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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
De La Cerda v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2026(De La Cerda v. Superior Court, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 59, fn. 8; People v. Sample, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1259 ; People v. Von Latta, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at pp. 339-340.) The reasoning underlying this exception is that a defendant should be held accountable for each of his or her separate and distinct acts of possession, such as actual and constructive possession of the 21 same type of contraband at different geographic locations. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hansenred2 sentences2003This principle is referred to as the “merger doctrine” (People v. Hansen (1994) 9 Cal.4th 300, 311 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 ] (Hansen)), even though the court in Ireland stated, “Although we are not at this time prepared to say that the limitation which we have above articulated, when applied to fact situations not now before us, will come to assume the exact outlines and proportions of the so-called ‘merger’ doctrine enunciated in ... other jurisdictions, we believe that the reasoning underlying that doctrine is basically sound and should be applied to the extent that it is consis 2003This principle is referred to as the “merger doctrine” (People v. Hansen (1994) 9 Cal.4th 300, 311 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 ] (Hansen)), even though the court in Ireland stated, “Although we are not at this time prepared to say that the limitation which we have above articulated, when applied to fact situations not now before us, will come to assume the exact outlines and proportions of the so-called ‘merger’ doctrine enunciated in ... other jurisdictions, we believe that the reasoning underlying that doctrine is basically sound and should be applied to the extent that it is consis | 1 | 1 |
People v. Garrisongreen2 sentences2003(Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 312; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 509, 517 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ] [error to instruct the jury that it could convict defendant of first degree murder if it found the killing occurred during a burglary in which defendant’s intent was to commit an assault]; People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 778 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 765 P.2d 419 ] [an unlawful entry with the specific intent to commit murder cannot support a felony-murder conviction under the doctrine of merger].) Thus far, there is no authority extending the merger doctrine to enhanc 2003(Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 312; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 509, 517 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ] [error to instruct the jury that it could convict defendant of first degree murder if it found the killing occurred during a burglary in which defendant’s intent was to commit an assault]; People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 778 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 765 P.2d 419 ] [an unlawful entry with the specific intent to commit murder cannot support a felony-murder conviction under the doctrine of merger].) Thus far, there is no authority extending the merger doctrine to enhanc | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sandersgreen2 sentences2003(Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 312; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 509, 517 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ] [error to instruct the jury that it could convict defendant of first degree murder if it found the killing occurred during a burglary in which defendant’s intent was to commit an assault]; People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 778 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 765 P.2d 419 ] [an unlawful entry with the specific intent to commit murder cannot support a felony-murder conviction under the doctrine of merger].) Thus far, there is no authority extending the merger doctrine to enhanc 2003(Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 312; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 509, 517 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ] [error to instruct the jury that it could convict defendant of first degree murder if it found the killing occurred during a burglary in which defendant’s intent was to commit an assault]; People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 778 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 765 P.2d 419 ] [an unlawful entry with the specific intent to commit murder cannot support a felony-murder conviction under the doctrine of merger].) Thus far, there is no authority extending the merger doctrine to enhanc | 1 | 1 |
Lavine v. Jessupgreen2 sentences1998(See Sacks v. Superior Court (1948) 31 Cal.2d 537, 540 [ 190 P.2d 602 ] [“A duly perfected appeal divests the trial court of further jurisdiction in the cause and of power to act other than with respect to specified excepted or collateral matters . . . .”]; Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 931, 937-938 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 ] (Betz); Copley v. Copley (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 248, 298 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 842 ] [“[d]uring the pendency of an appeal, the trial court is without power to hear a motion to vacate [a] judgment from which an appeal has been taken . . . .”].) The Betz court articulated the r 1998(See Sacks v. Superior Court (1948) 31 Cal.2d 537, 540 [ 190 P.2d 602 ] [“A duly perfected appeal divests the trial court of further jurisdiction in the cause and of power to act other than with respect to specified excepted or collateral matters . . . .”]; Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 931, 937-938 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 ] (Betz); Copley v. Copley (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 248, 298 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 842 ] [“[d]uring the pendency of an appeal, the trial court is without power to hear a motion to vacate [a] judgment from which an appeal has been taken . . . .”].) The Betz court articulated the r | 1 | 1 |
Sacks v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1998(See Sacks v. Superior Court (1948) 31 Cal.2d 537, 540 [ 190 P.2d 602 ] [“A duly perfected appeal divests the trial court of further jurisdiction in the cause and of power to act other than with respect to specified excepted or collateral matters . . . .”]; Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 931, 937-938 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 ] (Betz); Copley v. Copley (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 248, 298 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 842 ] [“[d]uring the pendency of an appeal, the trial court is without power to hear a motion to vacate [a] judgment from which an appeal has been taken . . . .”].) The Betz court articulated the r 1998(See Sacks v. Superior Court (1948) 31 Cal.2d 537, 540 [ 190 P.2d 602 ] [“A duly perfected appeal divests the trial court of further jurisdiction in the cause and of power to act other than with respect to specified excepted or collateral matters . . . .”]; Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 931, 937-938 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 ] (Betz); Copley v. Copley (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 248, 298 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 842 ] [“[d]uring the pendency of an appeal, the trial court is without power to hear a motion to vacate [a] judgment from which an appeal has been taken . . . .”].) The Betz court articulated the r | 1 | 1 |
Art Movers, Inc. v. Ni West, Inc.green2 sentences1998Therefore, final judgments, “as ‘developed by the case law’ ” (Efron v. Kalmanovitz (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 149, 154 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]), are appealable, but “[i]t is the substance and effect of the court’s order or judgment and not the label” which determines whether the party can appeal (Art Movers, Inc. v. Ni West, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 640, 645 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 689 ]). 1998Therefore, final judgments, “as ‘developed by the case law’ ” (Efron v. Kalmanovitz (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 149, 154 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]), are appealable, but “[i]t is the substance and effect of the court’s order or judgment and not the label” which determines whether the party can appeal (Art Movers, Inc. v. Ni West, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 640, 645 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 689 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Copley v. Copleygreen2 sentences1998(See Sacks v. Superior Court (1948) 31 Cal.2d 537, 540 [ 190 P.2d 602 ] [“A duly perfected appeal divests the trial court of further jurisdiction in the cause and of power to act other than with respect to specified excepted or collateral matters . . . .”]; Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 931, 937-938 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 ] (Betz); Copley v. Copley (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 248, 298 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 842 ] [“[d]uring the pendency of an appeal, the trial court is without power to hear a motion to vacate [a] judgment from which an appeal has been taken . . . .”].) The Betz court articulated the r 1998(See Sacks v. Superior Court (1948) 31 Cal.2d 537, 540 [ 190 P.2d 602 ] [“A duly perfected appeal divests the trial court of further jurisdiction in the cause and of power to act other than with respect to specified excepted or collateral matters . . . .”]; Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 931, 937-938 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 ] (Betz); Copley v. Copley (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 248, 298 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 842 ] [“[d]uring the pendency of an appeal, the trial court is without power to hear a motion to vacate [a] judgment from which an appeal has been taken . . . .”].) The Betz court articulated the r | 1 | 1 |
Betz v. Pankowgreen2 sentences1998(See Sacks v. Superior Court (1948) 31 Cal.2d 537, 540 [ 190 P.2d 602 ] [“A duly perfected appeal divests the trial court of further jurisdiction in the cause and of power to act other than with respect to specified excepted or collateral matters . . . .”]; Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 931, 937-938 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 ] (Betz); Copley v. Copley (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 248, 298 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 842 ] [“[d]uring the pendency of an appeal, the trial court is without power to hear a motion to vacate [a] judgment from which an appeal has been taken . . . .”].) The Betz court articulated the r 1998(See Sacks v. Superior Court (1948) 31 Cal.2d 537, 540 [ 190 P.2d 602 ] [“A duly perfected appeal divests the trial court of further jurisdiction in the cause and of power to act other than with respect to specified excepted or collateral matters . . . .”]; Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 931, 937-938 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 ] (Betz); Copley v. Copley (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 248, 298 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 842 ] [“[d]uring the pendency of an appeal, the trial court is without power to hear a motion to vacate [a] judgment from which an appeal has been taken . . . .”].) The Betz court articulated the r | 1 | 1 |
Efron v. Kalmanovitzgreen2 sentences1998Therefore, final judgments, “as ‘developed by the case law’ ” (Efron v. Kalmanovitz (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 149, 154 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]), are appealable, but “[i]t is the substance and effect of the court’s order or judgment and not the label” which determines whether the party can appeal (Art Movers, Inc. v. Ni West, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 640, 645 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 689 ]). 1998Therefore, final judgments, “as ‘developed by the case law’ ” (Efron v. Kalmanovitz (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 149, 154 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 107 ]), are appealable, but “[i]t is the substance and effect of the court’s order or judgment and not the label” which determines whether the party can appeal (Art Movers, Inc. v. Ni West, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 640, 645 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 689 ]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Talbotred2 sentences1969Finally, we note that two decisions of this court dealing with the related question of first degree felony murder have indicated that the limitation recognized in New York is not to be applied in this jurisdiction to preclude a first degree felony-murder instruction based upon a burglary as to which the intended felony is the homicide itself or an offense included therein. ( People v. Hamilton, supra, 55 Cal.2d 881, 901 ; People v. Talbot (1966) 64 Cal.2d 691, 703 [ 51 Cal. Rptr. 417 , 414 P.2d 633 ].) Although we express no present opinion upon the question specifically considered in those ca 1969Finally, we note that two decisions of this court dealing with the related question of first degree felony murder have indicated that the limitation recognized in New York is not to be applied in this jurisdiction to preclude a first degree felony-murder instruction based upon a burglary as to which the intended felony is the homicide itself or an offense included therein. ( People v. Hamilton, supra, 55 Cal.2d 881, 901 ; People v. Talbot (1966) 64 Cal.2d 691, 703 [ 51 Cal. Rptr. 417 , 414 P.2d 633 ].) Although we express no present opinion upon the question specifically considered in those ca | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sample
green
1 sentence2026(De La Cerda v. Superior Court, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 59, fn. 8; People v. Sample, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1259 ; People v. Von Latta, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at pp. 339-340.) The reasoning underlying this exception is that a defendant should be held accountable for each of his or her separate and distinct acts of possession, such as actual and constructive possession of the 21 same type of contraband at different geographic locations. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Von Latta
green
1 sentence2026(De La Cerda v. Superior Court, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 59, fn. 8; People v. Sample, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1259 ; People v. Von Latta, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at pp. 339-340.) The reasoning underlying this exception is that a defendant should be held accountable for each of his or her separate and distinct acts of possession, such as actual and constructive possession of the 21 same type of contraband at different geographic locations. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Ireland
green
2 sentences1970We therefore hold that a second degree felony-murder instruction may not properly be given when it is based upon a felony which is an integral part of the homicide and which the evidence produced by the prosecution shows to be an offense included in fact within the offense charged.” (Footnote omitted.) ( 70 Cal.2d at p. 539 .) We also pointed out that other jurisdictions, through a so-called “merger” doctrine, had applied similar limitations on the felony-murder doctrine and that, although it was not clear whether we would adopt the entire doctrine, “we believe that the reasoning underlying th 1970We therefore hold that a second degree felony-murder instruction may not properly be given when it is based upon a felony which is an integral part of the homicide and which the evidence produced by the prosecution shows to be an offense included in fact within the offense charged.” (Footnote omitted.) ( 70 Cal.2d at p. 539 .) We also pointed out that other jurisdictions, through a so-called “merger” doctrine, had applied similar limitations on the felony-murder doctrine and that, although it was not clear whether we would adopt the entire doctrine, “we believe that the reasoning underlying th | 1 | 1970–1970 |
People v. Wilson
red
2 sentences1970We therefore hold that a second degree felony-murder instruction may not properly be given when it is based upon a felony which is an integral part of the homicide and which the evidence produced by the prosecution shows to be an offense included in fact within the offense charged.” (Footnote omitted.) ( 70 Cal.2d at p. 539 .) We also pointed out that other jurisdictions, through a so-called “merger” doctrine, had applied similar limitations on the felony-murder doctrine and that, although it was not clear whether we would adopt the entire doctrine, “we believe that the reasoning underlying th 1970We therefore hold that a second degree felony-murder instruction may not properly be given when it is based upon a felony which is an integral part of the homicide and which the evidence produced by the prosecution shows to be an offense included in fact within the offense charged.” (Footnote omitted.) ( 70 Cal.2d at p. 539 .) We also pointed out that other jurisdictions, through a so-called “merger” doctrine, had applied similar limitations on the felony-murder doctrine and that, although it was not clear whether we would adopt the entire doctrine, “we believe that the reasoning underlying th | 1 | 1970–1970 |
State v. Essman
green
2 sentences1969(See People v. Moran (1927) 246 N.Y. 100 [ 158 N.E. 35 ]; People v. Wagner (1927) 245 N.Y. 143 [ 156 N.E. 644 ]; People v. Hüter (1906) 184 N.Y. 237 [ 77 N.E. 6 ]; State v. Branch (1966) 244 Ore. 97 [ 415 P.2d 766 ]; State v. Essman (1965) 98 Ariz. 228 [ 403 P.2d 540 ]; State v. Severns (1944) 158 Kan. 453 [ 148 P.2d 488 ].) Although we are not at this time prepared to say that the limitation which we have above articulated, when applied to fact situations not now before us, will come to assume the exact outlines and proportions of the so-called “merger” doetrine enunciated in these other juri 1969(See People v. Moran (1927) 246 N.Y. 100 [ 158 N.E. 35 ]; People v. Wagner (1927) 245 N.Y. 143 [ 156 N.E. 644 ]; People v. Hüter (1906) 184 N.Y. 237 [ 77 N.E. 6 ]; State v. Branch (1966) 244 Ore. 97 [ 415 P.2d 766 ]; State v. Essman (1965) 98 Ariz. 228 [ 403 P.2d 540 ]; State v. Severns (1944) 158 Kan. 453 [ 148 P.2d 488 ].) Although we are not at this time prepared to say that the limitation which we have above articulated, when applied to fact situations not now before us, will come to assume the exact outlines and proportions of the so-called “merger” doetrine enunciated in these other juri | 1 | 1969–1969 |
State v. Severns
green
2 sentences1969(See People v. Moran (1927) 246 N.Y. 100 [ 158 N.E. 35 ]; People v. Wagner (1927) 245 N.Y. 143 [ 156 N.E. 644 ]; People v. Hüter (1906) 184 N.Y. 237 [ 77 N.E. 6 ]; State v. Branch (1966) 244 Ore. 97 [ 415 P.2d 766 ]; State v. Essman (1965) 98 Ariz. 228 [ 403 P.2d 540 ]; State v. Severns (1944) 158 Kan. 453 [ 148 P.2d 488 ].) Although we are not at this time prepared to say that the limitation which we have above articulated, when applied to fact situations not now before us, will come to assume the exact outlines and proportions of the so-called “merger” doetrine enunciated in these other juri 1969(See People v. Moran (1927) 246 N.Y. 100 [ 158 N.E. 35 ]; People v. Wagner (1927) 245 N.Y. 143 [ 156 N.E. 644 ]; People v. Hüter (1906) 184 N.Y. 237 [ 77 N.E. 6 ]; State v. Branch (1966) 244 Ore. 97 [ 415 P.2d 766 ]; State v. Essman (1965) 98 Ariz. 228 [ 403 P.2d 540 ]; State v. Severns (1944) 158 Kan. 453 [ 148 P.2d 488 ].) Although we are not at this time prepared to say that the limitation which we have above articulated, when applied to fact situations not now before us, will come to assume the exact outlines and proportions of the so-called “merger” doetrine enunciated in these other juri | 1 | 1969–1969 |
State v. Amos Branch
green
2 sentences1969(See People v. Moran (1927) 246 N.Y. 100 [ 158 N.E. 35 ]; People v. Wagner (1927) 245 N.Y. 143 [ 156 N.E. 644 ]; People v. Hüter (1906) 184 N.Y. 237 [ 77 N.E. 6 ]; State v. Branch (1966) 244 Ore. 97 [ 415 P.2d 766 ]; State v. Essman (1965) 98 Ariz. 228 [ 403 P.2d 540 ]; State v. Severns (1944) 158 Kan. 453 [ 148 P.2d 488 ].) Although we are not at this time prepared to say that the limitation which we have above articulated, when applied to fact situations not now before us, will come to assume the exact outlines and proportions of the so-called “merger” doetrine enunciated in these other juri 1969(See People v. Moran (1927) 246 N.Y. 100 [ 158 N.E. 35 ]; People v. Wagner (1927) 245 N.Y. 143 [ 156 N.E. 644 ]; People v. Hüter (1906) 184 N.Y. 237 [ 77 N.E. 6 ]; State v. Branch (1966) 244 Ore. 97 [ 415 P.2d 766 ]; State v. Essman (1965) 98 Ariz. 228 [ 403 P.2d 540 ]; State v. Severns (1944) 158 Kan. 453 [ 148 P.2d 488 ].) Although we are not at this time prepared to say that the limitation which we have above articulated, when applied to fact situations not now before us, will come to assume the exact outlines and proportions of the so-called “merger” doetrine enunciated in these other juri | 1 | 1969–1969 |
People v. Hamilton
red
1 sentence1969Finally, we note that two decisions of this court dealing with the related question of first degree felony murder have indicated that the limitation recognized in New York is not to be applied in this jurisdiction to preclude a first degree felony-murder instruction based upon a burglary as to which the intended felony is the homicide itself or an offense included therein. ( People v. Hamilton, supra, 55 Cal.2d 881, 901 ; People v. Talbot (1966) 64 Cal.2d 691, 703 [ 51 Cal. Rptr. 417 , 414 P.2d 633 ].) Although we express no present opinion upon the question specifically considered in those ca | 1 | 1969–1969 |
People v. . Huter
green
2 sentences1969(See People v. Moran (1927) 246 N.Y. 100 [ 158 N.E. 35 ]; People v. Wagner (1927) 245 N.Y. 143 [ 156 N.E. 644 ]; People v. Hüter (1906) 184 N.Y. 237 [ 77 N.E. 6 ]; State v. Branch (1966) 244 Ore. 97 [ 415 P.2d 766 ]; State v. Essman (1965) 98 Ariz. 228 [ 403 P.2d 540 ]; State v. Severns (1944) 158 Kan. 453 [ 148 P.2d 488 ].) Although we are not at this time prepared to say that the limitation which we have above articulated, when applied to fact situations not now before us, will come to assume the exact outlines and proportions of the so-called “merger” doetrine enunciated in these other juri 1969(See People v. Moran (1927) 246 N.Y. 100 [ 158 N.E. 35 ]; People v. Wagner (1927) 245 N.Y. 143 [ 156 N.E. 644 ]; People v. Hüter (1906) 184 N.Y. 237 [ 77 N.E. 6 ]; State v. Branch (1966) 244 Ore. 97 [ 415 P.2d 766 ]; State v. Essman (1965) 98 Ariz. 228 [ 403 P.2d 540 ]; State v. Severns (1944) 158 Kan. 453 [ 148 P.2d 488 ].) Although we are not at this time prepared to say that the limitation which we have above articulated, when applied to fact situations not now before us, will come to assume the exact outlines and proportions of the so-called “merger” doetrine enunciated in these other juri | 1 | 1969–1969 |
People v. Moran
green
2 sentences1969(See People v. Moran (1927) 246 N.Y. 100 [ 158 N.E. 35 ]; People v. Wagner (1927) 245 N.Y. 143 [ 156 N.E. 644 ]; People v. Hüter (1906) 184 N.Y. 237 [ 77 N.E. 6 ]; State v. Branch (1966) 244 Ore. 97 [ 415 P.2d 766 ]; State v. Essman (1965) 98 Ariz. 228 [ 403 P.2d 540 ]; State v. Severns (1944) 158 Kan. 453 [ 148 P.2d 488 ].) Although we are not at this time prepared to say that the limitation which we have above articulated, when applied to fact situations not now before us, will come to assume the exact outlines and proportions of the so-called “merger” doetrine enunciated in these other juri 1969(See People v. Moran (1927) 246 N.Y. 100 [ 158 N.E. 35 ]; People v. Wagner (1927) 245 N.Y. 143 [ 156 N.E. 644 ]; People v. Hüter (1906) 184 N.Y. 237 [ 77 N.E. 6 ]; State v. Branch (1966) 244 Ore. 97 [ 415 P.2d 766 ]; State v. Essman (1965) 98 Ariz. 228 [ 403 P.2d 540 ]; State v. Severns (1944) 158 Kan. 453 [ 148 P.2d 488 ].) Although we are not at this time prepared to say that the limitation which we have above articulated, when applied to fact situations not now before us, will come to assume the exact outlines and proportions of the so-called “merger” doetrine enunciated in these other juri | 1 | 1969–1969 |
People v. Wagner
green
2 sentences1969(See People v. Moran (1927) 246 N.Y. 100 [ 158 N.E. 35 ]; People v. Wagner (1927) 245 N.Y. 143 [ 156 N.E. 644 ]; People v. Hüter (1906) 184 N.Y. 237 [ 77 N.E. 6 ]; State v. Branch (1966) 244 Ore. 97 [ 415 P.2d 766 ]; State v. Essman (1965) 98 Ariz. 228 [ 403 P.2d 540 ]; State v. Severns (1944) 158 Kan. 453 [ 148 P.2d 488 ].) Although we are not at this time prepared to say that the limitation which we have above articulated, when applied to fact situations not now before us, will come to assume the exact outlines and proportions of the so-called “merger” doetrine enunciated in these other juri 1969(See People v. Moran (1927) 246 N.Y. 100 [ 158 N.E. 35 ]; People v. Wagner (1927) 245 N.Y. 143 [ 156 N.E. 644 ]; People v. Hüter (1906) 184 N.Y. 237 [ 77 N.E. 6 ]; State v. Branch (1966) 244 Ore. 97 [ 415 P.2d 766 ]; State v. Essman (1965) 98 Ariz. 228 [ 403 P.2d 540 ]; State v. Severns (1944) 158 Kan. 453 [ 148 P.2d 488 ].) Although we are not at this time prepared to say that the limitation which we have above articulated, when applied to fact situations not now before us, will come to assume the exact outlines and proportions of the so-called “merger” doetrine enunciated in these other juri | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Rogers v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1961The court held (p. 550) that, “Assuming the arrest unlawful, the statements, if voluntary, were admissible.” The reasoning underlying this rule is found in Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 3 , at pages 10 and 11 [ 291 P.2d 929 ], There the court pointed out, among other things, that a voluntary admission is not a necessary product of an illegal detention. 1961The court held (p. 550) that, “Assuming the arrest unlawful, the statements, if voluntary, were admissible.” The reasoning underlying this rule is found in Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 3 , at pages 10 and 11 [ 291 P.2d 929 ], There the court pointed out, among other things, that a voluntary admission is not a necessary product of an illegal detention. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.