communicated her client's wishes and does not require an on-the-record personal waiver]; Conservatorship of Maldonado (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 144, 148 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 796 [same]; Christopher A, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 612-613, *404 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 [counsel may not without

2002Respondent also cites Conservatorship of Moore, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d 718, 730 , which she describes as finding that an ex parte LPS hearing *540 “actually preserved a conservatee’s dignity by avoiding a ‘potentially uncomfortable and disruptive court appearance. . . .’” Moore upheld the constitutionality of “reestablishing a conservatorship ex parte when the conservatee chooses not to contest the proceeding.” (Id. at p. 731.) In Moore, the conservatee received notice of the hearing on reestablishment of his conservatorship and his attorney represented to the court that the conservatee did not

2002Respondent also cites Conservatorship of Moore, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d 718, 730 , which she describes as finding that an ex parte LPS hearing *540 “actually preserved a conservatee’s dignity by avoiding a ‘potentially uncomfortable and disruptive court appearance. . . .’” Moore upheld the constitutionality of “reestablishing a conservatorship ex parte when the conservatee chooses not to contest the proceeding.” (Id. at p. 731.) In Moore, the conservatee received notice of the hearing on reestablishment of his conservatorship and his attorney represented to the court that the conservatee did not

1988(See Conservatorship of Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 171-172.) There has been no showing that the complete elimination of proof of some degree of present dangerousness is necessary to protect the public.

1988(See Conservatorship of Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 171-172.) There has been no showing that the complete elimination of proof of some degree of present dangerousness is necessary to protect the public.