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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1967–1983 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Jacksongreen2 sentences1983Again, in Jackson v. Jackson (1967) 67 Cal.2d 245, 247 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 649 , 430 P.2d 289 ], we observed that “the so-called conclusive presumption is really not a presumption but rather a rule of substantive law.” (Accord, Vincent B. v. Joan R. (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 619, 623 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 619 , 179 Cal.Rptr. 9 ]; People v. Russell (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 330, 335 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 277 ] [incest].) We take the same view of the “conclusive presumption of malice” in felony-murder cases. 1983Again, in Jackson v. Jackson (1967) 67 Cal.2d 245, 247 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 649 , 430 P.2d 289 ], we observed that “the so-called conclusive presumption is really not a presumption but rather a rule of substantive law.” (Accord, Vincent B. v. Joan R. (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 619, 623 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 619 , 179 Cal.Rptr. 9 ]; People v. Russell (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 330, 335 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 277 ] [incest].) We take the same view of the “conclusive presumption of malice” in felony-murder cases. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Russellgreen2 sentences1983Again, in Jackson v. Jackson (1967) 67 Cal.2d 245, 247 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 649 , 430 P.2d 289 ], we observed that “the so-called conclusive presumption is really not a presumption but rather a rule of substantive law.” (Accord, Vincent B. v. Joan R. (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 619, 623 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 619 , 179 Cal.Rptr. 9 ]; People v. Russell (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 330, 335 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 277 ] [incest].) We take the same view of the “conclusive presumption of malice” in felony-murder cases. 1983Again, in Jackson v. Jackson (1967) 67 Cal.2d 245, 247 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 649 , 430 P.2d 289 ], we observed that “the so-called conclusive presumption is really not a presumption but rather a rule of substantive law.” (Accord, Vincent B. v. Joan R. (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 619, 623 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 619 , 179 Cal.Rptr. 9 ]; People v. Russell (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 330, 335 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 277 ] [incest].) We take the same view of the “conclusive presumption of malice” in felony-murder cases. | 1 | 2 |
Vincent B. v. Joan R.green2 sentences1983Again, in Jackson v. Jackson (1967) 67 Cal.2d 245, 247 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 649 , 430 P.2d 289 ], we observed that “the so-called conclusive presumption is really not a presumption but rather a rule of substantive law.” (Accord, Vincent B. v. Joan R. (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 619, 623 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 619 , 179 Cal.Rptr. 9 ]; People v. Russell (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 330, 335 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 277 ] [incest].) We take the same view of the “conclusive presumption of malice” in felony-murder cases. 1983Again, in Jackson v. Jackson (1967) 67 Cal.2d 245, 247 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 649 , 430 P.2d 289 ], we observed that “the so-called conclusive presumption is really not a presumption but rather a rule of substantive law.” (Accord, Vincent B. v. Joan R. (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 619, 623 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 619 , 179 Cal.Rptr. 9 ]; People v. Russell (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 330, 335 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 277 ] [incest].) We take the same view of the “conclusive presumption of malice” in felony-murder cases. | 1 | 1 |
Salas v. Cortezgreen2 sentences1980(Salas v. Cortez (1979) 24 Cal.3d 22, 29, fn. 5 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 529 , 593 P.2d 226 ].) 1980(Salas v. Cortez (1979) 24 Cal.3d 22, 29, fn. 5 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 529 , 593 P.2d 226 ].) | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McNamara v. McNamara
green
2 sentences1971(Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82 [ 183 P. 552 , 7 A.L.R. 313 ].) If the presumption is founded on salutary public policy, and if it is in reality a rule of substantive law, it follows that Penal Code section 285 not only proscribes sexual intercourse between persons actually related by the prohibited blood lines, but also proscribes sexual intercourse between persons the law deems to be so related. 1971(Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82 [ 183 P. 552 , 7 A.L.R. 313 ].) If the presumption is founded on salutary public policy, and if it is in reality a rule of substantive law, it follows that Penal Code section 285 not only proscribes sexual intercourse between persons actually related by the prohibited blood lines, but also proscribes sexual intercourse between persons the law deems to be so related. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Kusior v. Silver
green
2 sentences1967In Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal.2d 603 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 354 P.2d 657 ], we held that blood tests were inadmissible to prove the husband had not fathered the wife’s child in circumstances where the conclusive presumption applied. 1 This is so because the so-called conclusive presumption is really not a presumption but rather a rule of substantive law. 1967In Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal.2d 603 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 354 P.2d 657 ], we held that blood tests were inadmissible to prove the husband had not fathered the wife’s child in circumstances where the conclusive presumption applied. 1 This is so because the so-called conclusive presumption is really not a presumption but rather a rule of substantive law. | 1 | 1967–1967 |