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5 California opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kisbey v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences1985(See Kisbey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415, 418, fn. 3 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 428 , 682 P.2d 1093 ] [expedience dictates that we discuss only the question of governmental immunity, rather than whether there was a cause of action stated].) Government Code section 850.2 provides: “Neither a public entity that has undertaken to provide fire protection service, nor an employee of such a public entity, is liable for any injury resulting from the failure to provide or maintain sufficient personnel, equipment or other fire protection facilities.” Government Code section 850.4 provides: “Neither 1985(See Kisbey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415, 418, fn. 3 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 428 , 682 P.2d 1093 ] [expedience dictates that we discuss only the question of governmental immunity, rather than whether there was a cause of action stated].) Government Code section 850.2 provides: “Neither a public entity that has undertaken to provide fire protection service, nor an employee of such a public entity, is liable for any injury resulting from the failure to provide or maintain sufficient personnel, equipment or other fire protection facilities.” Government Code section 850.4 provides: “Neither | 2 | 2 |
Lainer Investments v. Department of Water & Powergreen1 sentence2013(See Kisbey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415, 418, fn. 3 ; Lainer Investments v. Department of Water & Power (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 1, 7 (Lainer).) A. The County and the OCFA Were Statutorily Immune from Liability. ―‗Except as otherwise provided by statute,‘ a public entity ‗is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public 6 employee or any other person.‘ (Gov. | 1 | 1 |
Creason v. Department of Health Servicesgreen2 sentences1998“Conceptually the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 201-202 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 ]; see also Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 630 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 , 957 P.2d 1323 ] [“Analytically, although the issues are somewhat related, the question of possible statutory liability for breach of a mandatory duty ordinarily 1998“Conceptually the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 201-202 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 ]; see also Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 630 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 , 957 P.2d 1323 ] [“Analytically, although the issues are somewhat related, the question of possible statutory liability for breach of a mandatory duty ordinarily | 1 | 1 |
Torsiello v. Oakland Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences1998“Conceptually the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 201-202 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 ]; see also Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 630 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 , 957 P.2d 1323 ] [“Analytically, although the issues are somewhat related, the question of possible statutory liability for breach of a mandatory duty ordinarily 1998“Conceptually the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 201-202 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 ]; see also Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 630 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 , 957 P.2d 1323 ] [“Analytically, although the issues are somewhat related, the question of possible statutory liability for breach of a mandatory duty ordinarily | 1 | 1 |
Davidson v. City of Westminstergreen2 sentences1998“Conceptually the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 201-202 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 ]; see also Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 630 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 , 957 P.2d 1323 ] [“Analytically, although the issues are somewhat related, the question of possible statutory liability for breach of a mandatory duty ordinarily 1998“Conceptually the question of the applicability of a statutory immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 201-202 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 ]; see also Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 630 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 , 957 P.2d 1323 ] [“Analytically, although the issues are somewhat related, the question of possible statutory liability for breach of a mandatory duty ordinarily | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences1998At the threshold, it must be established that the public entity owed an affirmative duty of care under the circumstances and that there was a statutory basis for liability. "`[I]n California, all government tort liability must be based on statute.'" ( Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 716 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 823 , italics in Rodriguez; Gov.Code, § 815 ["Except as otherwise provided by statute: [¶] [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity...."].) Only if these points are answered in 1998At the threshold, it must be established that the public entity owed an affirmative duty of care under the circumstances and that there was a statutory basis for liability. "`[I]n California, all government tort liability must be based on statute.'" ( Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 716 , 230 Cal.Rptr. 823 , italics in Rodriguez; Gov.Code, § 815 ["Except as otherwise provided by statute: [¶] [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity...."].) Only if these points are answered in | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences1979Code, § 810 et seq.) Under that act, the inquiry would be whether the conduct here alleged involved “basic policy decisions.” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 445 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 , 83 A.L.R.3d 1166 ]; Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 793 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 ].) Before the question of governmental immunity can arise, a more fundamental issue needs first to be faced: Is there any liability for damages under the circumstances before us, in the absence of governmental immunity? 1979Code, § 810 et seq.) Under that act, the inquiry would be whether the conduct here alleged involved “basic policy decisions.” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 445 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 , 83 A.L.R.3d 1166 ]; Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 793 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 ].) Before the question of governmental immunity can arise, a more fundamental issue needs first to be faced: Is there any liability for damages under the circumstances before us, in the absence of governmental immunity? | 1 | 1 |
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Californiared2 sentences1979Code, § 810 et seq.) Under that act, the inquiry would be whether the conduct here alleged involved “basic policy decisions.” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 445 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 , 83 A.L.R.3d 1166 ]; Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 793 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 ].) Before the question of governmental immunity can arise, a more fundamental issue needs first to be faced: Is there any liability for damages under the circumstances before us, in the absence of governmental immunity? 1979Code, § 810 et seq.) Under that act, the inquiry would be whether the conduct here alleged involved “basic policy decisions.” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 445 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 , 83 A.L.R.3d 1166 ]; Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 793 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 ].) Before the question of governmental immunity can arise, a more fundamental issue needs first to be faced: Is there any liability for damages under the circumstances before us, in the absence of governmental immunity? | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Heieck and Moran v. City of Modesto
green
2 sentences1985(See Kisbey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415, 418, fn. 3 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 428 , 682 P.2d 1093 ] [expedience dictates that we discuss only the question of governmental immunity, rather than whether there was a cause of action stated].) Government Code section 850.2 provides: “Neither a public entity that has undertaken to provide fire protection service, nor an employee of such a public entity, is liable for any injury resulting from the failure to provide or maintain sufficient personnel, equipment or other fire protection facilities.” Government Code section 850.4 provides: “Neither 1985(See Kisbey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415, 418, fn. 3 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 428 , 682 P.2d 1093 ] [expedience dictates that we discuss only the question of governmental immunity, rather than whether there was a cause of action stated].) Government Code section 850.2 provides: “Neither a public entity that has undertaken to provide fire protection service, nor an employee of such a public entity, is liable for any injury resulting from the failure to provide or maintain sufficient personnel, equipment or other fire protection facilities.” Government Code section 850.4 provides: “Neither | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Kemp
green
2 sentences1976(People v. Kemp, 150 Cal.App.2d 654 [ 310 P.2d 680 ].) 13 We intimate no opinion as to the possible liability of the driver of the Sledge vehicle. 14 Compare People v. Harris, 52 Cal.App.3d 419, 426-428 , especially footnote 2 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 40 ], wherein it is observed: “In cases such as Kemp where two drivers are racing each other and one of the vehicles collides with a third vehicle, causing death, the culpability of the other driver is clear because each of the two drivers was inciting and encouraging the other to do an unlawful act. [Citations.] While in the case presently before this co 1976(People v. Kemp, 150 Cal.App.2d 654 [ 310 P.2d 680 ].) 13 We intimate no opinion as to the possible liability of the driver of the Sledge vehicle. 14 Compare People v. Harris, 52 Cal.App.3d 419, 426-428 , especially footnote 2 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 40 ], wherein it is observed: “In cases such as Kemp where two drivers are racing each other and one of the vehicles collides with a third vehicle, causing death, the culpability of the other driver is clear because each of the two drivers was inciting and encouraging the other to do an unlawful act. [Citations.] While in the case presently before this co | 1 | 1976–1976 |
People v. Harris
green
2 sentences1976(People v. Kemp, 150 Cal.App.2d 654 [ 310 P.2d 680 ].) 13 We intimate no opinion as to the possible liability of the driver of the Sledge vehicle. 14 Compare People v. Harris, 52 Cal.App.3d 419, 426-428 , especially footnote 2 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 40 ], wherein it is observed: “In cases such as Kemp where two drivers are racing each other and one of the vehicles collides with a third vehicle, causing death, the culpability of the other driver is clear because each of the two drivers was inciting and encouraging the other to do an unlawful act. [Citations.] While in the case presently before this co 1976(People v. Kemp, 150 Cal.App.2d 654 [ 310 P.2d 680 ].) 13 We intimate no opinion as to the possible liability of the driver of the Sledge vehicle. 14 Compare People v. Harris, 52 Cal.App.3d 419, 426-428 , especially footnote 2 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 40 ], wherein it is observed: “In cases such as Kemp where two drivers are racing each other and one of the vehicles collides with a third vehicle, causing death, the culpability of the other driver is clear because each of the two drivers was inciting and encouraging the other to do an unlawful act. [Citations.] While in the case presently before this co | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.