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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2003 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brandenburg v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2002This is the purpose served by the rule in Brandenburg [v. Ohio (1969)] 395 U.S. [444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827 , 23 L.Ed.2d 430 ] ... that to forfeit constitutional protection the speech must be `directed to inciting ... imminent lawless action' and must be likely to do so, and the corresponding rule of Chaplinsky [v. New Hampshire], supra, 315 U.S. at page 572 [ 62 S.Ct. 766 ], that fighting words lose First Amendment protection only when ... by their very utterance, *244 they `inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.'" Nevertheless, the court concluded that threats of vio 2002This is the purpose served by the rule in Brandenburg [v. Ohio (1969)] 395 U.S. [444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827 , 23 L.Ed.2d 430 ] ... that to forfeit constitutional protection the speech must be `directed to inciting ... imminent lawless action' and must be likely to do so, and the corresponding rule of Chaplinsky [v. New Hampshire], supra, 315 U.S. at page 572 [ 62 S.Ct. 766 ], that fighting words lose First Amendment protection only when ... by their very utterance, *244 they `inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.'" Nevertheless, the court concluded that threats of vio | 2 | 3 |
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshiregreen2 sentences2002This is the purpose served by the rule in Brandenburg [v. Ohio (1969)] 395 U.S. [444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827 , 23 L.Ed.2d 430 ] ... that to forfeit constitutional protection the speech must be `directed to inciting ... imminent lawless action' and must be likely to do so, and the corresponding rule of Chaplinsky [v. New Hampshire], supra, 315 U.S. at page 572 [ 62 S.Ct. 766 ], that fighting words lose First Amendment protection only when ... by their very utterance, *244 they `inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.'" Nevertheless, the court concluded that threats of vio 2002This is the purpose served by the rule in Brandenburg [v. Ohio (1969)] 395 U.S. [444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827 , 23 L.Ed.2d 430 ] ... that to forfeit constitutional protection the speech must be `directed to inciting ... imminent lawless action' and must be likely to do so, and the corresponding rule of Chaplinsky [v. New Hampshire], supra, 315 U.S. at page 572 [ 62 S.Ct. 766 ], that fighting words lose First Amendment protection only when ... by their very utterance, *244 they `inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.'" Nevertheless, the court concluded that threats of vio | 1 | 3 |
In Re MSgreen2 sentences2002This is the purpose served by the rule in Brandenburg [v. Ohio (1969)] 395 U.S. [444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827 , 23 L.Ed.2d 430 ] ... that to forfeit constitutional protection the speech must be `directed to inciting ... imminent lawless action' and must be likely to do so, and the corresponding rule of Chaplinsky [v. New Hampshire], supra, 315 U.S. at page 572 [ 62 S.Ct. 766 ], that fighting words lose First Amendment protection only when ... by their very utterance, *244 they `inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.'" Nevertheless, the court concluded that threats of vio 2002This is the purpose served by the rule in Brandenburg [v. Ohio (1969)] 395 U.S. [444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827 , 23 L.Ed.2d 430 ] ... that to forfeit constitutional protection the speech must be `directed to inciting ... imminent lawless action' and must be likely to do so, and the corresponding rule of Chaplinsky [v. New Hampshire], supra, 315 U.S. at page 572 [ 62 S.Ct. 766 ], that fighting words lose First Amendment protection only when ... by their very utterance, *244 they `inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.'" Nevertheless, the court concluded that threats of vio | 1 | 1 |
R. A. v. v. City of St. Paulgreen2 sentences1995Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 388 [ 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 321 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 ].) As long as the threat reasonably appears to be a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm ( U.S. v. Orozco-Santillan, supra, 903 F.2d at pp. 1265-1266), and its circumstances are such that there is a reasonable tendency to produce in the victim a fear the threat will be carried out ( Wurtz v. Risley, supra, 719 F.2d at p. 1441 ), the fact the threat may be contingent on some future event (e.g., "If you don't move out of the neighborhood by Sunday, I'll kill you") does not cloak it in constitutional protecti 1995Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 388 [ 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 321 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 ].) As long as the threat reasonably appears to be a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm ( U.S. v. Orozco-Santillan, supra, 903 F.2d at pp. 1265-1266), and its circumstances are such that there is a reasonable tendency to produce in the victim a fear the threat will be carried out ( Wurtz v. Risley, supra, 719 F.2d at p. 1441 ), the fact the threat may be contingent on some future event (e.g., "If you don't move out of the neighborhood by Sunday, I'll kill you") does not cloak it in constitutional protecti | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. State Bargreen2 sentences1979The purpose served by rule 8-101 is “ ‘ “to provide against the probability in some cases, the possibility in many cases, and the danger in all cases that such commingling will result in the loss of client’s money.” ’ ” (Black v. State Bar (1962) 57 Cal.2d 219, 225-226 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 518 , 368 P.2d 118 ]; Clark v. State Bar (1952) 39 Cal.2d 161, 168 [ 246 P.2d 1 ].) Petitioner’s indiscriminate use of the trust account—evidenced by his own testimony—demonstrates the dangers sought to be avoided by adherence to the rule. 1979The purpose served by rule 8-101 is “ ‘ “to provide against the probability in some cases, the possibility in many cases, and the danger in all cases that such commingling will result in the loss of client’s money.” ’ ” (Black v. State Bar (1962) 57 Cal.2d 219, 225-226 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 518 , 368 P.2d 118 ]; Clark v. State Bar (1952) 39 Cal.2d 161, 168 [ 246 P.2d 1 ].) Petitioner’s indiscriminate use of the trust account—evidenced by his own testimony—demonstrates the dangers sought to be avoided by adherence to the rule. | 1 | 1 |
Black v. State Bargreen2 sentences1979The purpose served by rule 8-101 is “ ‘ “to provide against the probability in some cases, the possibility in many cases, and the danger in all cases that such commingling will result in the loss of client’s money.” ’ ” (Black v. State Bar (1962) 57 Cal.2d 219, 225-226 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 518 , 368 P.2d 118 ]; Clark v. State Bar (1952) 39 Cal.2d 161, 168 [ 246 P.2d 1 ].) Petitioner’s indiscriminate use of the trust account—evidenced by his own testimony—demonstrates the dangers sought to be avoided by adherence to the rule. 1979The purpose served by rule 8-101 is “ ‘ “to provide against the probability in some cases, the possibility in many cases, and the danger in all cases that such commingling will result in the loss of client’s money.” ’ ” (Black v. State Bar (1962) 57 Cal.2d 219, 225-226 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 518 , 368 P.2d 118 ]; Clark v. State Bar (1952) 39 Cal.2d 161, 168 [ 246 P.2d 1 ].) Petitioner’s indiscriminate use of the trust account—evidenced by his own testimony—demonstrates the dangers sought to be avoided by adherence to the rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Commission
green
2 sentences2003As explained above, the exhaustion of internal remedies requirement gives the administrative body with jurisdiction over a claim an opportunity to redress the claimed wrong, or possibly mitigate the claimant's damages, short of costly litigation in the courts. ( Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 501 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 702 , 981 P.2d 543 .) It oftentimes will lead to the most prompt and economical means of resolving disputes, and even where complete relief is not obtained, it can serve to reduce the scope of litigation or possibly avoid it altogether. 2003As explained above, the exhaustion of internal remedies requirement gives the administrative body with jurisdiction over a claim an opportunity to redress the claimed wrong, or possibly mitigate the claimant's damages, short of costly litigation in the courts. ( Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 501 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 702 , 981 P.2d 543 .) It oftentimes will lead to the most prompt and economical means of resolving disputes, and even where complete relief is not obtained, it can serve to reduce the scope of litigation or possibly avoid it altogether. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Rojo v. Kliger
green
2 sentences2003As explained above, the exhaustion of internal remedies requirement gives the administrative body with jurisdiction over a claim an opportunity to redress the claimed wrong, or possibly mitigate the claimant's damages, short of costly litigation in the courts. ( Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 501 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 702 , 981 P.2d 543 .) It oftentimes will lead to the most prompt and economical means of resolving disputes, and even where complete relief is not obtained, it can serve to reduce the scope of litigation or possibly avoid it altogether. 2003As explained above, the exhaustion of internal remedies requirement gives the administrative body with jurisdiction over a claim an opportunity to redress the claimed wrong, or possibly mitigate the claimant's damages, short of costly litigation in the courts. ( Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 501 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 702 , 981 P.2d 543 .) It oftentimes will lead to the most prompt and economical means of resolving disputes, and even where complete relief is not obtained, it can serve to reduce the scope of litigation or possibly avoid it altogether. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State Department of Health Services v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2003A rule making employers liable even for those damages that an employee could have avoided with reasonable effort and without undue risk, expense, or humiliation would significantly weaken the incentive for employers to establish effective workplace remedies against sexual harassment.” (State Department of Health Services, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1034 .) Similar to the purpose served by the doctrine of avoidable consequences, the rule requiring exhaustion of internal administrative remedies makes employers, and in the case of public entity employers, their civil service commissions, the first l | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Larry Wurtz, and v. Henry Risley, and the Attorney General of the State of Montana, Michael T. Greeley, Additional And
green
1 sentence1995Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 388 [ 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 321 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 ].) As long as the threat reasonably appears to be a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm ( U.S. v. Orozco-Santillan, supra, 903 F.2d at pp. 1265-1266), and its circumstances are such that there is a reasonable tendency to produce in the victim a fear the threat will be carried out ( Wurtz v. Risley, supra, 719 F.2d at p. 1441 ), the fact the threat may be contingent on some future event (e.g., "If you don't move out of the neighborhood by Sunday, I'll kill you") does not cloak it in constitutional protecti | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.