pecuniary standard in California

1958The defamation of such character, therefore, however grievous or disturbing, can afford no injury that can be measured by a pecuniary standard.” The facts in Saucer v. Giroux, supra, 54 Cal.App. 732 , are stated in the opinion (p. 733): “The action is based upon the alleged act of defendant in causing to be published in a newspaper false and libelous statements that the deceased adult brother of plaintiff Virginia Saucer was an illegitimate son of her deceased mother, which false statements, it is alleged, have caused plaintiff grievous mental and physical suffering, for which she asked judgme

1955(Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225 [ 37 S.W.2d 46, 47 ] ; Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765 [ 299 S.W. 967, 971 , 55 A.L.R. 964 ].) While special damages may be recovered if sustained, general damages may *89 be recovered without a showing of specific loss.

1955(Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225 [ 37 S.W.2d 46, 47 ] ; Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765 [ 299 S.W. 967, 971 , 55 A.L.R. 964 ].) While special damages may be recovered if sustained, general damages may *89 be recovered without a showing of specific loss.

1955(Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225 [ 37 S.W.2d 46, 47 ] ; Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765 [ 299 S.W. 967, 971 , 55 A.L.R. 964 ].) While special damages may be recovered if sustained, general damages may *89 be recovered without a showing of specific loss.

1955(Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225 [ 37 S.W.2d 46, 47 ] ; Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765 [ 299 S.W. 967, 971 , 55 A.L.R. 964 ].) While special damages may be recovered if sustained, general damages may *89 be recovered without a showing of specific loss.

1955The law has never denied recovery to one entitled to damages simply because of uncertainty as to the extent of his injury and the amount which would properly compensate him.” (See Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill.App. 293 [ 106 N.E.2d 742, 746 ].) The fact that damages resulting from an invasion of the right of privacy cannot be measured by a pecuniary standard is not a bar to recovery.

1955The law has never denied recovery to one entitled to damages simply because of uncertainty as to the extent of his injury and the amount which would properly compensate him.” (See Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill.App. 293 [ 106 N.E.2d 742, 746 ].) The fact that damages resulting from an invasion of the right of privacy cannot be measured by a pecuniary standard is not a bar to recovery.

1922(Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444 [33 L.

1922(Pomeroy on Specific Performance, p. 268; Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580 [ 147 Pac. 259 ].) To warrant such action, however, it must not only be made to appear that the contract is fair and just (Flood v. Templeton, 148 Cal. 374 [ 83 Pac. 148 ]), but that the services called for and performed, by reason of their peculiar character, are such that they cannot be measured by a pecuniary standard (Morrison v. Land, supra), and hence cannot be compensated for in money.

1922(Pomeroy on Specific Performance, p. 268; Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580 [ 147 Pac. 259 ].) To warrant such action, however, it must not only be made to appear that the contract is fair and just (Flood v. Templeton, 148 Cal. 374 [ 83 Pac. 148 ]), but that the services called for and performed, by reason of their peculiar character, are such that they cannot be measured by a pecuniary standard (Morrison v. Land, supra), and hence cannot be compensated for in money.

1922(Pomeroy on Specific Performance, p. 268; Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580 [ 147 Pac. 259 ].) To warrant such action, however, it must not only be made to appear that the contract is fair and just (Flood v. Templeton, 148 Cal. 374 [ 83 Pac. 148 ]), but that the services called for and performed, by reason of their peculiar character, are such that they cannot be measured by a pecuniary standard (Morrison v. Land, supra), and hence cannot be compensated for in money.

1922(Pomeroy on Specific Performance, p. 268; Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580 [ 147 Pac. 259 ].) To warrant such action, however, it must not only be made to appear that the contract is fair and just (Flood v. Templeton, 148 Cal. 374 [ 83 Pac. 148 ]), but that the services called for and performed, by reason of their peculiar character, are such that they cannot be measured by a pecuniary standard (Morrison v. Land, supra), and hence cannot be compensated for in money.

1920Not only was evidence of the value of the properties exchanged admissible under the issue of fraud 'for the purpose of showing the circumstances surrounding and attending the making of the contract (Beverly v. Blackwood, 102 Cal. 83, 92 , [ 36 Pac. 378 ] ; Code Civ.

1920Not only was evidence of the value of the properties exchanged admissible under the issue of fraud 'for the purpose of showing the circumstances surrounding and attending the making of the contract (Beverly v. Blackwood, 102 Cal. 83, 92 , [ 36 Pac. 378 ] ; Code Civ.