outrageous conduct defense in California

2003We hold the doctrine does not exist separately within the context of entrapment cases." ( Thoi, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 696 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 789 , fn. omitted.) That said, the Thoi court, upon examining the challenged police conduct, found it did "not rise to the level necessary for [the defendant] to prevail on the outrageous conduct issue...." ( Id. at p. 697, 261 Cal.Rptr. 789 .) In People v. Holloway (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1757 , 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 ( Holloway ), [5] the Court of Appeal disagreed with Thoi to the extent Thoi rejected the outrageous conduct defense in entrapment cases. ( H

2003We hold the doctrine does not exist separately within the context of entrapment cases." ( Thoi, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 696 , 261 Cal.Rptr. 789 , fn. omitted.) That said, the Thoi court, upon examining the challenged police conduct, found it did "not rise to the level necessary for [the defendant] to prevail on the outrageous conduct issue...." ( Id. at p. 697, 261 Cal.Rptr. 789 .) In People v. Holloway (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1757 , 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 ( Holloway ), [5] the Court of Appeal disagreed with Thoi to the extent Thoi rejected the outrageous conduct defense in entrapment cases. ( H

2014(Smith, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1223-1224, citing Hampton, supra, 425 U.S. 484 ; Russell, supra, 411 U.S. 423 ; Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 561 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638 , 869 P.2d 1163 ]; Mclntire, supra, 23 Cal.3d 742 .) The Smith court acknowledged this court, in People v. Thoi (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 689 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 789 ] (Thoi), previously concluded the outrageous conduct defense is “superfluous” in entrapment cases.

2003Singleton (1960) 361 U.S. 234, 246 , 80 S.Ct. 297 , 4 L.Ed.2d 268 .) In Hampton v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 484 , 96 S.Ct. 1646 , 48 L.Ed.2d 113 *572 ( Hampton ), the high court again left open the possibility that a defendant might successfully invoke an outrageous conduct defense even if the entrapment defense were unavailable to him because of his predisposition to commit the crime. [3] The vast majority of the federal circuit courts of appeals allow the outrageous conduct defense.

2014(See Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 407 [“[o]ur greatest responsibility as members of a civilized society is our common goal of safeguarding our children, our chief legacy, so they may grow to their full potential and can, in time, take our places in the community at large”]; Hulstedt v. City of Scottsdale (D.Ariz. 2012) 884 F.Supp.2d 972, 1019 [conduct that “impedes medical treatment to an injured child is ‘utterly intolerable in a civilized society’”]; Rodriguez- Sanchez v. Acevedo-Vila (D.P.R. 2011) 763 F.Supp.2d 294, 303 [“the measure of a civilization is

2014(Smith, *1006 supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1225 .) The Smith court noted, however, the court in People v. Holloway (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1757, 1767-1768 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 ] (Holloway), overruled on another ground in People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 947, fn. 11 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 941 P.2d 1189 ], disagreed with the Thoi court’s analysis rejecting the outrageous government conduct defense in entrapment cases.

2014(Smith, *1006 supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1225 .) The Smith court noted, however, the court in People v. Holloway (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1757, 1767-1768 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 ] (Holloway), overruled on another ground in People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 947, fn. 11 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 941 P.2d 1189 ], disagreed with the Thoi court’s analysis rejecting the outrageous government conduct defense in entrapment cases.

2014(See Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 407 [“[o]ur greatest responsibility as members of a civilized society is our common goal of safeguarding our children, our chief legacy, so they may grow to their full potential and can, in time, take our places in the community at large”]; Hulstedt v. City of Scottsdale (D.Ariz. 2012) 884 F.Supp.2d 972, 1019 [conduct that “impedes medical treatment to an injured child is ‘utterly intolerable in a civilized society’”]; Rodriguez- Sanchez v. Acevedo-Vila (D.P.R. 2011) 763 F.Supp.2d 294, 303 [“the measure of a civilization is

2014(See Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 407 [“[o]ur greatest responsibility as members of a civilized society is our common goal of safeguarding our children, our chief legacy, so they may grow to their full potential and can, in time, take our places in the community at large”]; Hulstedt v. City of Scottsdale (D.Ariz. 2012) 884 F.Supp.2d 972, 1019 [conduct that “impedes medical treatment to an injured child is ‘utterly intolerable in a civilized society’”]; Rodriguez- Sanchez v. Acevedo-Vila (D.P.R. 2011) 763 F.Supp.2d 294, 303 [“the measure of a civilization is

2003The Court of Appeals of New Mexico has apparently left the question open. ( State v. Rael (Ct.App.1999) 127 N.M. 347 , 981 P.2d 280, 287 [under some circumstances continuing transactions may constitute unfair manipulation of a defendant's sentence, but no sentencing manipulation found in case at bar].) The Superior Court of *567 Pennsylvania has adopted the doctrine of sentencing manipulation as defined by the outrageous conduct standard. ( Commonwealth v. Petzold (Pa.Super.Ct.1997) 701 A.2d 1363, 1366-1367 [sentence reduction an appropriate and just response to outrageous government conduct d

2003(State v. Thornton (Tenn.Crim.App. 1999) 10 S.W.3d 229, 244 [imposition of consecutive sentences for sale of narcotics may be inappropriate, “ ‘depending upon the number of specific buys the officers [choose] to conduct and the amounts purchased in each buy’ ”].) A. The Conduct of the Undercover Officer Here Was Unexceptionable, Hence We Need Not Decide Whether We Accept the Doctrine of Sentencing Manipulation.

2003(See, e.g., United States v. Stavig (8th Cir.1996) 80 F.3d 1241, 1245 [although having repeatedly recognized the doctrine, "we have yet to find that sentencing entrapment existed under the facts of a particular case"].) [3] Bogart parsed Hampton : "The Hampton plurality concluded that the defendants predisposition to the crime would bar an outrageous conduct defense. [ Hampton, supra, 425 U.S.] at 490 [ 96 S.Ct. 1646 ] (Rehnquist J., joined by White J. and Burger C.J.).

2003(See, e.g., United States v. Stavig (8th Cir. 1996) 80 F.3d 1241, 1245 [although having repeatedly recognized the doctrine, “we have yet to find that sentencing entrapment existed under the facts of a particular case”].) Bogart parsed Hampton: “The Hampton plurality concluded that the defendant’s predisposition to the crime would bar an outrageous conduct defense. [ Hampton, supra, 425 U.S.] at 490 (Rehnquist J., joined by White J. and Burger C.

2003Singleton (1960) 361 U.S. 234, 246 , 80 S.Ct. 297 , 4 L.Ed.2d 268 .) In Hampton v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 484 , 96 S.Ct. 1646 , 48 L.Ed.2d 113 *572 ( Hampton ), the high court again left open the possibility that a defendant might successfully invoke an outrageous conduct defense even if the entrapment defense were unavailable to him because of his predisposition to commit the crime. [3] The vast majority of the federal circuit courts of appeals allow the outrageous conduct defense.

2003Singleton (1960) 361 U.S. 234, 246 , 80 S.Ct. 297 , 4 L.Ed.2d 268 .) In Hampton v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 484 , 96 S.Ct. 1646 , 48 L.Ed.2d 113 *572 ( Hampton ), the high court again left open the possibility that a defendant might successfully invoke an outrageous conduct defense even if the entrapment defense were unavailable to him because of his predisposition to commit the crime. [3] The vast majority of the federal circuit courts of appeals allow the outrageous conduct defense.

2003The Court of Appeals of New Mexico has apparently left the question open. ( State v. Rael (Ct.App.1999) 127 N.M. 347 , 981 P.2d 280, 287 [under some circumstances continuing transactions may constitute unfair manipulation of a defendant's sentence, but no sentencing manipulation found in case at bar].) The Superior Court of *567 Pennsylvania has adopted the doctrine of sentencing manipulation as defined by the outrageous conduct standard. ( Commonwealth v. Petzold (Pa.Super.Ct.1997) 701 A.2d 1363, 1366-1367 [sentence reduction an appropriate and just response to outrageous government conduct d

2003The Court of Appeals of New Mexico has apparently left the question open. ( State v. Rael (Ct.App.1999) 127 N.M. 347 , 981 P.2d 280, 287 [under some circumstances continuing transactions may constitute unfair manipulation of a defendant's sentence, but no sentencing manipulation found in case at bar].) The Superior Court of *567 Pennsylvania has adopted the doctrine of sentencing manipulation as defined by the outrageous conduct standard. ( Commonwealth v. Petzold (Pa.Super.Ct.1997) 701 A.2d 1363, 1366-1367 [sentence reduction an appropriate and just response to outrageous government conduct d

2003(See, e.g., United States v. Penagaricano-Soler (1st Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 833, 839, fn. 1 ; United States v. Rahman (2nd Cir.1999) 189 F.3d 88, 131 ; United States v. Nolan-Cooper (3rd Cir.1998) 155 F.3d 221, 230 ; United States v. Osborne (4th Cir.1991) 935 F.2d 32, 36 ; United States v. Arteaga (5th Cir.1986) 807 F.2d 424, 426 ; United States v. Quintana (7th Cir.1975) 508 F.2d 867, 878 ; Berg, supra, 178 F.3d at p. 979 [8th Cir.]; Bogart, supra, 783 F.2d at p. 1438 [9th Cir.]; United States v. Mosley (10th Cir.1992) 965 F.2d 906, 909 ; United States v. Capo (11th Cir.1982) 693 F.2d 1330, 1336

2003(See, e.g., United States v. Penagiarcano-Soler (1st Cir. 1990) 911 F.2d 833, 839, fn. 1 ; United States v. Rahman (2nd Cir. 1999) 189 F.3d 88, 131 ; United States v. Nolan-Cooper (3rd Cir. 1998) 155 F.3d 221, 230 ; United States v. Osborne (4th Cir. 1991) 935 F.2d 32, 36 ; United States v. Arteaga (5th Cir. 1986) 807 F.2d 424, 426 ; United States v. Quintana (7th Cir. 1975) 508 F.2d 867, 878 ; Berg, supra, 178 F.3d at p. 979 [8th Cir.]; Bogart, supra, 783 F.2d at p. 1438 [9th Cir.]; United States v. Mosley (10th Cir. 1992) 965 F.2d 906, 909 ; United States v. Capo (11th Cir. 1982) 693 F.2d 13

2003(See, e.g., United States v. Penagaricano-Soler (1st Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 833, 839, fn. 1 ; United States v. Rahman (2nd Cir.1999) 189 F.3d 88, 131 ; United States v. Nolan-Cooper (3rd Cir.1998) 155 F.3d 221, 230 ; United States v. Osborne (4th Cir.1991) 935 F.2d 32, 36 ; United States v. Arteaga (5th Cir.1986) 807 F.2d 424, 426 ; United States v. Quintana (7th Cir.1975) 508 F.2d 867, 878 ; Berg, supra, 178 F.3d at p. 979 [8th Cir.]; Bogart, supra, 783 F.2d at p. 1438 [9th Cir.]; United States v. Mosley (10th Cir.1992) 965 F.2d 906, 909 ; United States v. Capo (11th Cir.1982) 693 F.2d 1330, 1336

2003(See, e.g., United States v. Penagiarcano-Soler (1st Cir. 1990) 911 F.2d 833, 839, fn. 1 ; United States v. Rahman (2nd Cir. 1999) 189 F.3d 88, 131 ; United States v. Nolan-Cooper (3rd Cir. 1998) 155 F.3d 221, 230 ; United States v. Osborne (4th Cir. 1991) 935 F.2d 32, 36 ; United States v. Arteaga (5th Cir. 1986) 807 F.2d 424, 426 ; United States v. Quintana (7th Cir. 1975) 508 F.2d 867, 878 ; Berg, supra, 178 F.3d at p. 979 [8th Cir.]; Bogart, supra, 783 F.2d at p. 1438 [9th Cir.]; United States v. Mosley (10th Cir. 1992) 965 F.2d 906, 909 ; United States v. Capo (11th Cir. 1982) 693 F.2d 13

2003(See, e.g., United States v. Penagaricano-Soler (1st Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 833, 839, fn. 1 ; United States v. Rahman (2nd Cir.1999) 189 F.3d 88, 131 ; United States v. Nolan-Cooper (3rd Cir.1998) 155 F.3d 221, 230 ; United States v. Osborne (4th Cir.1991) 935 F.2d 32, 36 ; United States v. Arteaga (5th Cir.1986) 807 F.2d 424, 426 ; United States v. Quintana (7th Cir.1975) 508 F.2d 867, 878 ; Berg, supra, 178 F.3d at p. 979 [8th Cir.]; Bogart, supra, 783 F.2d at p. 1438 [9th Cir.]; United States v. Mosley (10th Cir.1992) 965 F.2d 906, 909 ; United States v. Capo (11th Cir.1982) 693 F.2d 1330, 1336

2003(See, e.g., United States v. Penagiarcano-Soler (1st Cir. 1990) 911 F.2d 833, 839, fn. 1 ; United States v. Rahman (2nd Cir. 1999) 189 F.3d 88, 131 ; United States v. Nolan-Cooper (3rd Cir. 1998) 155 F.3d 221, 230 ; United States v. Osborne (4th Cir. 1991) 935 F.2d 32, 36 ; United States v. Arteaga (5th Cir. 1986) 807 F.2d 424, 426 ; United States v. Quintana (7th Cir. 1975) 508 F.2d 867, 878 ; Berg, supra, 178 F.3d at p. 979 [8th Cir.]; Bogart, supra, 783 F.2d at p. 1438 [9th Cir.]; United States v. Mosley (10th Cir. 1992) 965 F.2d 906, 909 ; United States v. Capo (11th Cir. 1982) 693 F.2d 13

2003The Court of Appeals of New Mexico has apparently left the question open. ( State v. Rael (Ct.App.1999) 127 N.M. 347 , 981 P.2d 280, 287 [under some circumstances continuing transactions may constitute unfair manipulation of a defendant's sentence, but no sentencing manipulation found in case at bar].) The Superior Court of *567 Pennsylvania has adopted the doctrine of sentencing manipulation as defined by the outrageous conduct standard. ( Commonwealth v. Petzold (Pa.Super.Ct.1997) 701 A.2d 1363, 1366-1367 [sentence reduction an appropriate and just response to outrageous government conduct d

2003(State v. Steadman (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2002) 827 So.2d 1022 , 1024—1025 [no legitimate law enforcement purpose given for undisputed sentencing manipulation].) The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee apparently accepts the doctrine of sentencing manipulation under the rubric of sentencing entrapment, but has not spelled out whether it adopts the outrageous conduct standard or some lesser standard.

2003The Court of Appeals of New Mexico has apparently left the question open. ( State v. Rael (Ct.App.1999) 127 N.M. 347 , 981 P.2d 280, 287 [under some circumstances continuing transactions may constitute unfair manipulation of a defendant's sentence, but no sentencing manipulation found in case at bar].) The Superior Court of *567 Pennsylvania has adopted the doctrine of sentencing manipulation as defined by the outrageous conduct standard. ( Commonwealth v. Petzold (Pa.Super.Ct.1997) 701 A.2d 1363, 1366-1367 [sentence reduction an appropriate and just response to outrageous government conduct d

2003(Commonwealth v. Petzold (Pa.Super.Ct. 1997) 701 A.2d 1363, 1366-1367 [sentence reduction an appropriate and just response to outrageous government conduct designed solely to increase a defendant’s term of incarceration].) The District Court of Appeal of Florida has adopted the lesser standard of sentencing manipulation embraced by the Court of Appeal here.