plaintiff makes claim (California) · Go Syfert
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plaintiff makes claim in California

5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Better Food Markets, Inc. v. American District Telegraph Co.green
cal · 1953 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1984–2006
2 sentences

2006Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 179 , 187-188 [ 253 P.2d 10 ], a case against an alarm company sued for similar failures, the court concluded: `However, the plaintiff makes no claim that a duty was owed to it outside of that created by the contract, and no breach of duty was alleged other than a failure to render the contracted for service.

2006Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 179 , 187-188 [ 253 P.2d 10 ], a case against an alarm company sued for similar failures, the court concluded: `However, the plaintiff makes no claim that a duty was owed to it outside of that created by the contract, and no breach of duty was alleged other than a failure to render the contracted for service.

22
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.green
cal · 1966 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 275 (Gray), italics in original.) Once a plaintiff makes a claim that, if true, would be covered under the policy, the duty to defend is triggered. "[T]he ultimate question is whether the facts alleged do fairly apprise the insurer that plaintiff is suing the insured upon an occurrence which, if his allegations are true, gives rise to liability of insurer to insured under the terms of the policy." (Id. at p. 275, fn. 15.) "The determination whether the insurer owes a duty to defend usually is made in the first instance by comparing the allegations of the complaint wit

11
Pardee Construction Co. v. Insurance of the Westgreen
calctapp · 2000 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1081 (Horace Mann).) "Facts extrinsic to the complaint also give rise to a duty to defend when they reveal a possibility that the claim may be covered by the policy." (Ibid.) "Conversely, where such facts eliminate the potential for coverage, the insurer may decline to defend even where the bare allegations of the complaint suggest potential liability." (Pardee Construction Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1350 (Pardee).) "Any doubt as to whether the facts give rise to a duty to defend is resolved in the insured's favor." (Horace Mann, at p. 1081.) "An i

11
Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B.green
cal · 1993 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1081 (Horace Mann).) "Facts extrinsic to the complaint also give rise to a duty to defend when they reveal a possibility that the claim may be covered by the policy." (Ibid.) "Conversely, where such facts eliminate the potential for coverage, the insurer may decline to defend even where the bare allegations of the complaint suggest potential liability." (Pardee Construction Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1350 (Pardee).) "Any doubt as to whether the facts give rise to a duty to defend is resolved in the insured's favor." (Horace Mann, at p. 1081.) "An i

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

CaseCitedYears
Tanguilig v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc. green
calctapp · 2018
1 sentence

2022If, for instance, a plaintiff makes a tactical decision early in the history of a case that leads inevitably to a later claim of impracticability (Tanguilig v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 313 ), or if a plaintiff makes a claim of impracticability for some period of time early in the history of the case but then later fails to avail itself of a ready means of accelerating the case thereafter (Wilshire Bundy Corp. v. Auerbach (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1280 ), then what happened outside the claimed tolling period is a factor the court may properly consider in its discretionary det

12022–2022
Griffis v. S. S. Kresge Co. green
calctapp · 1984
1 sentence

2022Bank (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 134, 136 , 138-140 (plaintiff argued it was impossible to seek a trial date within the five-year period because, for nearly eighteen months as the mandatory trial deadline approached, the court failed to notify his counsel the case was eligible for a trial readiness certificate; it was not an abuse of discretion to reject that argument where the plaintiff could not show diligence prior to the final eighteen months in the mandatory time-to-trial period, and he failed to seek a special trial setting until 40 days before expiration of the deadline). 12 According to the

12022–2022
Karubian v. Security Pacific National Bank green
calctapp · 1984
1 sentence

2022Bank (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 134, 136 , 138-140 (plaintiff argued it was impossible to seek a trial date within the five-year period because, for nearly eighteen months as the mandatory trial deadline approached, the court failed to notify his counsel the case was eligible for a trial readiness certificate; it was not an abuse of discretion to reject that argument where the plaintiff could not show diligence prior to the final eighteen months in the mandatory time-to-trial period, and he failed to seek a special trial setting until 40 days before expiration of the deadline). 12 According to the

12022–2022
Brock v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals green
calctapp · 1992
1 sentence

2022Bank (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 134, 136 , 138-140 (plaintiff argued it was impossible to seek a trial date within the five-year period because, for nearly eighteen months as the mandatory trial deadline approached, the court failed to notify his counsel the case was eligible for a trial readiness certificate; it was not an abuse of discretion to reject that argument where the plaintiff could not show diligence prior to the final eighteen months in the mandatory time-to-trial period, and he failed to seek a special trial setting until 40 days before expiration of the deadline). 12 According to the

12022–2022
King v. State of California green
calctapp · 1970
1 sentence

2022Bank (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 134, 136 , 138-140 (plaintiff argued it was impossible to seek a trial date within the five-year period because, for nearly eighteen months as the mandatory trial deadline approached, the court failed to notify his counsel the case was eligible for a trial readiness certificate; it was not an abuse of discretion to reject that argument where the plaintiff could not show diligence prior to the final eighteen months in the mandatory time-to-trial period, and he failed to seek a special trial setting until 40 days before expiration of the deadline). 12 According to the

12022–2022
Schwenke v. J & P SCOTT, INC. green
calctapp · 1988
1 sentence

2022If, for instance, a plaintiff makes a tactical decision early in the history of a case that leads inevitably to a later claim of impracticability (Tanguilig v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 313 ), or if a plaintiff makes a claim of impracticability for some period of time early in the history of the case but then later fails to avail itself of a ready means of accelerating the case thereafter (Wilshire Bundy Corp. v. Auerbach (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1280 ), then what happened outside the claimed tolling period is a factor the court may properly consider in its discretionary det

12022–2022
Minkin v. Levander green
calctapp · 1986
1 sentence

2022Bank (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 134, 136 , 138-140 (plaintiff argued it was impossible to seek a trial date within the five-year period because, for nearly eighteen months as the mandatory trial deadline approached, the court failed to notify his counsel the case was eligible for a trial readiness certificate; it was not an abuse of discretion to reject that argument where the plaintiff could not show diligence prior to the final eighteen months in the mandatory time-to-trial period, and he failed to seek a special trial setting until 40 days before expiration of the deadline). 12 According to the

12022–2022
Wilshire Bundy Corp. v. Auerbach green
calctapp · 1991
1 sentence

2022If, for instance, a plaintiff makes a tactical decision early in the history of a case that leads inevitably to a later claim of impracticability (Tanguilig v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 313 ), or if a plaintiff makes a claim of impracticability for some period of time early in the history of the case but then later fails to avail itself of a ready means of accelerating the case thereafter (Wilshire Bundy Corp. v. Auerbach (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1280 ), then what happened outside the claimed tolling period is a factor the court may properly consider in its discretionary det

12022–2022
Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. green
cal · 2011
1 sentence

2022Bank (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 134, 136 , 138-140 (plaintiff argued it was impossible to seek a trial date within the five-year period because, for nearly eighteen months as the mandatory trial deadline approached, the court failed to notify his counsel the case was eligible for a trial readiness certificate; it was not an abuse of discretion to reject that argument where the plaintiff could not show diligence prior to the final eighteen months in the mandatory time-to-trial period, and he failed to seek a special trial setting until 40 days before expiration of the deadline). 12 According to the

12022–2022
Buss v. Superior Court green
cal · 1997
1 sentence

2014Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1081 (Horace Mann).) "Facts extrinsic to the complaint also give rise to a duty to defend when they reveal a possibility that the claim may be covered by the policy." (Ibid.) "Conversely, where such facts eliminate the potential for coverage, the insurer may decline to defend even where the bare allegations of the complaint suggest potential liability." (Pardee Construction Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1350 (Pardee).) "Any doubt as to whether the facts give rise to a duty to defend is resolved in the insured's favor." (Horace Mann, at p. 1081.) "An i

12014–2014
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court green
cal · 1993
1 sentence

2014Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1081 (Horace Mann).) "Facts extrinsic to the complaint also give rise to a duty to defend when they reveal a possibility that the claim may be covered by the policy." (Ibid.) "Conversely, where such facts eliminate the potential for coverage, the insurer may decline to defend even where the bare allegations of the complaint suggest potential liability." (Pardee Construction Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1350 (Pardee).) "Any doubt as to whether the facts give rise to a duty to defend is resolved in the insured's favor." (Horace Mann, at p. 1081.) "An i

12014–2014
Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Morse Signal Devices green
calctapp · 1984
2 sentences

2006Although an action in tort may sometimes be brought for the negligent breach of a contractual duty [citation], still the nature of the duty owed and the consequences of its breach must be determined by reference to the contract which created that duty.'" ( Morse, supra , 15 Cal.App.3d at p. 687 .) The court held that while the alarm companies may have been negligent in performance of their contractual duties, their negligence did not create the harm. ( Morse, supra , 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 687 .) The court went on to hold that the primary cause of loss was the creator of the fire or the burglar

2006Although an action in tort may sometimes be brought for the negligent breach of a contractual duty [citation], still the nature of the duty owed and the consequences of its breach must be determined by reference to the contract which created that duty.'" ( Morse, supra , 15 Cal.App.3d at p. 687 .) The court held that while the alarm companies may have been negligent in performance of their contractual duties, their negligence did not create the harm. ( Morse, supra , 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 687 .) The court went on to hold that the primary cause of loss was the creator of the fire or the burglar

12006–2006
People v. Cain green
calctapp · 1971
1 sentence

2006Although an action in tort may sometimes be brought for the negligent breach of a contractual duty [citation], still the nature of the duty owed and the consequences of its breach must be determined by reference to the contract which created that duty.'" ( Morse, supra , 15 Cal.App.3d at p. 687 .) The court held that while the alarm companies may have been negligent in performance of their contractual duties, their negligence did not create the harm. ( Morse, supra , 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 687 .) The court went on to hold that the primary cause of loss was the creator of the fire or the burglar

12006–2006
Jones v. Kelly green
cal · 1929
2 sentences

1953However, the plaintiff makes no claim that a duty was owed to it outside of that created by the contract, and no breach of *188 duty was alleged other than a failure to render the contracted for service. [14] Although an action in tort may sometimes be brought for the negligent breach of a contractual duty (Jones v. Kelly, 208 Cal. 251 [ 280 P. 942 ]), still the nature of the duty owed and the consequences of its breach must be determined by reference to the contract which created that duty.

1953However, the plaintiff makes no claim that a duty was owed to it outside of that created by the contract, and no breach of *188 duty was alleged other than a failure to render the contracted for service. [14] Although an action in tort may sometimes be brought for the negligent breach of a contractual duty (Jones v. Kelly, 208 Cal. 251 [ 280 P. 942 ]), still the nature of the duty owed and the consequences of its breach must be determined by reference to the contract which created that duty.

11953–1953

Where else courts name it

CT 23 (1948–2021) NC 12 (1973–2020) NY 7 (1915–1988) MA 6 (1979–2018) CA 5 (1953–2022) OH 5 (1938–2018) IN 4 (1925–2019) TX 3 (2005–2005) IL 3 (1986–1988) OR 3 (1982–2004) FL 2 (1971–1998) MN 2 (1908–1931) SC 2 (1923–2014) MS 2 (2006–2007)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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