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5 California opinions name it 1 courts 1990–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2022This overrules cases such as State of California v. Superior Court, 98 Cal.App.3d 643 (1979), and Brown v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.App.3d 197 (1976).” (Id. at p. 936.) The Law Revision Commission further explained that this approach was “consistent with the treatment given other statutory excuses,” such as the exception that excluded from the five-year period time during which jurisdiction of the court is suspended, and “increase[d] certainty and minimize[d] the need for a judicial hearing to ascertain whether or not the statutory period has run.” (Id. at p. 919, fn. omitted.) “Thus, a conditio 1990(See Brown v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 197, 199 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 916 ]; State of California v. Superior Court (Garner) (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 643, 649 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 650 ], But, as Witkin points out (6 Witkin, op. cit. supra, § 142, p. 447) the 1984 revision of the dismissal statutes “repudiates these holdings by stating the excuse without any such qualification; hence, the time during which it was impracticable is excluded in all cases.” The Law Revision Commission explained that “[t]his is consistent with the treatment given other statutory excuses; it increases certainty and minimi | 1 | 2 |
State of California v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2022This overrules cases such as State of California v. Superior Court, 98 Cal.App.3d 643 (1979), and Brown v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.App.3d 197 (1976).” (Id. at p. 936.) The Law Revision Commission further explained that this approach was “consistent with the treatment given other statutory excuses,” such as the exception that excluded from the five-year period time during which jurisdiction of the court is suspended, and “increase[d] certainty and minimize[d] the need for a judicial hearing to ascertain whether or not the statutory period has run.” (Id. at p. 919, fn. omitted.) “Thus, a conditio 1990(See Brown v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 197, 199 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 916 ]; State of California v. Superior Court (Garner) (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 643, 649 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 650 ], But, as Witkin points out (6 Witkin, op. cit. supra, § 142, p. 447) the 1984 revision of the dismissal statutes “repudiates these holdings by stating the excuse without any such qualification; hence, the time during which it was impracticable is excluded in all cases.” The Law Revision Commission explained that “[t]his is consistent with the treatment given other statutory excuses; it increases certainty and minimi | 1 | 2 |
In Re Hopgreen2 sentences2013(Hop, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 90 .) The Hop court rejected this argument, pointing out that it only highlighted the need for a judicial hearing to test the grounds for the placement. 2013(Hop, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 90.) The Hop court rejected this argument, pointing out that it only highlighted the need for a judicial hearing to test the grounds for the placement. | 1 | 2 |
Ocean Services Corp. v. Ventura Port Districtgreen2 sentences2009That a stay of certain types of proceedings within an action—a partial stay of an action—is a stay of prosecution under subdivision (b) of section 583.340, is consistent with the general policy favoring trial over dismissal for failure to prosecute an action. [6] In Ocean Services Corp. v. Ventura Port Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1762, 1774 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 750 ], the Court of Appeal stated, "Code of Civil Procedure section 583.340, subdivision (b), provides that the five-year period `shall be' tolled if `[p]rosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined.' The statute is unconditiona 2009That a stay of certain types of proceedings within an action—a partial stay of an action—is a stay of prosecution under subdivision (b) of section 583.340, is consistent with the general policy favoring trial over dismissal for failure to prosecute an action. [6] In Ocean Services Corp. v. Ventura Port Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1762, 1774 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 750 ], the Court of Appeal stated, "Code of Civil Procedure section 583.340, subdivision (b), provides that the five-year period `shall be' tolled if `[p]rosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined.' The statute is unconditiona | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2022This overrules cases such as State of California v. Superior Court, 98 Cal.App.3d 643 (1979), and Brown v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.App.3d 197 (1976).” (Id. at p. 936.) The Law Revision Commission further explained that this approach was “consistent with the treatment given other statutory excuses,” such as the exception that excluded from the five-year period time during which jurisdiction of the court is suspended, and “increase[d] certainty and minimize[d] the need for a judicial hearing to ascertain whether or not the statutory period has run.” (Id. at p. 919, fn. omitted.) “Thus, a conditio 2022This overrules cases such as State of California v. Superior Court, 98 Cal.App.3d 643 (1979), and Brown v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.App.3d 197 (1976).” (Id. at p. 936.) The Law Revision Commission further explained that this approach was “consistent with the treatment given other statutory excuses,” such as the exception that excluded from the five-year period time during which jurisdiction of the court is suspended, and “increase[d] certainty and minimize[d] the need for a judicial hearing to ascertain whether or not the statutory period has run.” (Id. at p. 919, fn. omitted.) “Thus, a conditio | 1 | 2022–2022 |