officer violation in Texas

2006In contrast, appellant testified at the suppression hearing that 1) the officer told him he wanted to ask him some questions, 2) the officer did not tell him to leave McCurin alone but told him to go to McCurin's house and pay him back, 3) the officer asked him if he knew McCurin and if he took the wallet, and 4) that even though he was not told he was under arrest, he "could see it in [the officer's] eyes that he wasn't going to let [appellant] walk off." We note initially that if the trial court believed the officer's testimony at the suppression hearing, (1) it legitimately could have found

2006In contrast, appellant testified at the suppression hearing that 1) the officer told him he wanted to ask him some questions, 2) the officer did not tell him to leave McCurin alone but told him to go to McCurin’s house and pay him back, 3) the officer asked him if he knew McCurin and if he took the wallet, and 4) that even though he was not told he was under arrest, he “could see it in [the officer’s] eyes that he wasn’t going to let [appellant] walk off.” We note initially that if the trial court believed the officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing,1 it legitimately could have found th

2001In Rheinlander v. State, 888 S.W.2d 917, 918 (Tex. App. SAustin 1994), pet. dism’d, 918 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Crim.

2001In Rheinlander v. State , 888 S.W.2d 917, 918 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994), pet. dism'd , 918 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Crim.

2006To exclude this ongoing one-and-a-half hour activity from our foreseeability analysis would deny the reality of the facts of this case and distort the foreseeability analysis. 8 When determining whether a duty lies, we must consider all “the facts surrounding the occurrence in question.” Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.1995).

2006To exclude this ongoing one-and-a-half hour activity from our foreseeability analysis would deny the reality of the facts of this case and distort the foreseeability analysis. [8] When determining whether a duty lies, we must consider all "the facts surrounding the occurrence in question." Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.1995).

1996Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.23 (Vernon Supp.1993); Cardenas v. State, 857 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd); Flores v. State, 824 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref'd).

1993Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.23 (Vernon Supp.1993); Cardenas, 857 S.W.2d at 710 ; Flores v. State, 824 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, pet. refd).

1996Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.23 (Vernon Supp.1993); Cardenas v. State, 857 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd); Flores v. State, 824 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref'd).

1993Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.23 (Vernon Supp.1993); Cardenas, 857 S.W.2d at 710 ; Flores v. State, 824 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, pet. refd).

2024“This would raise the standard for reasonable suspicion far above probable cause or even a preponderance of the evidence, in contravention of the Supreme Court’s instructions.” Id. at 681 (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Miranda-Sotolongo, 827 F.3d 663, 669 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Reasonable suspicion . . . does not require the officer to rule out all innocent explanations of what he sees.”). 9 B.

2024“This would raise the standard for reasonable suspicion far above probable cause or even a preponderance of the evidence, in contravention of the Supreme Court’s instructions.” Id. at 681 (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Miranda-Sotolongo, 827 F.3d 663, 669 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Reasonable suspicion . . . does not require the officer to rule out all innocent explanations of what he sees.”). 9 B.

2019See Steele, 490 S.W.3d at 129 (concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a resisting arrest charge where the defendant physically struggled with the officer and caused the officer injuries); Ortega v. State, 207 S.W.3d 911, 918 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–2006, no pet.) (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing lesser-included-offense instruction on resisting arrest when “[t]he evidence show[ed] that appellant struck the arresting officer in the chest and face using his fists”); Oiler v. State, 77 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, pet ref’d) (holding th

2019See Steele, 490 S.W.3d at 129 (concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a resisting arrest charge where the defendant physically struggled with the officer and caused the officer injuries); Ortega v. State, 207 S.W.3d 911, 918 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–2006, no pet.) (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing lesser-included-offense instruction on resisting arrest when “[t]he evidence show[ed] that appellant struck the arresting officer in the chest and face using his fists”); Oiler v. State, 77 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, pet ref’d) (holding th

2019See Steele, 490 S.W.3d at 129 (concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a resisting arrest charge where the defendant physically struggled with the officer and caused the officer injuries); Ortega v. State, 207 S.W.3d 911, 918 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–2006, no pet.) (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing lesser-included-offense instruction on resisting arrest when “[t]he evidence show[ed] that appellant struck the arresting officer in the chest and face using his fists”); Oiler v. State, 77 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, pet ref’d) (holding th

2019See Steele, 490 S.W.3d at 129 (concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a resisting arrest charge where the defendant physically struggled with the officer and caused the officer injuries); Ortega v. State, 207 S.W.3d 911, 918 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–2006, no pet.) (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing lesser-included-offense instruction on resisting arrest when “[t]he evidence show[ed] that appellant struck the arresting officer in the chest and face using his fists”); Oiler v. State, 77 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, pet ref’d) (holding th

2018See Tucker v. State, 369 S.W.3d 179, 185 (Tex. Crim.

2016See id.

2015Proc. art. 38.23(b); McClintock v. State, 444 S.W.3d 15, 20-21 (Tex. Crim.

2015See cf. Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 465-66 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (concluding that despite prior unlawful police conduct, evidence discovered and obtained pursuant to valid search warrant is not subject to suppression if police would have sought the warrant regardless of any observations made during the illegal entry) (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 799 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984)); see also Roberts v. State, No. 03-12-00194-CR, 2014 WL 1910428 , at *1-2 (Tex.App.-Austin May 8, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (determining that althoug

2015See cf. Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 465-66 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (concluding that despite prior unlawful police conduct, evidence discovered and obtained pursuant to valid search warrant is not subject to suppression if police would have sought the warrant regardless of any observations made during the illegal entry) (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 799 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984)); see also Roberts v. State, No. 03-12-00194-CR, 2014 WL 1910428 , at *1-2 (Tex.App.-Austin May 8, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (determining that althoug

2015See cf. Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 465-66 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (concluding that despite prior unlawful police conduct, evidence discovered and obtained pursuant to valid search warrant is not subject to suppression if police would have sought the warrant regardless of any observations made during the illegal entry) (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 799 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984)); see also Roberts v. State, No. 03-12-00194-CR, 2014 WL 1910428 , at *1-2 (Tex.App.-Austin May 8, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (determining that althoug

2015See cf. Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 465-66 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (concluding that despite prior unlawful police conduct, evidence discovered and obtained pursuant to valid search warrant is not subject to suppression if police would have sought the warrant regardless of any observations made during the illegal entry) (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 799 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984)); see also Roberts v. State, No. 03-12-00194-CR, 2014 WL 1910428 , at *1-2 (Tex.App.-Austin May 8, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (determining that althoug

2015See Villarreal, 2014 Tex. Crim.

2008See id. art. 38.23(a).

2003The plurality notes that the officers had not articulated "facts reasonably showing other persons were in Barocio's home" and summarily concludes that "[c]oupling odor and burglary suspicions, when the sole suspect has been detained, is simply a red herring." [11] However, the deputies had no confirmed belief that appellant was the "sole suspect," and thus, it was "appropriate for them to act on the basis of the kinds of risks burglaries normally present." In re Sealed Case 96-3167, 153 F.3d 759, 767 (D.C.Cir.1998). [12] Importantly, any failure of the officers to testify to concerns of reside

2003The plurality notes that the officers had not articulated “facts reasonably showing other persons were in Barocio’s home” and summarily concludes that “[cjoupling odor and burglary suspicions, when the sole suspect has been detained, is simply a red herring.” 11 However, the deputies had no confirmed belief that appellant was the “sole suspect,” and thus, it was “appropriate for them to act on the basis of the kinds of risks burglaries normally present.” In re Sealed Case 96-3167, 153 F.3d 759, 767 (D.C.Cir.1998). 12 Importantly, any failure of the officers to testify to concerns of resident s

2002Quite the contrary, if the circum stances perm it the court to de duc e tha t a reasonable officer could have justified the stop based upon the existence of circumstances creating reasonable suspicion that c rim inal activity w as afo ot, that is all the State need show, irrespective of the subjective m otivations of the actua l officer. 3 Standard of Review The standard of review applicable to claims implicating the admission of evidence is discussed in Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 378-79 (Tex. Crim.

2000See Lawton , 913 S.W.2d at 553-54 .

1999Finally, because the officer at bar seized appellant without a warrant, the burden lay with the State to prove the validity of the seizure. 1 Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9-10 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

1999Nor can inference arising from an officer's ever-changing experience suffice in the absence of facts indicating unusual activity. *751 Finally, because the officer at bar seized appellant without a warrant, the burden lay with the State to prove the validity of the seizure. [1] Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9-10 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).