officer rule in New Hampshire

2020“As we have previously recognized, however, ‘that observed activity could be consistent with both guilty and innocent behavior does not mean that an officer must rule out innocent explanations before proceeding.’” Sage, 170 N.H. at 610-11 (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Galgay, 145 N.H. 100, 103 (2000)); accord Turmel, 150 N.H. at 381 .

2018As we have previously recognized, however, "[t]hat observed activity could be consistent with both guilty and innocent behavior does not mean that an officer must rule out innocent explanations before proceeding." State v. Galgay , 145 N.H. 100 , 103, 750 A.2d 52 (2000) ; accord State v. Turmel , 150 N.H. 377 , 381, 838 A.2d 1279 (2003).

2020“As we have previously recognized, however, ‘that observed activity could be consistent with both guilty and innocent behavior does not mean that an officer must rule out innocent explanations before proceeding.’” Sage, 170 N.H. at 610-11 (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Galgay, 145 N.H. 100, 103 (2000)); accord Turmel, 150 N.H. at 381 .

2019“That observed activity could be consistent with both guilty and innocent behavior, however, does not mean that an officer must rule out innocent explanations before proceeding.” State v. Turmel, 150 N.H. 377, 381 (2003).

2020While “the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time,” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion), we cannot say that Arteaga acted unreasonably by asking the defendant to exit the vehicle before asking a direct question about the source of the odor of marijuana.

2019We have recognized that, although “a person’s mere presence in a high-crime area, even at a late hour, is not a sufficient basis, standing alone, to justify a brief investigatory detention, the hour and the character of the area may cast an individual’s own conduct in a more suspicious light.” State v. Vadnais, 141 N.H. 68, 70-71 (1996); see also State v. Roach, 141 N.H. 64, 66 (1996) (weighing facts that defendant was nervous and in a high-crime area as factors in favor of finding reasonable suspicion).

2019We have recognized that, although “a person’s mere presence in a high-crime area, even at a late hour, is not a sufficient basis, standing alone, to justify a brief investigatory detention, the hour and the character of the area may cast an individual’s own conduct in a more suspicious light.” State v. Vadnais, 141 N.H. 68, 70-71 (1996); see also State v. Roach, 141 N.H. 64, 66 (1996) (weighing facts that defendant was nervous and in a high-crime area as factors in favor of finding reasonable suspicion).

2000See, e.g., United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 112 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916 (1987) (noting that “it must be rare indeed that an officer observes behavior consistent only with guilt and incapable of innocent interpretation” (brackets omitted)).

2000See, e.g., United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 112 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916 (1987) (noting that “it must be rare indeed that an officer observes behavior consistent only with guilt and incapable of innocent interpretation” (brackets omitted)).