probationer at a revocation hearing in California

2024(Arreola, at p. 1157; People v. Winson (1981) 29 Cal.3d 711, 717 .) The court reaffirmed its holding in Winson that due process requires a showing of good cause for the admission of a preliminary hearing transcript, and held that “the probationer at a revocation hearing [is] ‘entitled to cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless the hearing body specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation.’ ” (Arreola, at pp. 1157–1158; see Black v. Romano, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 612 .) The Arreola court explained that the determination of whether former testimony is admissible must be made on a

1994Indeed, in the years subsequent to our decision in Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d 711 , the United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed, rather than retreated from, the Morrissey-Gagnon requirements—and specifically the requirement that the probationer at a revocation hearing be “entitled to cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless the hearing body specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation." (Black v. Romano (1985) 471 U.S. 606, 612 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 636, 643 , 105 S.Ct. 2254 ].) The high court also has reaffirmed the principle that the opportunity of the accused to observe an adverse wi

2007In an unsuccessful attempt to suppress evidence of a suitcase and its contents seized from Mrs. Mahon’s basement, the defendant had admitted ownership of the suitcase. ( 390 U.S. at p. 389 .) The court noted that the defendant’s testimony of ownership of the challenged evidence was often necessary to establish standing and therefore “his testimony is to be regarded as an integral part of his Fourth Amendment exclusion claim.” (Id. at p. 391.) The court found it “intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.” (Id. at p. 394.) In People v. Co

2004(Id. at pp. 393-394.) Similarly, People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ] held that the testimony of a probationer at a revocation hearing is inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief in a subsequent trial on charges based on the same conduct that prompted the revocation.

2024(Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1159 ; People v. Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 719 .) And that the broad standard of good cause is met “(1) when the declarant is ‘unavailable’ under the traditional hearsay standard (see Evid.

2007The court found an inherent conflict between the constitutional right to speak at a probation revocation hearing *814 (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ]), and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

2007The court found an inherent conflict between the constitutional right to speak at a probation revocation hearing *814 (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ]), and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

2007In an unsuccessful attempt to suppress evidence of a suitcase and its contents seized from Mrs. Mahon’s basement, the defendant had admitted ownership of the suitcase. ( 390 U.S. at p. 389 .) The court noted that the defendant’s testimony of ownership of the challenged evidence was often necessary to establish standing and therefore “his testimony is to be regarded as an integral part of his Fourth Amendment exclusion claim.” (Id. at p. 391.) The court found it “intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.” (Id. at p. 394.) In People v. Co

2004(Id. at p. 872.) We said: “When a pending or potential criminal charge forms the basis of an alleged violation of a condition of probation, a probationer who can explain his actions only by jeopardizing his chances of acquittal at a subsequent criminal trial may understandably feel that his opportunity to be heard is more illusory than real and that he is being deprived of his liberty without one of the essential elements of rudimentary fairness—a meaningful chance to speak on his own behalf.” (Id. at p. 874.) In the latter category, those in which a defendant’s testimony is impelled by the im

2004(Id. at p. 872.) We said: “When a pending or potential criminal charge forms the basis of an alleged violation of a condition of probation, a probationer who can explain his actions only by jeopardizing his chances of acquittal at a subsequent criminal trial may understandably feel that his opportunity to be heard is more illusory than real and that he is being deprived of his liberty without one of the essential elements of rudimentary fairness—a meaningful chance to speak on his own behalf.” (Id. at p. 874.) In the latter category, those in which a defendant’s testimony is impelled by the im

1994In Coy v. Iowa (1987) 487 U.S. 1012 [ 101 L.Ed.2d 857 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 ], the court held the placement of a screen between the defendant and the complaining minor witnesses during their testimony violated the defendant’s right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution.

1994In Coy v. Iowa (1987) 487 U.S. 1012 [ 101 L.Ed.2d 857 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 ], the court held the placement of a screen between the defendant and the complaining minor witnesses during their testimony violated the defendant’s right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution.